The DOI matches its Crossref record; 89 of the 89 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Beyond the Washington consensus: Institutions matter
Abstract
This report examines the precise nature of the required institutional reforms needed to achieve higher sustained rates of growth and to make a dent in poverty reduction and provides a framework for their design and implementation. The more modest objective is to examine how the concepts of the new institutional economics are useful for analyzing and designing institutions and to evaluate how political economy concepts can be used to develop strategies for implementing institutional reforms. Employing some of these concepts, the report demonstrates that sound institutional reform can be technically and politically viable in the following key sectors: banking; capital markets and legal institutions; educational institutions; judicial reforms; and public administration.
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Citations
Cites
Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure
Jensen, M. C., & Meckling, W. H. (1976) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/0304-405x(76)90026-x · Cited by 71,491
Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance
Munger, M. C., & North, D. C. (1991) · Southern Economic Journal · doi:10.2307/1060065 · Cited by 24,871
Coase, R. H. (1937) · Economica · doi:10.1111/j.1468-0335.1937.tb00002.x · Cited by 23,972
The Market for "Lemons": Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism
Akerlof, G. A. (1970) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/1879431 · Cited by 23,016
Making democracy work: civic traditions in modern Italy
(1993) · Choice Reviews Online · doi:10.5860/choice.30-6408 · Cited by 14,307
Credit Rationing in Markets with Imperfect Information
Stiglitz, J. E., & Weiss, A. (1981) · Columbia University · doi:10.7916/d8v12ft1 · Cited by 12,769
The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups.
Sufrin, S. C., & Olson, M. (1966) · Industrial and Labor Relations Review · doi:10.2307/2521228 · Cited by 11,518
Exit, Voice and Loyalty: Responses to Decline in Firms, Organizations, and States.
Tullock, G., & Hirschman, A. O. (1970) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.2307/2325604 · Cited by 10,904
Legal Determinants of External Finance
LA PORTA, R., LOPEZ‐DE‐SILANES, F., SHLEIFER, A., & VISHNY, R. W. (1997) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/j.1540-6261.1997.tb02727.x · Cited by 9,783
The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration
Grossman, S. J., & Hart, O. D. (1986) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/261404 · Cited by 9,352
Cited by
Political Connections and Corporate Bailouts
FACCIO, M., MASULIS, R. W., & McCONNELL, J. J. (2006) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/j.1540-6261.2006.01000.x · Cited by 2,561
Seize the State, Seize the Day: State Capture, Corruption, and Influence in Transition
Hellman, J. S., Jones, G., & Kaufmann, D. (2000) · World Bank, Washington, DC eBooks · doi:10.1596/1813-9450-2444 · Cited by 759
In Search of Prosperity: Analytic Narratives on Economic Growth
(2003) · Princeton University Press eBooks · doi:10.1515/9781400845897 · Cited by 689
ACCOUNTABILITY AND CORRUPTION: POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS MATTER
Lederman, D., Loayza, N. V., & Soares, R. R. (2005) · Economics and Politics · doi:10.1111/j.1468-0343.2005.00145.x · Cited by 617
The Illusion of Sustainability
Kremer, M., & Miguel, E. (2007) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.1162/qjec.122.3.1007 · Cited by 544
Metadata
- Authors
- Burki, S. J., & Perry, G. E.
- Venue
- World Bank, Washington, DC eBooks
- Publisher
- The World Bank
- Published
- 1998-09-30
- OpenAlex
- W1536540528
- Cited by
- 323
- References
- 89
- FWCI
- 38.27
- Type
- book
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.