The DOI matches its Crossref record; 3 of the 3 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Incentives, choice and accountability in the provision of public services
Abstract
This paper discusses a theoretical framework to study the issues of competition and incentives without relying on the standard profit-oriented “market” model in the context of the debates about public service reform in the UK. It uses the idea that the production of public services coheres around a mission, and discusses how decentralized service provision can raise productivity by matching motivated workers to their preferred missions. Our focus on competition and incentives cuts across traditional debates about public versus private ownership and allows for the possibility of involving private non-profits. We also address concerns about the consequences of allowing more flexibility in mission design and competition on inequality.
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Citations
Cites
A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures
Tiebout, C. M. (1956) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/257839 · Cited by 13,222
Multitask principal – agent analyses: Incentive contracts, asset ownership, and job design
Holmstrom, B., & Milgrom, P. (1991) · The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization · doi:10.1093/jleo/7.special_issue.24 · Cited by 6,046
Managerial Incentive Problems: A Dynamic Perspective
Holmstrom, B. (1999) · Review of Economic Studies · doi:10.1111/1467-937x.00083 · Cited by 3,172
Cited by
THE IMPACT OF FISCAL DECENTRALIZATION: A SURVEY
Martinez‐Vazquez, J., Lago‐Peñas, S., & Sacchi, A. (2017) · Journal of Economic Surveys · doi:10.1111/joes.12182 · Cited by 421
School decentralization: Helping the good get better, but leaving the poor behind
Galiani, S., Gertler, P., & Schargrodsky, E. (2008) · Journal of Public Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jpubeco.2008.05.004 · Cited by 304
Accountability in the Shadow of Hierarchy: The Horizontal Accountability of Agencies
Schillemans, T. (2008) · Public Organization Review · doi:10.1007/s11115-008-0053-8 · Cited by 281
Schillemans, T. (2011) · Administration & Society · doi:10.1177/0095399711412931 · Cited by 137
Does Performance Budgeting Work? An Analytical Review of the Empirical Literature
Robinson, M., & Brumby, J. (2005) · IMF Working Papers · doi:10.5089/9781451862294.001 · Cited by 54
Metadata
- Authors
- Ghatak (only on Friday's pm), M., & Besley, T.
- Venue
- Working Paper Series
- Publisher
- Institute for Fiscal Studies
- Published
- 2003-05-01
- ISSN
- 1369-4685 (ISSN-L)
- 1742-0415
- OpenAlex
- W2112495490
- Cited by
- 189
- References
- 3
- Type
- paratext
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.