CoChat

Empirical Detection Techniques of Insider Threat Incidents

Open access
Alsowail, Rakan A., Al-Shehari, Taher · 2020 · IEEE Access

The DOI matches its Crossref record; 73 of the 76 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.

Abstract

Vital organizations have faced increasing challenges of how to defend against insider threats that may cause a severe damage to their assets. The nature of insider threats is more challenging than external threats, as insiders have a privileged access to sensitive assets of an organization. In fact, there are several studies that reviewed the insider threat detection approaches from taxonomical and theoretical perspectives. However, the protection against insider threat incidents requires empirical defense solutions. Hence, our study uniquely focuses on empirical detection approaches that are validated with empirical results. We propose a 10-question model that highlights different prospective of empirical detection approaches. Significant factors are also proposed to reveal the extent to which the detection approaches are effective against insider threat incidents (e.g., feature domains, protection coverage, classification techniques, simulated scenarios, performance and accuracy metrics, etc.). The objective of this paper is to enhance researchers' efforts in the domain of insider attack by systemizing the detection techniques in comparable manner. It also highlights the challenges and gaps for further research to institute more effective solutions that can predict, detect, and prevent emerging attack incidents. Some recommendations for future research directions are also presented.

Overview

The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.

Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.

A few free checks a day · papers already verified open instantly · results are public

Integrity signals

Registry

Crossref · 10.1109/access.2020.2989739

Cites

73 of 73 references verified0 citation errors · 0 not checkable

Statistics

Verification

Claims the paper makes

The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.

Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.

A few free checks a day · papers already verified open instantly · results are public

Claims other papers make about this one

Each is checked against this paper’s own text: does it say what the citing paper says it does?

Self-check

Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.

The self-check needs the paper’s full text.

Citations

Cites

Show all 73 references

Research works printed but not linked: 10

  1. cohen, 2009, Growing information: Part I, Proc Informing Sci Inf Technol (IISIT), 326
  2. 2016, Insider Threat Test Dataset
  3. schonlau, 2001, Masquerading User Dataset of Unix Command Line Sequences
  4. project, 2015, Enron Email Dataset
  5. laboratory, 2018, 1998 DARPA Intrusion Detection Evaluation Data Set
  6. 2018, Cost of Insider Threats? Global Sponsored by ObserveIT
  7. lee, 2019, IBM X-Force Threat Intelligence Index Report
  8. 2018, Threat Report 2018–C Technologies
  9. shaw, 1998, The insider threat to information systems, Security Awareness Bulletin, 2, 1
  10. homoliak, 2018, Insight into Insiders and IT: A Survey of Insider Threat Taxonomies, Analysis, Modeling, and Countermeasures, ACM Comput Surv, 52, 30

Cited by

See all 55

Metadata

Authors
Alsowail, R. A., & Al-Shehari, T.
Affiliations
King Saud University (SA)
Venue
IEEE Access
Published
2020
Volume
8
Pages
78385-78402
ISSN
2169-3536 (ISSN-L)
OpenAlex
W3020736316
Cited by
41
References
76
Citations by year
2026: 7 · 2025: 4 · 2024: 10 · 2023: 5 · 2022: 11 · 2021: 3 · 2020: 1
FWCI
4.70
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
Locations
  • IEEE Access (publishedVersion, cc-by)
  • DOAJ (DOAJ: Directory of Open Access Journals) (submittedVersion, cc-by-sa)
Funders
Deanship of Scientific Research at King Saud University (RG-1441-401)
Topics
  • Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Information Systems › Information and Cyber Security
  • Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Computer Networks and Communications › Network Security and Intrusion Detection
  • Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Artificial Intelligence › Privacy-Preserving Technologies in Data
Keywords
insider threats, insider threat detection, privileged access, classification methods, attack simulation

About these checks

Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.

Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.

Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.

What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›

Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review

How to cite

Cite CoChat for the checks on this page, and the paper for its own findings.

This page
CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Empirical Detection Techniques of Insider Threat Incidents. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1109/access.2020.2989739
The paper
Alsowail, R. A., & Al-Shehari, T. (2020). Empirical Detection Techniques of Insider Threat Incidents. IEEE Access. https://doi.org/10.1109/access.2020.2989739

Data sources

Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.

Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).

Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.