Experts & AI systems, explanation & trust: A comparative investigation into the formation of epistemically justified belief in expert testimony and in the outputs of AI-enabled expert systems
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Abstract
The relationship between human experts and those that seek their advice (novices), and between AI-enabled expert systems and users, are epistemically imbalanced relationships. An epistemically imbalanced relationship is one in which the information source (expert/AI) occupies an epistemically privileged position relative to the novice/user; she/it can utilize capacities, resources, and reasoning techniques to draw conclusions that the novice/user would be unable to access, reproduce, or in some cases, comprehend on her own. The interesting and problematic thing about epistemically imbalanced relationships is that when the epistemically disadvantaged party seeks out expert/AI aid, then in virtue of the novice’s epistemically disadvantaged position, she is not well-equipped to independently confirm the expert/AI’s response. Consider for example, a physician who outlines a cancer treatment regime to a patient. If the physician were then to try to explain to the patient how she decided on that specific regime (including drug doses, timings, etc.) it is not clear how the explanation would help the patient justify her belief in the physician’s claims. If an expert outlines her reasoning in such detail that it provides strong evidence in support of her claim – for instance, such that a series of true premises logically leads to a conclusion – then the novice is unlikely to have the expertise necessary to recognize the evidence as supporting the claim. Accordingly, the question stands, how can the novice, while remaining a novice, acquire justification for her belief in an expert claim? A similar question can be asked of user-AI interactions: How can an AI user, without becoming an expert in the domain in which the AI system is applied, justify her belief in AI outputs? If an answer can be provided in the expert-novice case, then it would seem that we are at least on our way to acquiring an answer for the AI-user case. This dissertation serves a dual purpose as it responds to the above questions. The primary purpose is as an investigation into how AI users can acquire a degree of justification for their belief in AI outputs. I pursue this objective by using the epistemically imbalanced novice-expert relationship as a model to help identify key challenges to user appraisal of AI systems. In so doing, the primary objective is achieved while pursuing the dissertation’s secondary purpose of addressing standing questions about the justification of novice belief in human expert claims. The discussions that follow are framed against an overarching conceptual concern about preserving epistemic security in technologically advanced societies. As my colleagues and I have defined it (Seger et al., 2020), an epistemically secure society is one in which information recipients can reliably identify true information or epistemically trustworthy information sources (human or technological). An investigation into how novices and users might make epistemically well-informed decisions about believing experts and AI systems is therefore an investigation into how we might address challenges to epistemic security posed by epistemically imbalanced relationships.
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“both the relationship between EAs and subjects and the relationship between AI systems and their users are 'epistemically imbalanced relationships' (Seger 2022).”
From Artificial Epistemic Authorities (2025) · cites this paper as Seger 2022
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Artificial Epistemic Authorities
Hauswald, R. (2025) · Social Epistemology · doi:10.1080/02691728.2025.2449602 · Cited by 46
AI and the Philosophy of Expertise and Epistemic Authority
Hauswald, R. (2025) · A Companion to Applied Philosophy of AI · doi:10.1002/9781394238651.ch5 · Cited by 5
Metadata
- Authors
- Seger, E.
- ORCID
- Seger, Elizabeth
- Venue
- Apollo - University of Cambridge Repository
- Publisher
- Apollo - University of Cambridge Repository
- Published
- 2022-05-01
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- Seger, E. (2022). Experts & AI systems, explanation & trust: A comparative investigation into the formation of epistemically justified belief in expert testimony and in the outputs of AI-enabled expert systems. Apollo - University of Cambridge Repository. https://doi.org/10.17863/cam.90175
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