Insider Threat Control: Using Centralized Logging to Detect Data Exfiltration Near Insider Termination
The DOI matches its Crossref record.
Abstract
Since 2001, the CERT(registered trademark) Insider Threat Center has built an extensive library and comprehensive database containing more than 600 cases of crimes committed against organizations by insiders. A significant class of insider crimes, insider theft of intellectual property, involves highly damaging attacks against organizations that result in significant tangible losses in the form of stolen business plans, customer lists, and other proprietary information. The Insider Threat Center's behavioral modeling of insiders who steal intellectual property shows that many insiders who stole their organization's intellectual property stole at least some of it within 30 days of their termination. This technical note presents an example of an insider threat pattern based on this insight. It then presents an example implementation of this pattern on an enterprise-class system using the centralized log storage and indexing engine Splunk to detect malicious insider behavior on a network.
Overview
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
The self-check needs the paper’s full text.
Citations
Cited by
Detecting and Preventing Cyber Insider Threats: A Survey
Liu, L., De Vel, O., Han, Q.-L., Zhang, J., & Xiang, Y. (2018) · IEEE Communications Surveys & Tutorials · doi:10.1109/comst.2018.2800740 · Cited by 385
Homoliak, I., Toffalini, F., Guarnizo, J., Elovici, Y., & Ochoa, M. (2020) · ACM Computing Surveys · doi:10.1145/3303771 · Cited by 255
Wang, Z. Q., & El Saddik, A. (2023) · IEEE Access · doi:10.1109/access.2023.3324371 · Cited by 49
“Hanley and Montelibano [7] proposed a set of hands-on rules for identifying data exfiltration based on Email, HR and LDAP data.”
BackgroundEmpirical Detection Techniques of Insider Threat Incidents
Alsowail, R. A., & Al-Shehari, T. (2020) · IEEE Access · doi:10.1109/access.2020.2989739 · Cited by 41
Insider Threat Identification Using the Simultaneous Neural Learning of Multi-Source Logs
Liu, L., Chen, C., Zhang, J., De Vel, O., & Xiang, Y. (2019) · IEEE Access · doi:10.1109/access.2019.2957055 · Cited by 31
Metadata
- Authors
- Hanley, M., & Montelibano, J.
- Publisher
- Defense Technical Information Center
- Published
- 2011-10-01
- OpenAlex
- W4236135181
- Cited by
- 27
- References
- 0
- Type
- report
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
How to cite
Cite CoChat for the checks on this page, and the paper for its own findings.
- This page
- CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Insider Threat Control: Using Centralized Logging to Detect Data Exfiltration Near Insider Termination. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.21236/ada610463
- The paper
- Hanley, M., & Montelibano, J. (2011). Insider Threat Control: Using Centralized Logging to Detect Data Exfiltration Near Insider Termination. https://doi.org/10.21236/ada610463
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.