Ten Tales of Betrayal: The Threat to Corporate Infrastructure by Information Technology Insiders Analysis and Observations
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Abstract
This report offers an overview and analysis of 10 significant cases of trust betrayal. The cases in question were information technology (IT) insider events in which an insider or former insider, having had legitimate access to a critical information system, abused or violated that trust for personal advantage or to exact revenge on a person or organization. In each case the actions of a disgruntled or self-interested offender seriously damaged or compromised the operability of a critical information system. Also included in this report is a discussion of common themes and patterns emerging from the examination of these incidents under five general headings corresponding to clusters of significant issues or lessons emerging from the substance of the case narratives. These issue areas are: Subject and Attack Characteristics, Screening, Attack Detection, Organizational and Social Environment, and Personnel Management Issues.
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Cited by
Homoliak, I., Toffalini, F., Guarnizo, J., Elovici, Y., & Ochoa, M. (2020) · ACM Computing Surveys · doi:10.1145/3303771 · Cited by 255
An Empirical Validation of Malicious Insider Characteristics
Liang, N. (., Biros, D. P., & Luse, A. (2016) · Journal of Management Information Systems · doi:10.1080/07421222.2016.1205925 · Cited by 48
“” For example, one malicious insider made a racial comment about his African-American supervisor [75].”
BackgroundInfluentialInsider Threat Risk Prediction based on Bayesian Network
Elmrabit, N., Yang, S.-H., Yang, L., & Zhou, H. (2020) · Computers & Security · doi:10.1016/j.cose.2020.101908 · Cited by 46
Methods and Metrics for Evaluating Analytic Insider Threat Tools
Greitzer, F. L., & Ferryman, T. A. (2013) · 2013 IEEE Security and Privacy Workshops · doi:10.1109/spw.2013.34 · Cited by 22
Metadata
- Authors
- Shaw, E. D., & Fischer, L. F.
- Publisher
- Defense Technical Information Center
- Published
- 2005-09-01
- OpenAlex
- W294429906
- Cited by
- 45
- References
- 0
- Type
- report
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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