The DOI matches its Crossref record; 88 of the 89 references it cites were found in a registry or an index; 8 of the 86 sources its claims cite were checked for support.
Investor protection and corporate governance
Open accessAbstract
Recent research has documented large differences among countries in ownership concentration in publicly traded firms, in the breadth and depth of capital markets, in dividend policies, and in the access of firms to external finance. A common element to the explanations of these differences is how well investors, both shareholders and creditors, are protected by law from expropriation by the managers and controlling shareholders of firms. We describe the differences in laws and the effectiveness of their enforcement across countries, discuss the possible origins of these differences, summarize their consequences, and assess potential strategies of corporate governance reform. We argue that the legal approach is a more fruitful way to understand corporate governance and its reform than the conventional distinction between bank-centered and market-centered financial systems.
Overview
CoChat Summary
TL;DR
The paper argues that legal protection of outside investors—shareholders and creditors—is central to explaining cross-country differences in ownership concentration, financial market development, dividend policy, and resource allocation. It advocates the legal approach over the conventional bank-centered versus market-centered classification and discusses obstacles and strategies for corporate governance reform.
Key findings
- Legal origin correlates with investor protection. In Table 1 across 49 countries, common-law countries have the highest antidirector rights index (4.00) and creditor rights index (3.11); French civil-law countries have the lowest (2.33 and 1.58); world averages are 3.00 and 2.30. Enforcement also varies: judicial-system efficiency is 8.15 in common-law countries versus 6.56 in French civil-law countries; corruption scores are 7.06 versus 5.84; accounting standards are 69.92 versus 51.17.
- Poor investor protection is associated with concentrated control and family/state control. LLS (1999) and Claessens, Djankov, and Lang (1999) find family-controlled firms are typically managed by family members; outside Japan, the top 10 families in each of 8 East Asian economies control between 18 and 58 percent of aggregate listed equity value.
- Investor protection predicts financial market development. LLSV (1997) show countries that protect shareholders have more valuable stock markets, larger numbers of listed securities per capita, and higher IPO activity; better creditor protection is associated with larger credit markets. LLSV (1999b) find better shareholder protection is associated with higher Tobin’s Q in 27 wealthy economies; LLSV (2000) find better minority shareholder protection is associated with higher dividend payouts.
- Governance variables predict crisis declines. Johnson and others (1999) examine 25 countries during the 1997–1998 Asian crisis and find investor protection indices and law-enforcement quality predict the extent of market declines better than macroeconomic variables.
Methods
- Conceptual/review paper synthesizing cross-country research on legal investor protection, not a new primary empirical study.
- Uses a comparative legal-origin framework—common law, French civil law, German civil law, and Scandinavian civil law—and Table 1 data from La Porta et al. (1998) for 49 countries, with shareholder-rights and creditor-rights indices plus enforcement measures.
- Main analysis is descriptive/comparative and literature synthesis, linking legal rules and enforcement to ownership patterns, financial markets, real outcomes, and reform.
Limitations
- Stated: understanding of reform principles remains limited; there is no checklist of what needs to be done; the legal protections studied by LLSV (1998) are neither necessary nor sufficient; reform faces intense political opposition from governments and controlling families; functional convergence has limitations, especially for creditor rights, and is unlikely to fully replace bona fide legal reform.
- Stated: why common law is more protective than civil law lacks an agreed answer; the judicial explanation is incomplete without political and historical analysis.
- Evident from the text: this is a synthesis/review, and Table 1 is descriptive; the paper does not itself provide new causal estimates, and many empirical claims are drawn from cited studies.
Model-written summary. Check it against the paper before relying on it.
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
8 Valid · 6 Not valid · 68 Not checked · 117 Own results and interpretations
Every source the paper cites for this claim was checked and supports it.
In the paper
“First, it can enhance savings.”
§ NBER WORKING PAPER SERIES INVESTOR PROTECTION: ORIGINS, CONSEQUENCES, REFORM > Real Consequences
What the sources say
- Supportedcites Beck, Levine, and Loayza 2000 source
Section V (pp. 28–29) reports a small positive effect of financial development on private saving rates in the cross-country regression, supporting the qualified claim that it can enhance savings. The paper also notes that the panel result is insignificant and the relationship is not robust across measures. (LLM, conf=0.87)
plainstates a possible cause- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
- Supported
Every source the paper cites for this claim was checked and supports it.
In the paper
“Third, to the extent that the financiers exercise some control over the investment decisions of the entrepreneurs, financial development improves the efficiency of resource allocation, as capital flows toward the more productive uses.”
§ NBER WORKING PAPER SERIES INVESTOR PROTECTION: ORIGINS, CONSEQUENCES, REFORM > Real Consequences
What the sources say
- Supportedcites Beck, Levine, and Loayza 2000 source
Section II (p. 7) says that banks can enhance resource allocation by exerting corporate control and can encourage investment in higher-return activities. The Conclusions also state that better-functioning banks improve resource allocation. These passages support the claim's account of control and capital moving toward more productive uses. (LLM, conf=0.90)
plainstates a possible cause- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
- Supported
The sources with a verdict support this claim; the rest weren’t checked yet, have no full text we could read, or their verdicts aren’t rated yet.
In the paper
“The research in this area originates in the work of Grossman and Hart (1988) and Harris and Raviv (1988), who examine the optimal allocation of voting and cash flow rights in a firm.”
§ NBER WORKING PAPER SERIES INVESTOR PROTECTION: ORIGINS, CONSEQUENCES, REFORM > Patterns of Ownership and Control
What the sources say
- Supportedcites Grossman and Hart (1988) source
The Introduction (section 1.1) says Grossman and Hart analyze how to assign voting rights relative to claims on a firm's income. Section 7 explicitly describes this as an analysis of the optimal voting structure. This supports the characterization of their work; the sentence's broader claim about where the field originated is the citing authors' framing. (LLM, conf=0.91)
- Not checked — no full text of the sourcecites Harris and Raviv (1988) source
plain- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: unclear — It is unclear whether the paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
- Supported
Every source the paper cites for this claim was checked and supports it.
In the paper
“Second, it can channel these savings into real investment and thereby foster capital accumulation.”
§ NBER WORKING PAPER SERIES INVESTOR PROTECTION: ORIGINS, CONSEQUENCES, REFORM > Real Consequences
What the sources say
- Supportedcites Beck, Levine, and Loayza 2000 source
The Introduction (p. 1) says banks influence which firms use society’s savings, and Section II (p. 7) says banks can encourage investment. The paper also reports a positive relationship with physical capital growth in some analyses, though its Conclusions caution that the relationship is not robust across methods and measures. The claim’s “can” is consistent with that qualification. (LLM, conf=0.85)
plainstates a cause- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
- Supported
The cited sources support only part of this claim — read each source’s verdict below.
In the paper
“In large corporations of most countries, the fundamental agency problem is not the Berle and Means conflict between outside investors and managers, but rather that between outside investors and controlling shareholders, who in particular have nearly full control over the managers (Shleifer and Vishny 1997).”
§ NBER WORKING PAPER SERIES INVESTOR PROTECTION: ORIGINS, CONSEQUENCES, REFORM > Patterns of Ownership and Control
What the sources say
- Partly supportedcites Shleifer and Vishny 1997 sourceExperimental — accuracy not yet measured
Split into 2 atoms — 1 confirmed, 1 partially supported, 0 disputed, 0 misattributed, 0 unverifiable. Expand the claim to see per-atom verdicts.
plain- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
- Partly supported
117 more claims · 1 with their cited sources checked
Create a free account to see all 199 claims and to verify the 1 reference still open.
- It may state two separate claims as one. 54
- Probably not a substantial claim. 28
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
Each contradiction between two passages listed here was confirmed by an independent check.
Rated minor: it would not touch a result — a value no result rests on, a p-value that stays on the same side of the significance level, or a conflict that is clerical, resolved elsewhere in the paper, or outside its own findings.
In the paper
§ NBER WORKING PAPER SERIES INVESTOR PROTECTION: ORIGINS, CONSEQUENCES, REFORM > 3. Consequences of Investor Protection
“Three broad areas in which investor protection has been shown to matter”
§ NBER WORKING PAPER SERIES INVESTOR PROTECTION: ORIGINS, CONSEQUENCES, REFORM > 3. Consequences of Investor Protection
“the ownership patterns of firms, the development of financial markets, dividend policies, and the allocation of real resources.”
Citations
Cites
Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure
Jensen, M. C., & Meckling, W. H. (1976) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/0304-405x(76)90026-x · Cited by 71,491
Coase, R. H. (1960) · The Journal of Law and Economics · doi:10.1086/466560 · Cited by 18,255
La Porta, R., Lopez‐de‐Silanes, F., Shleifer, A., & Vishny, R. W. (1998) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/250042 · Cited by 18,025
Self-citationA Survey of Corporate Governance
Shleifer, A., & Vishny, R. W. (1997) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/j.1540-6261.1997.tb04820.x · Cited by 16,243
Self-citationThe Cost of Capital, Corporation Finance and the Theory of Investment
Miller, M. H. (1958) · American Economic Review · Cited by 14,574
Determinants of corporate borrowing
Myers, S. C. (1977) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/0304-405x(77)90015-0 · Cited by 13,169
Corporate Ownership Around the World
La Porta, R., Lopez‐De‐Silanes, F., & Shleifer, A. (1999) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/0022-1082.00115 · Cited by 10,541 · cited 11×
“securities legislation of 1933}1934, described by Landis (1938) and McCraw (1984). This legislation placed much of the responsibility for accurate corporate accounting and disclosure on intermediaries, and focused the regulatory oversight by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) on these relatively few intermed…”
BackgroundResultInfluentialSelf-citationLegal Determinants of External Finance
LA PORTA, R., LOPEZ‐DE‐SILANES, F., SHLEIFER, A., & VISHNY, R. W. (1997) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/j.1540-6261.1997.tb02727.x · Cited by 9,783
Self-citationFinance and Growth: Schumpeter Might Be Right
King, R. G., & Levine, R. (1993) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/2118406 · Cited by 8,657
The cost of capital, corporation finance and the theory of investment
Terra, P. R. (2008) · Revista de Administração e Contabilidade da Unisinos · doi:10.4013/base.20082.07 · Cited by 8,615
Research works printed but not linked: 2
- Jensen, 1989, Eclipse of the modern corporation, Harvard Business Review, 67, 61
- Porter, 1992, Capital disadvantage, Harvard Business Review, 46, 65
Cited by
Corporate Governance and Equity Prices
Gompers, P., Ishii, J., & Metrick, A. (2003) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.1162/00335530360535162 · Cited by 6,120
Earnings management and investor protection: an international comparison
Leuz, C., Nanda, D., & Wysocki, P. D. (2003) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/s0304-405x(03)00121-1 · Cited by 5,381
Law, finance, and economic growth in China
ALLEN, F., QIAN, J., & QIAN, M. (2005) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jfineco.2004.06.010 · Cited by 4,446
Investor Protection and Corporate Valuation
La Porta, R., Lopez‐De‐Silanes, F., Shleifer, A., & Vishny, R. (2002) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/1540-6261.00457 · Cited by 4,050
“When the enforcement of private contracts through the court system is costly enough, other forms of protecting property rights, such as judicially-enforced laws or even government-enforced regulations, may be more efficient.”
BackgroundSelf-citationDisentangling the Incentive and Entrenchment Effects of Large Shareholdings
Claessens, S., Djankov, S., Fan, J. P. H., & Lang, L. H. P. (2002) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/1540-6261.00511 · Cited by 3,842
Metadata
- Authors
- La Porta, R., Lopez-de-Silanes, F., Shleifer, A., & Vishny, R.
- Affiliations
- National Bureau of Economic Research (US)
- ORCID
- Vishny, Robert
- Venue
- Journal of Financial Economics
- Publisher
- Elsevier BV
- Published
- 2000-01
- Volume
- 58
- Issue
- 1-2
- Pages
- 3-27
- ISSN
- 0304-405X (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2162012454
- Cited by
- 6,848
- References
- 89
- Citations by year
- 2026: 225 · 2025: 285 · 2024: 284 · 2023: 272 · 2022: 296 · 2021: 290 · 2020: 304 · 2019: 316 · 2018: 301 · 2017: 302 · 2016: 311 · 2015: 350 · 2014: 331 · 2013: 310 · 2012: 338
- FWCI
- 535.36
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
- doi.org
- Licence
- www.elsevier.com/tdm/userlicense/1.0/ (tdm)
- Locations
- Journal of Financial Economics (publishedVersion)
- SSRN Electronic Journal (acceptedVersion)
- RePEc: Research Papers in Economics (submittedVersion)
- Digital Access to Scholarship at Harvard (DASH) (Harvard University) (submittedVersion, cc-by)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Finance › Corporate Finance and Governance
- Social Sciences › Business, Management and Accounting › Strategy and Management › Corporate Governance and Law
- Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Law, Economics, and Judicial Systems
- Keywords
- investor protection, corporate governance, ownership concentration, capital markets, dividend policy, access to external financing, expropriation, shareholder rights, creditor protection, legal enforcement, corporate governance reform, cross-national comparison
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- CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Investor protection and corporate governance. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1016/s0304-405x(00)00065-9
- The paper
- La Porta, R., Lopez-de-Silanes, F., Shleifer, A., & Vishny, R. (2000). Investor protection and corporate governance. Journal of Financial Economics. https://doi.org/10.1016/s0304-405x(00)00065-9
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