The DOI matches its Crossref record; 1 of the 1 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Performance Measure Properties and Delegation
Abstract
In this paper, I extend the organizational design literature by examining how the delegation choice is affected by the ability to resolve the incentive problem caused by this delegation. Based on the seminal papers by Grossman and Hart (1986) and Holmstrom and Milgrom (1994), I argue that the ability to resolve the incentive problem depends on the contractibility of financial performance measures versus nonfinancial performance measures, where the contractibility depends on the performance measure properties sensitivity, precision, and verifiability. The empirical results show that, if financial performance measures are “good” (“poor”) incentive measures, i.e., high (low) on sensitivity, precision, and verifiability, then using these measures for incentive purposes increases (decreases) delegation. Overall, the results are consistent with the argument that firms design their decision-making process around the quality of contractible performance measures.
Overview
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
The self-check needs the paper’s full text.
Citations
Cites
Bound, J., Jaeger, D. A., & Baker, R. M. (1995) · Journal of the American Statistical Association · doi:10.2307/2291055 · Cited by 1,018
Cited by
Management control effectiveness and strategy: An empirical analysis of packages and systems
Bedford, D. S., Malmi, T., & Sandelin, M. (2016) · Accounting, Organizations and Society · doi:10.1016/j.aos.2016.04.002 · Cited by 328
Chenhall, R. H., & Moers, F. (2015) · Accounting, Organizations and Society · doi:10.1016/j.aos.2015.10.002 · Cited by 309
Self-citation
Metadata
- Authors
- Moers, F.
- Venue
- The Accounting Review
- Publisher
- American Accounting Association
- Published
- 2006-07
- Volume
- 81
- Issue
- 4
- Pages
- 897-924
- ISSN
- 0001-4826 (ISSN-L)
- 1558-7967
- OpenAlex
- W2115503832
- Cited by
- 212
- References
- 1
- FWCI
- 20.75
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.