The Power of Shareholder Votes: Evidence from Uncontested Director Elections
Open accessAbstract
This paper asks the question whether dissent votes in uncontested director elections have consequences for directors. We show that, contrary to popular belief based on prior studies, shareholder votes have power and result in negative consequences for directors. Directors facing dissent are more likely to depart boards, especially if they are not lead directors or chairs of important committees. Directors facing dissent who do not leave are moved to less prominent positions on boards. Finally, we find evidence that directors facing dissent face reduced opportunities in the market for directors. We also find that the effects of dissent votes go beyond those of proxy advisor recommendations.
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Wealth-performance-sensitivities decline with common ownership.
“Fos and Tsoutsoura (2014); Aggarwal, Dahiya, and Prabhala (2015) show commonly owned, and show that wealth-performance-sensitivities decline with common ownership.”
From Anticompetitive Effects of Common Ownership (2018) · cites this paper as Aggarwal, Dahiya, and Prabhala (2015)
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Anticompetitive Effects of Common Ownership
AZAR, J., SCHMALZ, M. C., & TECU, I. (2018) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/jofi.12698 · Cited by 980 · see citing works
- Authors
- Aggarwal, R., Dahiya, S., & Prabhala, N.
- Affiliations
- Georgetown University (US)
- Johns Hopkins University (US)
- Corresponding author
- Aggarwal, Reena
- Venue
- Journal of Financial Economics
- Publisher
- Elsevier BV
- Published
- 2015
- Volume
- 133
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 134-153
- ISSN
- 0304-405X (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W3123512527
- Cited by
- 167
- References
- 0
- Citations by year
- 2026: 15 · 2025: 33 · 2024: 19 · 2023: 28 · 2022: 22 · 2021: 15 · 2020: 9 · 2019: 9 · 2018: 8 · 2017: 6 · 2016: 1 · 2015: 1 · 2014: 1
- FWCI
- 30.16
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
- doi.org
- Locations
- Journal of Financial Economics (publishedVersion)
- SSRN Electronic Journal (acceptedVersion)
- RePEc: Research Papers in Economics (submittedVersion)
- Funders
- Georgetown University
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Business, Management and Accounting › Accounting › Corporate Finance and Governance
- Social Sciences › Business, Management and Accounting › Strategy and Management › Corporate Governance and Law
- Social Sciences › Gender Studies › Gender Diversity and Inequality
- Keywords
- corporate governance
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