The DOI matches its Crossref record; 38 of the 38 references it cites were found in a registry or an index; 21 of the 55 sources its claims cite were checked for support.
Manufacturing Cybersecurity for SMEs: Implementing Zero Trust in Legacy Industrial Environments
Open accessAbstract
Small and medium-sized manufacturing enterprises (SMEs) face significant cybersecurity challenges due to the convergence of information technology and operational technology, yet they lack resources for enterprise-grade solutions. With manufacturing representing 25.7% of global cyberattacks in 2023, SMEs operating legacy industrial equipment are disproportionately at risk. This research adapts Zero Trust Architecture (ZTA) principles for resource-constrained environments through systematic analysis of financial, technical, and human resource constraints. We propose a four-layer adaptive framework comprising proxy-based identity enforcement, protocol-aware segmentation aligned with the Purdue Model, manufacturing-tuned behavioral analytics, and fail-operational response mechanisms, enabling ZTA implementation without equipment replacement. Validation via a multi-month pilot at a mid-sized discrete manufacturing facility operating legacy industrial system shows measurable improvements: critical vulnerabilities decreased by approximately 55%, mean time to detection improved by over 99% (from 90 days to 12 minutes), and security incidents fell by 78%, while production availability increased from 94.2% to 96.1%. The total implementation cost of approximately $75,000 yields a payback period of 1.3 to 4.5 months based on breach prevention value. The approach demonstrates that SMEs can achieve enterprise-level security outcomes at only 3–9% of infrastructure replacement cost
Overview
CoChat Summary
TL;DR
This paper adapts Zero Trust Architecture for manufacturing SMEs that run legacy industrial systems, arguing that enterprise-style deployments are too costly and incompatible with old OT equipment. In a multi-month pilot at a mid-sized discrete manufacturer, the framework cut critical vulnerabilities from 37 to 17, improved mean time to detection from 90 days to 12 minutes, reduced incidents by 78%, and raised availability from 94.2% to 96.1%.
Key findings
- The paper reports a four-layer adaptive ZTA framework: proxy-based identity enforcement, protocol-aware segmentation aligned with the Purdue Model, manufacturing-tuned behavioral analytics, and fail-operational response mechanisms.
- In the pilot, critical vulnerabilities fell from 37 to 17, a 54% reduction; default-credential vulnerabilities were eliminated and unrestricted IT-OT paths were removed.
- Mean time to detection improved from about 90 days to 12 minutes, described as over 99% improvement; behavioral analytics achieved 98.7% accuracy and tuning reduced alerts from 12/day to 2.1/day.
- Security incidents declined from nine pre-implementation incidents to two post-implementation incidents over 6-month measurement periods, while production availability increased from 94.2% to 96.1%; total implementation cost was about $75,000 with annual ongoing costs of about $8,500.
Methods
- The study used a pilot implementation at a mid-sized discrete manufacturing facility operating legacy equipment from 1995–2008, followed by pre- and post-implementation assessment over a multi-month period.
- It combined phased deployment with a 20-week roadmap: organizational preparation, observation infrastructure, and graduated enforcement; the paper also reports structured interviews with 17 SME manufacturers for generalizability analysis.
- Analysis included vulnerability counts, detection-time measurement during simulated lateral movement testing, incident-frequency comparison, availability tracking, and economic comparison against infrastructure replacement costs.
Limitations
- The paper states that the pilot was at a single mid-sized discrete manufacturing facility, so the empirical validation is limited to one site; this is stated in the text.
- It also states that digital twin security testing was not implemented in the pilot due to resource constraints; this is stated in the text.
- The text makes evident that some results may not transfer directly to continuous-process manufacturers because the paper itself says they require longer timelines and graduated enforcement; this is an inference from the text.
Model-written summary. Check it against the paper before relying on it.
Integrity signals
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Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
15 Valid · 9 Not valid · 32 Not checked · 225 Own results and interpretations
The cited sources support only part of this claim — read each source’s verdict below.
In the paper
“However, direct translation of enterprise Zero Trust principles to manufacturing environments is not straightforward.Industrial Control Systems operate with different threat models, risk tolerances, and operational constraints compared to traditional IT systems [15].”
§ Manufacturing Cybersecurity for SMEs: Implementing Zero Trust in Legacy Industrial Environments > 1.3 Zero Trust Architecture as an Emerging Security Paradigm
What the sources say
- Partly supportedcites [15] Nankya, M., Chataut, R., Akl, R.: Securing Industrial Control Systems: Components, Cyber Threats, and Machine Learning-Driven Defense Strategies, Italian National Conference on Sensors, Oct. (2023). https://doi.org/10.3390/s23218840 sourceExperimental — accuracy not yet measured
Section 3 (ICS System Design Considerations; page unavailable) describes ICS-specific timing, safety, and availability requirements, while Section 6 (ICS Communication Protocols Cyber Vulnerabilities; page unavailable) describes cyber-physical threats and the consequences of losing control. These support the point that ICS have distinctive risks and operational constraints, but the copy does not compare their risk tolerances with traditional IT or address whether enterprise Zero Trust principles translate directly to manufacturing. (LLM, conf=0.84)
plain- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
- Partly supported
The cited sources that could be checked couldn’t confirm or dispute this claim.
In the paper
“SMEs allocate 2-5% of IT budgets to security, representing $30K-80K annual investment for facilities with $30M-100M revenue.”
§ Manufacturing Cybersecurity for SMEs: Implementing Zero Trust in Legacy Industrial Environments > 1.2 Contrasting Enterprise and SME Cybersecurity Realities
What the sources say
- Could not verifycites [4] Austin-Gabriel, B., Hussain, N.Y., Ige, A.B., Adepoju, P.A., Amoo, O.O., Afolabi, A.I.: Advancing zero trust architecture with AI and data science for enterprise cybersecurity frameworks. Open. Access. Res. J. Eng. Technol. Jun. (2021). https//doi.org/10.53022/oarjet.2021.1.1.0107 sourceExperimental — accuracy not yet measured
The discussion of implementation costs (Additional information; page unavailable) recommends a cost-benefit analysis but gives no SME security-budget figures. Searches for “2–5%,” the annual investment range, and the revenue range found no passage addressing the claimed amounts. (LLM, conf=0.76)
plainstates an association- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: unclear — It is unclear whether the paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
- Could not verify
Every source the paper cites for this claim was checked and supports it.
In the paper
“Correlation-based detection analyzed device relationships [20].”
§ Manufacturing Cybersecurity for SMEs: Implementing Zero Trust in Legacy Industrial Environments > 3.4 Manufacturing Anomaly Detection
What the sources say
- Supportedcites [20] Jadidi, Z., Pal, S., Hussain, M., Thanh, K.N.: Correlation-Based Anomaly Detection in Industrial Control Systems, Italian National Conference on Sensors, Feb. (2023). https://doi.org/10.3390/s23031561 source
Section 3.2 describes using correlation analysis to identify relationships between devices and their features. Section 4.2 reports checking correlated nodes when an anomaly is detected, matching the claim’s description of correlation-based detection analyzing device relationships. (LLM, conf=0.94)
plainstates an association- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
- Supported
The cited sources support only part of this claim — read each source’s verdict below.
In the paper
“Vendors in niche markets may no longer support decades-old equipment, making patches impossible even when operators recognize the need [3].”
§ Manufacturing Cybersecurity for SMEs: Implementing Zero Trust in Legacy Industrial Environments > 2.2 Technical Infrastructure Constraints and Legacy System Incompatibilities
What the sources say
- Partly supportedcites [3] Jeffrey, N., Tan, Q., Villar, J.: A Review of Anomaly Detection Strategies to Detect Threats to Cyber-Physical Systems, Electronics, vol. 12, no. 15, art. 3283, Jul. (2023). https://doi.org/10.3390/electronics12153283 sourceExperimental — accuracy not yet measured
Section 2 (Background and Rationale; page not provided) says legacy ICS vendors typically lacked ways to deliver updates or bug fixes, leaving vulnerabilities unresolved. Section 4.6 describes devices losing vendor support, but these are short-lived consumer IoT devices, not decades-old equipment in niche markets. Neither passage establishes that operators recognized the need for patches. (LLM, conf=0.85)
hedgedstates a possible cause- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
- Partly supported
The cited sources support only part of this claim — read each source’s verdict below.
In the paper
“Some operate in highly regulated industries such as pharmaceuticals, aerospace, or medical devices, where comprehensive security systems are mandatory and substantially strengthen the business case for investment [14].”
§ Manufacturing Cybersecurity for SMEs: Implementing Zero Trust in Legacy Industrial Environments > 2.4 Regulatory Environment and Compliance Pressures
What the sources say
- Partly supportedcites [14] Rawindaran, N., et al.: Enhancing Cyber Security Governance and Policy for SMEs in Industry 5.0: A Comparative Study between Saudi Arabia and the United Kingdom. None Aug. (2023). https://doi.org/10.3390/digital3030014 sourceExperimental — accuracy not yet measured
The General section discusses data-protection regulations affecting SMEs and says compliance can be daunting. It does not identify pharmaceuticals, aerospace, or medical devices as examples, say comprehensive security systems are mandatory in those industries, or link such requirements to a stronger business case for investment. No page number is available in our copy. (LLM, conf=0.75)
plainstates a cause- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: unclear — It is unclear whether the paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
- Partly supported
128 more claims · 5 with their cited sources checked
Create a free account to see all 281 claims and every source verdict.
- It may state two separate claims as one. 117
- Probably not a substantial claim. 45
- The quote only partly states this claim. 2
Citations
Cites
Digital twin: Enabling technologies, challenges and open research
Fuller, A., Fan, Z., Day, C., & Barlow, C. (2020) · IEEE Access · doi:10.1109/access.2020.2998358 · Cited by 2,965
A systematic review of industrial wastewater management: Evaluating challenges and enablers
Singh, B. J., Chakraborty, A., & Sehgal, R. (2023) · Journal of Environmental Management · doi:10.1016/j.jenvman.2023.119230 · Cited by 610
Rodríguez-Espíndola, O., Cuevas-Romo, A., Chowdhury, S., Díaz-Acevedo, N., Albores, P., Despoudi, S., Malesios, C., & Dey, P. (2022) · International Journal of Production Economics · doi:10.1016/j.ijpe.2022.108495 · Cited by 459
Jamwal, A., Agrawal, R., Sharma, M., & Giallanza, A. (2021) · Applied Sciences · doi:10.3390/app11125725 · Cited by 458
Shahzad, M., Shafiq, M. T., Douglas, D., & Kassem, M. (2022) · Buildings · doi:10.3390/buildings12020120 · Cited by 325
Tsolakis, N., Schumacher, R., Dora, M., & Kumar, M. (2023) · Annals of Operations Research · doi:10.1007/s10479-022-04785-2 · Cited by 325
The NIST Cybersecurity Framework (CSF) 2.0
National Institute of Standards and Technology (2024) · doi:10.6028/nist.cswp.29 · Cited by 266
Chidukwani, A., Zander, S., & Koutsakis, P. (2022) · IEEE Access · doi:10.1109/access.2022.3197899 · Cited by 247
Khanfar, A. A. A., Iranmanesh, M., Ghobakhloo, M., Senali, M. G., & Fathi, M. (2021) · Sustainability · doi:10.3390/su13147870 · Cited by 225
Industrial IoT, Cyber Threats, and Standards Landscape: Evaluation and Roadmap
Dhirani, L. L., Armstrong, E., & Newe, T. (2021) · Sensors · doi:10.3390/s21113901 · Cited by 172
Research works printed but not linked: 3
- Akinsanya, A.: Enhancing Process Efficiency and Security in the U.S. Manufacturing Sector: Evidence from Industry Implementation, IRE Journals, vol. 8, no. 8, pp. 753–762, ISSN: 2456–8880. (2025)
- Department of Defense, U.S.: Cybersecurity Maturity Model Certification (CMMC) Program, 32 CFR Part 170, Federal Register, vol. 89, no. 199, pp. 83092–83222, Oct. 2024. [Online]. Available: https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2024/10/15/2024-22905/cybersecurity-maturity-model-certification-cmmc-program
- Aminu, M., Akinsanya, A., Oyedokun, O., Tosin, O.: A review of advanced cyber threat detection techniques in critical infrastructure: Evolution, current state, and future directions. Int. J. Comput. Appl. Technol. Res., 13(8), 111
Cited by
Enhancing Patient Data Security in Healthcare Through Cybersecurity Tools: A NERO-Based Use Case
Kioskli, K., Seralidou, E., Nguyễn, H. N., Zarifi, A., Bensenousi, A., & Vidakis, A. (2026) · Lecture notes in computer science · doi:10.1007/978-3-032-37218-5_31
Metadata
- Authors
- Akinsanya, A.
- Affiliations
- Bowie State University (US)
- Corresponding author
- Akinsanya, Ayokunle
- ORCID
- Akinsanya, Ayokunle
- Venue
- Research Square
- Published
- 2026-03-09
- OpenAlex
- W7134246097
- Cited by
- 1
- References
- 38
- Citations by year
- 2026: 1
- Type
- posted content
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
- doi.org
- Locations
- Research Square (acceptedVersion, cc-by)
- Topics
- Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Information Systems › Information and Cyber Security
- Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Computer Networks and Communications › Network Security and Intrusion Detection
- Physical Sciences › Engineering › Control and Systems Engineering › Smart Grid Security and Resilience
- Keywords
- zero-trust architecture, manufacturing cybersecurity, small and medium-sized enterprises, industrial control systems, IT-OT convergence, behavioral analytics, mean time to detect, payback period, discrete manufacturing
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- CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Manufacturing Cybersecurity for SMEs: Implementing Zero Trust in Legacy Industrial Environments. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.21203/rs.3.rs-8846670/v1
- The paper
- Akinsanya, A. (2026). Manufacturing Cybersecurity for SMEs: Implementing Zero Trust in Legacy Industrial Environments. Research Square. https://doi.org/10.21203/rs.3.rs-8846670/v1
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