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Expropriation of Minority Shareholders: Evidence from East Asia

Lang, P. H. Larry, Fan, Joseph P. H., Claessens, Stijn, Djankov, Simeon·1999·Policy Research Working Papers

Abstract

No AccessPolicy Research Working Papers21 Jun 2013Expropriation of Minority Shareholders: Evidence from East AsiaAuthors/Editors: P. H. Larry Lang, Joseph P. H. Fan, Stijn Claessens, Simeon DjankovP. H. Larry Lang, Joseph P. H. Fan, Stijn Claessens, Simeon Djankovhttps://doi.org/10.1596/1813-9450-2088SectionsAboutPDF (0.1 MB) ToolsAdd to favoritesDownload CitationsTrack Citations ShareFacebookTwitterLinked In Abstract:March 1999 In nine East Asian countries, higher cash-flow rights are associated with a higher market valuation and higher control rights with a lower valuation, especially when cash-flow rights are low and control rights are high. This suggests the expropriation of minority shareholders by controlling shareholders. The risk of expropriation is the chief principal-agent problem for large publicly traded corporations. As many East Asian countries plunged into economic decline, the structure of concentrated ownership and associated corporate governance, along with weak corporate performance, have been blamed for the crisis. There is little empirical evidence, however, of the nature of ownership structures in East Asia and their relationship to corporate performance in the typical East Asian environment (where inefficient judicial systems, and weak property and shareholder rights are common). Claessens, Djankov, Fan, and Lang examine evidence of the expropriation of minority shareholders for 2,658 corporations in nine East Asian countries in 1996. They distinguish control from cash-flow rights. They also distinguish between various types of ultimate owners, including family, state, widely held corporations, and widely held financial institutions. Higher cash-flow rights are associated with higher market values, consistent with Jensen and Meckling (1976). In contrast, deviations of control from cash-flow rights-through the use of dual-class shares, pyramiding, and cross-holdings-are associated with lower market values. This is especially true for corporations under family control and, in Japan, under the control of widely held financial institutions. They conclude that the risk of expropriation is the major principal-agent problem for large corporations, as suggested by La Porta and colleagues (1999). The degree to which certain ownership structures are associated with expropriation depends on country-specific circumstances. These may include the quality of banking systems, the legal and judicial protection of individual shareholders, and the degree of financial disclosure required. This paper-a product of the Financial Economics Unit, Financial Operations Vice Presidency-is part of a larger effort in the vice presidency to study corporate performance patterns in East Asia. Previous bookNext book FiguresReferencesRecommendedDetailsCited ByCONCOMITANT OF INSIDE-SHAREHOLDING, GROUP AFFILIATION AND FIRM VALUE: EVIDENCE FROM PAKISTANBusiness: Theory and Practice, Vol.22, No.1The clustering analysis of corporate ownership and control contestability based on Shapley valueCluster Computing, Vol.20, No.31 April 2017The relationship between corporate governance mechanisms and the performance of Saudi listed firmsCorporate Ownership and Control, Vol.14, No.217 March 2017Is agency theory dominant in explaining the board roles of Malaysian listed firms?Corporate Ownership and Control, Vol.13, No.31 January 2016Corporate governance mechanisms and the performance of Malaysian listed firmsCorporate Ownership and Control, Vol.14, No.128 October 2016Agency conflicts and choice of specialist audit firms and audit partners: Signaling or substantial monitoring?Corporate Ownership and Control, Vol.10, No.31 January 2013Herding in the Foreign Exchange MarketSSRN Electronic JournalDoes CEO duality is really matter? 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Evidence from Malaysian equity marketCorporate Owne

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Authors
Lang, P. H. L., Fan, J. P. H., Claessens, S., & Djankov, S.
Venue
Policy Research Working Papers
Published
1999-11-30
ISSN
1813-9450 (ISSN-L)
OpenAlex
W1866647725
Cited by
182
References
2
Type
report
Language
en
Open access
closed

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Lang, P. H. L., Fan, J. P. H., Claessens, S., & Djankov, S. (1999). Expropriation of Minority Shareholders: Evidence from East Asia. Policy Research Working Papers. https://doi.org/10.1596/1813-9450-2088

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