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Executive Absolutism: The Dynamics of Authority Acquisition in a System of Separated Powers
Open accessAbstract
We study a dynamic model in which a politician (most commonly an executive) makes authority claims that are subject to a hard constraint (administered, typically, by a court). At any period, the court is free to rule against the executive and thereby permanently halt her efforts to acquire more power. Because it appropriately cares about the executive’s ability to address real-world disruptions, however, the court is always willing to affirm more authority. Neither robust electoral competition nor alternative characterizations of judicial decision-making fundamentally alters this state of affairs. Moreover, we show modest authority claims in one period yield opportunities for more substantial claims in the next. The result is an often persistent accumulation of executive authority and a degradation of judicial checks on presidential power.
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Courts may not check a potentially autocratic executive because they worry that doing so will establish a precedent that could later limit the executive during a crisis, establishing a problematic future baseline.
“Howell et al. (2023) show that courts may not check a potentially autocratic executive because they worry that doing so will establish a precedent that could later limit the executive during a crisis, establishing a problematic future baseline.”
From How to study democratic backsliding (2024) · cites this paper as Howell et al., 2023
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Metadata
- Authors
- Howell, W. G., Shepsle, K. A., & Wolton, S.
- Affiliations
- University of Chicago (US)
- Harvard University (US)
- Centre for Economic Policy Research (GB)
- Venue
- Quarterly Journal of Political Science
- Publisher
- Emerald
- Published
- 2023-04-11
- Volume
- 18
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 243-275
- ISSN
- 1554-0626 (ISSN-L)
- 1554-0634
- OpenAlex
- W4319318348
- Cited by
- 22
- References
- 63
- Citations by year
- 2026: 3 · 2025: 1 · 2024: 5 · 2023: 5
- FWCI
- 25.13
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
- doi.org
- Locations
- Quarterly Journal of Political Science (publishedVersion)
- SSRN Electronic Journal (acceptedVersion)
- Munich Personal RePEc Archive (Ludwig Maximilian University of Munich) (acceptedVersion)
- RePEc: Research Papers in Economics (submittedVersion)
- London School of Economics and Political Science Research Online (London School of Economics and Political Science) (submittedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Law › Judicial and Constitutional Studies
- Social Sciences › Political Science and International Relations › American Constitutional Law and Politics
- Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Game Theory and Voting Systems
- Keywords
- presidential power, separation of powers, judicial review, judicial decision-making, electoral competition
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