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The DOI matches its Crossref record; 88 of the 89 references it cites were found in a registry or an index; 8 of the 86 sources its claims cite were checked for support.

Investor protection and corporate governance

Open access
La Porta, Rafael, Lopez-de-Silanes, Florencio, Shleifer, Andrei, Vishny, Robert · 2000 · Journal of Financial Economics

Abstract

Recent research has documented large differences among countries in ownership concentration in publicly traded firms, in the breadth and depth of capital markets, in dividend policies, and in the access of firms to external finance. A common element to the explanations of these differences is how well investors, both shareholders and creditors, are protected by law from expropriation by the managers and controlling shareholders of firms. We describe the differences in laws and the effectiveness of their enforcement across countries, discuss the possible origins of these differences, summarize their consequences, and assess potential strategies of corporate governance reform. We argue that the legal approach is a more fruitful way to understand corporate governance and its reform than the conventional distinction between bank-centered and market-centered financial systems.

Overview

CoChat Summary

TL;DR

The paper argues that legal protection of outside investors—shareholders and creditors—is central to explaining cross-country differences in ownership concentration, financial market development, dividend policy, and resource allocation. It advocates the legal approach over the conventional bank-centered versus market-centered classification and discusses obstacles and strategies for corporate governance reform.

Key findings

  • Legal origin correlates with investor protection. In Table 1 across 49 countries, common-law countries have the highest antidirector rights index (4.00) and creditor rights index (3.11); French civil-law countries have the lowest (2.33 and 1.58); world averages are 3.00 and 2.30. Enforcement also varies: judicial-system efficiency is 8.15 in common-law countries versus 6.56 in French civil-law countries; corruption scores are 7.06 versus 5.84; accounting standards are 69.92 versus 51.17.
  • Poor investor protection is associated with concentrated control and family/state control. LLS (1999) and Claessens, Djankov, and Lang (1999) find family-controlled firms are typically managed by family members; outside Japan, the top 10 families in each of 8 East Asian economies control between 18 and 58 percent of aggregate listed equity value.
  • Investor protection predicts financial market development. LLSV (1997) show countries that protect shareholders have more valuable stock markets, larger numbers of listed securities per capita, and higher IPO activity; better creditor protection is associated with larger credit markets. LLSV (1999b) find better shareholder protection is associated with higher Tobin’s Q in 27 wealthy economies; LLSV (2000) find better minority shareholder protection is associated with higher dividend payouts.
  • Governance variables predict crisis declines. Johnson and others (1999) examine 25 countries during the 1997–1998 Asian crisis and find investor protection indices and law-enforcement quality predict the extent of market declines better than macroeconomic variables.

Methods

  • Conceptual/review paper synthesizing cross-country research on legal investor protection, not a new primary empirical study.
  • Uses a comparative legal-origin framework—common law, French civil law, German civil law, and Scandinavian civil law—and Table 1 data from La Porta et al. (1998) for 49 countries, with shareholder-rights and creditor-rights indices plus enforcement measures.
  • Main analysis is descriptive/comparative and literature synthesis, linking legal rules and enforcement to ownership patterns, financial markets, real outcomes, and reform.

Limitations

  • Stated: understanding of reform principles remains limited; there is no checklist of what needs to be done; the legal protections studied by LLSV (1998) are neither necessary nor sufficient; reform faces intense political opposition from governments and controlling families; functional convergence has limitations, especially for creditor rights, and is unlikely to fully replace bona fide legal reform.
  • Stated: why common law is more protective than civil law lacks an agreed answer; the judicial explanation is incomplete without political and historical analysis.
  • Evident from the text: this is a synthesis/review, and Table 1 is descriptive; the paper does not itself provide new causal estimates, and many empirical claims are drawn from cited studies.

Model-written summary. Check it against the paper before relying on it.

Integrity signals

Registry

Crossref · 10.1016/s0304-405x(00)00065-9

Cites

88 of 89 references verified0 citation errors · 1 not checkable

Statistics

Nothing to recompute.

Verification

Claims the paper makes

8 Valid · 6 Not valid · 68 Not checked · 117 Own results and interpretations

117 more claims · 1 with their cited sources checked

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  • It may state two separate claims as one. 54
  • Probably not a substantial claim. 28

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Self-check

Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.

Each contradiction between two passages listed here was confirmed by an independent check.

1 of 1

Citations

Cites

Show all 89 references

Research works printed but not linked: 2

  1. Jensen, 1989, Eclipse of the modern corporation, Harvard Business Review, 67, 61
  2. Porter, 1992, Capital disadvantage, Harvard Business Review, 46, 65

Cited by

See all 6,848

Metadata

Authors
La Porta, R., Lopez-de-Silanes, F., Shleifer, A., & Vishny, R.
Affiliations
National Bureau of Economic Research (US)
Venue
Journal of Financial Economics
Publisher
Elsevier BV
Published
2000-01
Volume
58
Issue
1-2
Pages
3-27
ISSN
0304-405X (ISSN-L)
OpenAlex
W2162012454
Cited by
6,848
References
89
Citations by year
2026: 225 · 2025: 285 · 2024: 284 · 2023: 272 · 2022: 296 · 2021: 290 · 2020: 304 · 2019: 316 · 2018: 301 · 2017: 302 · 2016: 311 · 2015: 350 · 2014: 331 · 2013: 310 · 2012: 338
FWCI
535.36
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
Licence
www.elsevier.com/tdm/userlicense/1.0/ (tdm)
Locations
  • Journal of Financial Economics (publishedVersion)
  • SSRN Electronic Journal (acceptedVersion)
  • RePEc: Research Papers in Economics (submittedVersion)
  • Digital Access to Scholarship at Harvard (DASH) (Harvard University) (submittedVersion, cc-by)
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Finance › Corporate Finance and Governance
  • Social Sciences › Business, Management and Accounting › Strategy and Management › Corporate Governance and Law
  • Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Law, Economics, and Judicial Systems
Keywords
investor protection, corporate governance, ownership concentration, capital markets, dividend policy, access to external financing, expropriation, shareholder rights, creditor protection, legal enforcement, corporate governance reform, cross-national comparison

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This page
CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Investor protection and corporate governance. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1016/s0304-405x(00)00065-9
The paper
La Porta, R., Lopez-de-Silanes, F., Shleifer, A., & Vishny, R. (2000). Investor protection and corporate governance. Journal of Financial Economics. https://doi.org/10.1016/s0304-405x(00)00065-9

Data sources

Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.

Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).

Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.