Empirical Detection Techniques of Insider Threat Incidents
Open accessThe DOI matches its Crossref record; 73 of the 76 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
Vital organizations have faced increasing challenges of how to defend against insider threats that may cause a severe damage to their assets. The nature of insider threats is more challenging than external threats, as insiders have a privileged access to sensitive assets of an organization. In fact, there are several studies that reviewed the insider threat detection approaches from taxonomical and theoretical perspectives. However, the protection against insider threat incidents requires empirical defense solutions. Hence, our study uniquely focuses on empirical detection approaches that are validated with empirical results. We propose a 10-question model that highlights different prospective of empirical detection approaches. Significant factors are also proposed to reveal the extent to which the detection approaches are effective against insider threat incidents (e.g., feature domains, protection coverage, classification techniques, simulated scenarios, performance and accuracy metrics, etc.). The objective of this paper is to enhance researchers' efforts in the domain of insider attack by systemizing the detection techniques in comparable manner. It also highlights the challenges and gaps for further research to institute more effective solutions that can predict, detect, and prevent emerging attack incidents. Some recommendations for future research directions are also presented.
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“The authors of [62], [63] show that the effectiveness of these methods hinges on the quality of the baseline behavior models.”
From A Review of Recent Advances, Challenges, and Opportunities in Malicious Insider Threat Detection Using Machine Learning Methods (2024) · cites this paper as [63]
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In the citing paper
“Recurrent Neural Networks (RNNs) and Long Short-Term Memory (LSTM) networks, designed to handle sequential data, excel in capturing temporal dependencies in user behavior, making them well-suited for insider threat detection [63], [77].”
From A Review of Recent Advances, Challenges, and Opportunities in Malicious Insider Threat Detection Using Machine Learning Methods (2024) · cites this paper as [63]
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Cites
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Preferred reporting items for systematic reviews and meta-analyses: the PRISMA Statement.
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“[76] assured that research implementation approaches cannot be tested or reused without full and precise description of experiments’ components.”
BackgroundUsing grounded theory as a method for rigorously reviewing literature
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Cited by
Alzaabi, F. R., & Mehmood, A. (2024) · IEEE Access · doi:10.1109/access.2024.3369906 · Cited by 204
“The authors of [62] and [63] show that the effectiveness of these methods hinges on the quality of the baseline behavior models.”
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Self-citationCybersecurity Enterprises Policies: A Comparative Study
Mishra, A., Alzoubi, Y. I., Gill, A. Q., & Anwar, M. J. (2022) · Sensors · doi:10.3390/s22020538 · Cited by 149
Insider threat detection model using anomaly-based Isolation Forest algorithm
Al-Shehari, T., Al-Razgan, M., Alfakih, T., Alsowail, R. A., & Pandiaraj, S. (2023) · IEEE Access · doi:10.1109/access.2023.3326750 · Cited by 52
Self-citationAl-Shehari, T. A., Rosaci, D., Al-Razgan, M., Alfakih, T., Kadrie, M., Afzal, H., & Nawaz, R. (2024) · IEEE Access · doi:10.1109/access.2024.3373694 · Cited by 51
“The recent survey in [6] summarized the insider threat detection models in the literature.”
BackgroundSelf-citation
Metadata
- Authors
- Alsowail, R. A., & Al-Shehari, T.
- Affiliations
- King Saud University (SA)
- Venue
- IEEE Access
- Published
- 2020
- Volume
- 8
- Pages
- 78385-78402
- ISSN
- 2169-3536 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W3020736316
- Cited by
- 41
- References
- 76
- Citations by year
- 2026: 7 · 2025: 4 · 2024: 10 · 2023: 5 · 2022: 11 · 2021: 3 · 2020: 1
- FWCI
- 4.70
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- gold
- doi.org
- Locations
- IEEE Access (publishedVersion, cc-by)
- DOAJ (DOAJ: Directory of Open Access Journals) (submittedVersion, cc-by-sa)
- Funders
- Deanship of Scientific Research at King Saud University (RG-1441-401)
- Topics
- Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Information Systems › Information and Cyber Security
- Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Computer Networks and Communications › Network Security and Intrusion Detection
- Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Artificial Intelligence › Privacy-Preserving Technologies in Data
- Keywords
- insider threats, insider threat detection, privileged access, classification methods, attack simulation
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