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Looking at the Monopsony in the Mirror

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Stucke, Maurice E.·2012·SSRN Electronic Journal
DOI 10.2139/ssrn.2094553
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Abstract

Although still a distant second to monopoly, buyer power and monopsony are hot topics in the antitrust community. Despite the increasing interest in monopsony and buyer power, relatively few cases have actually been brought. Given the relatively few antitrust cases, the legal standards for monopsony claims are less developed than for monopoly claims. In recent years, courts, competition agencies, and scholars in addressing monopsony begin with a simple premise: monopsony is the mirror image of monopoly. But as this Article contends, courts and agencies should be careful when importing monopolization standards for monopsony cases. What works for monopolization claims may not necessarily work for monopsony claims. This Article discusses two key issues: first, how much market share must defendant possess to be a monopsony? If courts and agencies assume that monopsony is the mirror image of monopoly, should the agencies and courts use the same market share thresholds for monopsonization claims as in monopolization claims? Second, should agencies and courts use consumer harm as a threshold screen for monopsony claims?

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Metadata

Authors
Stucke, M. E.
Affiliations
University of Tennessee at Knoxville (US)
Corresponding author
Stucke, Maurice E.
ORCID
Stucke, Maurice E.
Venue
SSRN Electronic Journal
Publisher
Elsevier BV
Published
2012
Volume
62
Issue
6
Pages
1509
ISSN
1556-5068 (ISSN-L)
DOI
10.2139/ssrn.2094553
OpenAlex
W3122501178
Cited by
24
References
2
Citations by year
2025: 2 · 2024: 1 · 2023: 4 · 2022: 13 · 2020: 2 · 2017: 1 · 2014: 1
Type
posted content
Language
en
Open access
Locations
  • SSRN Electronic Journal (acceptedVersion)
  • eYLS (Yale Law School) (submittedVersion)
  • Emory law journal
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Merger and Competition Analysis
  • Social Sciences › Law › Diverse Legal and Medical Studies
  • Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Legal and Constitutional Studies
Keywords
monopsony, buyer power, competition law, monopolization, market share thresholds, consumer harm, antitrust enforcement, competition policy

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CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Looking at the Monopsony in the Mirror. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.2139/ssrn.2094553
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Stucke, M. E. (2012). Looking at the Monopsony in the Mirror. SSRN Electronic Journal. https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2094553