Further Experimental Evidence against the Utility of Occam's Razor
Open accessThe DOI matches its Crossref record; 3 of the 3 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
This paper presents new experimental evidence against the utility of Occam's razor. A~systematic procedure is presented for post-processing decision trees produced by C4.5. This procedure was derived by rejecting Occam's razor and instead attending to the assumption that similar objects are likely to belong to the same class. It increases a decision tree's complexity without altering the performance of that tree on the training data from which it is inferred. The resulting more complex decision trees are demonstrated to have, on average, for a variety of common learning tasks, higher predictive accuracy than the less complex original decision trees. This result raises considerable doubt about the utility of Occam's razor as it is commonly applied in modern machine learning.
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Citations
Cites
Learning Logical Definitions from Relations
Quinlan, J. R. (1990) · Machine Learning · doi:10.1023/a:1022699322624 · Cited by 1,644
Blumer, A., Ehrenfeucht, A., Haussler, D., & Warmuth, M. K. (1987) · Information Processing Letters · doi:10.1016/0020-0190(87)90114-1 · Cited by 1,054
Schaffer, C. (1993) · Machine Learning · doi:10.1023/a:1022653209073 · Cited by 310
Cited by
The Role of Occam's Razor in Knowledge Discovery
Domingos, P. (1999) · Data Mining and Knowledge Discovery · doi:10.1023/a:1009868929893 · Cited by 459
Fürnkranz, J., Gamberger, D., & Lavrač, N. (2012) · Cognitive Technologies · doi:10.1007/978-3-540-75197-7 · Cited by 428
Simplifying decision trees: A survey
BRESLOW, L. A., & AHA, D. W. (1997) · The Knowledge Engineering Review · doi:10.1017/s0269888997000015 · Cited by 337
A tutorial introduction to the minimum description length principle
Grunwald, P. (2004) · arXiv · doi:10.48550/arxiv.math/0406077 · Cited by 293
Metadata
- Authors
- Webb, G. I.
- Venue
- Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research
- Publisher
- AI Access Foundation
- Published
- 1996-06-01
- Volume
- 4
- Pages
- 397-417
- ISSN
- 1076-9757 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W1731670240
- Cited by
- 110
- References
- 3
- FWCI
- 18.98
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- diamond
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