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The DOI matches its Crossref record; 31 of the 32 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.

Policies designed for self-interested citizens may undermine ‘the moral sentiments’: evidence from economic experiments

Bowles, Samuel · 2008 · Science

Abstract

High-performance organizations and economies work on the basis not only of material interests but also of Adam Smith's “moral sentiments.” Well-designed laws and public policies can harness self-interest for the common good. However, incentives that appeal to self-interest may fail when they undermine the moral values that lead people to act altruistically or in other public-spirited ways. Behavioral experiments reviewed here suggest that economic incentives may be counterproductive when they signal that selfishness is an appropriate response; constitute a learning environment through which over time people come to adopt more self-interested motivations; compromise the individual's sense of self-determination and thereby degrade intrinsic motivations; or convey a message of distrust, disrespect, and unfair intent. Many of these unintended effects of incentives occur because people act not only to acquire economic goods and services but also to constitute themselves as dignified, autonomous, and moral individuals. Good organizational and institutional design can channel the material interests for the achievement of social goals while also enhancing the contribution of the moral sentiments to the same ends.

Overview

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Crossref · 10.1126/science.1152110

Cites

31 of 31 references verified0 citation errors · 0 not checkable

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Citations

Cites

Show all 32 references

Research works printed but not linked: 8

  1. D. Hume, David Hume, The Philosophical Works, T. H. Green, T. H. Grose, Eds. (Longmans, Green, and Co, London, 1898), pp. 117–118.
  2. J. J. Laffont, E. Maskin, in Advances in Economic Theory, W. Hildenbrand, Ed. (Cambridge Univ. Press, Cambridge, 1982) pp. 31–92.
  3. S. Bowles, J. Econ. Lit.36, 75 (1998).
  4. B. S. Frey, Econ. J.107, 1043 (1997). · doi:10.1111/j.1468-0297.1997.tb00006.x · Paper page
  5. S. Bowles, S.-H. Hwang, J. Public Econ.92, 8 (2008).
  6. J. Andreoni, B. Erand, J. Feinstein, J. Econ. Lit.36, 818 (1998).
  7. E. Fehr, S. Gaechter, J. Econ. Perspect.14, 159 (2000).
  8. J. Falkinger, E. Fehr, S. Gaechter, R. Winter-Ebmer, Am. Econ. Rev.90, 247 (2000).

Cited by

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Metadata

Authors
Bowles, S.
Affiliations
University of Siena (IT)
Corresponding author
Bowles, Samuel
Venue
Science
Published
2008-06-20
Volume
320
Issue
5883
Pages
1605-1609
ISSN
  • 0036-8075 (ISSN-L)
  • 1095-9203
OpenAlex
W1998053404
Cited by
833
References
32
Citations by year
2026: 39 · 2025: 31 · 2024: 25 · 2023: 42 · 2022: 25 · 2021: 60 · 2020: 39 · 2019: 63 · 2018: 74 · 2017: 49 · 2016: 35 · 2015: 53 · 2014: 48 · 2013: 58 · 2012: 70
FWCI
19.09
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
closed
Locations
  • Science (publishedVersion)
  • PubMed (publishedVersion)
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies
  • Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Economic Theory and Institutions
  • Social Sciences › Decision Sciences › General Decision Sciences › Decision-Making and Behavioral Economics
Keywords
moral sentiments, self-interest, economic incentives, altruism, intrinsic motivation, self-determination, organizational design, institutional design, Adam Smith, public policy, behavioral economics
MeSH terms
Economics, Games, Experimental, Humans, Morals, Motivation, Policy Making, Public Policy, Social Behavior, Personal Autonomy

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CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Policies designed for self-interested citizens may undermine ‘the moral sentiments’: evidence from economic experiments. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1126/science.1152110
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Bowles, S. (2008). Policies designed for self-interested citizens may undermine ‘the moral sentiments’: evidence from economic experiments. Science. https://doi.org/10.1126/science.1152110

Data sources

Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.

Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).

Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.