Homo Socialis : An Analytical Core for Sociological Theory
Open accessAbstract
We develop an analytical core for sociology. We follow standard dynamical systems theory by first specifying the conditions for social equilibrium, and then studying the dynamical principles that govern disequilibrium behavior. Our general social equilibrium model is an expansion of the general equilibrium model of economic theory, and our dynamical principles treat the society as a complex adaptive system that can be studied using evolutionary game theory and agent-based Markov models based on variants of the replicator dynamic.
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The same holds for the models elaborated by Gintis and Helbing.
“The same holds for the models elaborated by Gintis and Helbing (2015: 21-22).”
From Durkheim, Indoctrinability and the Moral Ambivalence of Human Sociality (2026) · cites this paper as Gintis & Helbing, 2015
These studies did not simultaneously combine the effect of violent intergroup conflict or competition with more or less efficient cultural transmission.
“These studies did not simultaneously combine the effect of violent intergroup conflict or competition with more or less efficient cultural transmission.”
From Durkheim, Indoctrinability and the Moral Ambivalence of Human Sociality (2026) · cites this paper as Gintis & Helbing, 2015
Cites
The Bayesian brain: The role of uncertainty in neural coding and computation
Knill, D. C., & Pouget, A. (2004) · Trends in Neurosciences · doi:10.1016/j.tins.2004.10.007 · Cited by 2,588 · see citing works
Young, H. P. (1993) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/2951778 · Cited by 2,399 · see citing works
The neural basis of human moral cognition
Moll, J., Zahn, R., de Oliveira-Souza, R., Krueger, F., & Grafman, J. (2005) · Nature Reviews Neuroscience · doi:10.1038/nrn1768 · Cited by 930 · see citing works
Preference Reversals Due to Myopic Discounting of Delayed Reward
Kirby, K. N., & Herrnstein, R. J. (1995) · Psychological Science · doi:10.1111/j.1467-9280.1995.tb00311.x · Cited by 591 · see citing works
Book Review: Two Phylogenetic Specializations in the Human Brain
Allman, J., Hakeem, A., & Watson, K. (2002) · The Neuroscientist · doi:10.1177/107385840200800409 · Cited by 178 · see citing works
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Zoon politikon: The evolutionary origins of human socio-political systems
Gintis, H., van Schaik, C., & Boehm, C. (2019) · Behavioural Processes · doi:10.1016/j.beproc.2018.01.007 · Cited by 53 · see citing works
Self-citationDurkheim, Indoctrinability and the Moral Ambivalence of Human Sociality
Windzio, M. (2026) · Human Nature · doi:10.1007/s12110-026-09531-2
- Authors
- Gintis, H., & Helbing, D.
- Affiliations
- Santa Fe Institute (US)
- ETH Zurich (CH)
- Corresponding author
- Gintis, Herbert
- ORCID
- Helbing, Dirk
- Venue
- Review of Behavioral Economics
- Publisher
- Emerald
- Published
- 2015-07-29
- Volume
- 2
- Issue
- 1-2
- Pages
- 1-59
- ISSN
- 2326-6198 (ISSN-L)
- 2326-6201
- OpenAlex
- W3122141548
- Cited by
- 61
- References
- 5
- Citations by year
- 2026: 1 · 2025: 2 · 2024: 3 · 2023: 2 · 2022: 3 · 2021: 6 · 2020: 12 · 2019: 8 · 2018: 9 · 2017: 6 · 2016: 7 · 2015: 1 · 2014: 1
- FWCI
- 25.43
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- hybrid
- doi.org
- Locations
- Review of Behavioral Economics (publishedVersion, cc-by)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Evolutionary Game Theory and Cooperation
- Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Economic Theory and Institutions
- Physical Sciences › Physics and Astronomy › Statistical and Nonlinear Physics › Complex Systems and Dynamics
- Keywords
- social equilibrium, disequilibrium dynamics, dynamical systems theory, general equilibrium model, complex adaptive systems, evolutionary game theory, replicator dynamics, sociological theory
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