Cited by 40Adversarial Robustness in Machine LearningSecurity and Verification in ComputingTopic Modeling

SafeDecoding: Defending against Jailbreak Attacks via Safety-Aware Decoding

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Xu, Zhangchen, Jiang, Fengqing, Niu, Luyao, Jia, Jinyuan, Lin, Bill Yuchen, Poovendran, Radha·2024·Proceedings of the 62nd Annual Meeting of the Association for Computational Linguistics (Volume 1: Long Papers)

Abstract

Zhangchen Xu, Fengqing Jiang, Luyao Niu, Jinyuan Jia, Bill Yuchen Lin, Radha Poovendran. Proceedings of the 62nd Annual Meeting of the Association for Computational Linguistics (Volume 1: Long Papers). 2024.

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  • ICD maintains the natural performance of LLMs.

    “while maintaining the natural performance of LLMs”

    From Jailbreak and Guard Aligned Language Models With Only Few In-Context Demonstrations (2026) · cites this paper as [43]

    The paper identifies ICD as a baseline in Section 5.1, but the Table 2 discussion says that baseline defenses degrade LLM utility, particularly on Llama2. It attributes preservation of the original models’ utility to SafeDecoding, not ICD (Sections 5.1–5.2; page numbers unavailable). (LLM, conf=0.73)

    Checked by a reasoning model — may be wrong.

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  • ICD does not hurt natural performance, as evaluated with GLUE and MT-bench.

    “In our experiments, we evaluate ICD with GLUE [43] and MT-bench [59] to show that ICD does not hurt natural performance.”

    From Jailbreak and Guard Aligned Language Models With Only Few In-Context Demonstrations (2026) · cites this paper as [43]

    Section 5.1 identifies ICD as a baseline and says the paper uses MT-bench to evaluate model helpfulness. But the preserved-utility finding in Section 5.2 is about SafeDecoding, not ICD; the copy provides no GLUE evaluation or finding that ICD does not hurt natural performance. Page numbers were not available in our copy. (LLM, conf=0.78)

    Experimental — accuracy not yet measured

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Cited by

Sorted by citations

Authors
Xu, Z., Jiang, F., Niu, L., Jia, J., Lin, B. Y., & Poovendran, R.
Affiliations
Pennsylvania State University (US)
Venue
Proceedings of the 62nd Annual Meeting of the Association for Computational Linguistics (Volume 1: Long Papers)
Published
2024
Pages
5587-5605
ISSN
0736-587X (ISSN-L)
OpenAlex
W4402671718
Cited by
40
References
0
Citations by year
2026: 23 · 2025: 16 · 2024: 1
FWCI
11.80
Type
conference paper
Language
en
Open access
Licence
cc-by
Locations
Proceedings of the conference - Association for Computational Linguistics. Meeting (publishedVersion, cc-by)
Funders
  • National Science Foundation (2229876)
  • U.S. Department of Homeland Security
  • Air Force Office of Scientific Research (FA9550-, FA9550-23-1-0208)
Topics
  • Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Artificial Intelligence › Adversarial Robustness in Machine Learning
  • Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Artificial Intelligence › Security and Verification in Computing
  • Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Artificial Intelligence › Topic Modeling
Keywords
jailbreak attacks, large language model security, prompt injection

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