The DOI matches its DataCite record; 20 of the 20 references it cites were found in a registry or an index; 1 of the 135 sources its claims cite were checked for support.
Trust, but Verify: Why the Blockchain Needs the Law
Open accessAbstract
The blockchain could be the most consequential development in information technology since the Internet. Created to support the Bitcoin digital currency, the blockchain is actually something deeper: a novel solution to the age-old human problem of trust. Its potential is extraordinary. Yet, this approach may not promote trust at all without effective governance. Wholly divorced from legal enforcement, blockchain-based systems may be counterproductive or even dangerous. And they are less insulated from the law’s reach than it seems. The central question is not how to regulate blockchains but how blockchains regulate. They may supplement, complement, or substitute for legal enforcement. Excessive or premature application of rigid legal obligations will stymie innovation and forego opportunities to leverage technology to achieve public policy objectives. Blockchain developers and legal institutions can work together. Each must recognize the unique affordances of the other system.
Overview
CoChat Summary
TL;DR
The article argues that blockchain’s cryptographic verification cannot by itself produce durable trust; it must be integrated with legal institutions and governance. It maps how distributed ledgers can supplement, complement, or substitute for law, and proposes hybrids such as safe harbors, modular contracts, oracles, and on-chain governance.
Key findings
- Blockchain systems can verify transactions without relying on a central intermediary, but the paper argues this is not the same as trust. The DAO episode—about 11,000 participants committing roughly $150 million in Ether, with a third taken—shows that code alone cannot resolve intent, theft, or governance disputes.
- The article identifies vulnerabilities beyond consensus: smart contracts, edge services and exchanges, and token issuers. It cites Mt. Gox’s collapse with over $400 million stolen, Bitfinex’s loss of nearly $70 million, a 2018 Japanese exchange theft of half a billion dollars, and 2016 data showing at least fifteen cryptocurrency theft incidents of $1 million or more, totaling over $600 million.
- It argues token sales create securities-like risks: 2017 ICOs raised over $5 billion, Telegram sought $2 billion, and almost no ICOs registered. The SEC treated The DAO tokens as securities, while Ripple paid a $950,000 FinCEN penalty and agreed to AML/KYC compliance.
- The paper proposes three relationships between blockchains and law: supplementing existing regimes (e.g., Corda, title records), complementing them (e.g., orphan works registries, artist rights), and substituting where legal enforcement is weak (e.g., a UN food aid trial tracking aid to 10,000 Syrian refugees in Jordan). It also discusses safe harbors and sandboxes, modular legal contracts, Ricardian contracts, oracles and arbitration, and on-chain governance.
Methods
- Conceptual and doctrinal legal analysis, not an empirical study. It synthesizes blockchain technical architecture—distributed ledgers, consensus, and smart contracts—with cyberlaw theory and regulatory examples.
- Uses case studies and regulatory episodes: The DAO hack and Ethereum hard fork, Silk Road, Mt. Gox, Bitfinex, Ripple/FinCEN, New York’s BitLicense, the SEC’s DAO report, and the UK FCA sandbox, among others.
- Main analysis compares legal and code-based trust mechanisms and categorizes interactions as supplement, complement, or substitute, then evaluates governance hybrids.
Limitations
- The paper states that blockchain is still early-stage and its development remains uncertain; it notes open research questions about consensus security and performance and says its proposals are exploratory rather than guaranteed.
- Evident from the text: published in 2018, so its regulatory and market examples predate later developments; it is normative and argumentative, relying on illustrative cases rather than systematic data; some cited estimates come from third parties such as Goldman Sachs and are not independently tested.
Model-written summary. Check it against the paper before relying on it.
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
0 Valid · 12 Not valid · 130 Not checked · 226 Own results and interpretations
In the paper
“Another major exchange, Bitfinex, was hacked in 2016, losing cryptocurrency valued at nearly $70 million.146”
§ TRUST, BUT VERIFY: WHY THE BLOCKCHAIN NEEDS THE LAW > 3. Trusting Edge Services
What the sources say
- Not matchedcites [146]
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
plain- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: unclear — It is unclear whether the paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
- Not matched
In the paper
“And in early 2018, a Japanese exchange reported a theft of half a billion dollars of cryptocurrency.147”
§ TRUST, BUT VERIFY: WHY THE BLOCKCHAIN NEEDS THE LAW > 3. Trusting Edge Services
What the sources say
- Not matchedcites [147]
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
plain- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: unclear — It is unclear whether the paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
- Not matched
In the paper
“And indeed, vulnerabilities have already been identified in high-profile Ethereum smart contracts.134”
§ TRUST, BUT VERIFY: WHY THE BLOCKCHAIN NEEDS THE LAW > 2. Trusting Smart Contracts
What the sources say
- Not matchedcites [134]
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
plain- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
- Not matched
In the paper
“In 2014, the most prominent Bitcoin exchange, Mt.Gox, collapsed after hackers stole a significant amount of currency, then worth over $400 million.145”
§ TRUST, BUT VERIFY: WHY THE BLOCKCHAIN NEEDS THE LAW > 3. Trusting Edge Services
What the sources say
- Not matchedcites [145]
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
plainstates a causeSingle case- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: unclear — It is unclear whether the paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
- Not matched
In the paper
“The danger of a 51% attack increases when mining network power decreases.129”
§ TRUST, BUT VERIFY: WHY THE BLOCKCHAIN NEEDS THE LAW > 1. Trusting Ledgers
What the sources say
- Not matchedcites [129]
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
plainstates a cause- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: unclear — It is unclear whether the paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
- Not matched
126 more claims
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- It may state two separate claims as one. 74
- Probably not a substantial claim. 200
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
Each contradiction between two passages listed here was confirmed by an independent check.
Rated minor: it would not touch a result — a value no result rests on, a p-value that stays on the same side of the significance level, or a conflict that is clerical, resolved elsewhere in the paper, or outside its own findings.
In the paper
§ TRUST, BUT VERIFY: WHY THE BLOCKCHAIN NEEDS THE LAW > Consensus
“The Bitcoin network today is thousands of times more powerful than the world's 500 most powerful supercomputers combined.”
§ TRUST, BUT VERIFY: WHY THE BLOCKCHAIN NEEDS THE LAW > 1. Trusting Ledgers
“Today, that would be equivalent to several hundred of the world's fastest supercomputers, running non-stop.”
Citations
Cites
The publisher hasn’t deposited this paper’s reference list.
Research works printed but not linked: 6
- [9]9. Trevor I. Kiviat, Beyond Bitcoin: Issues in Regulating Blockchain Transactions, 65
- [22]22. see generally, Swanson, supra note 85 at 4-5. 121. See Richard Gendal Brown, Towards Deeper Collaboration in Distributed Ledgers: Thoughts on Digital Asset's Global Synchronisation Log, GENDAL.ME (Jan. 24, 2017), https://gendal.me/2017/01/24/towards-deeper-collaboration-in-distributed-ledgers -thoughts-on-digital-assets-global-synchronisation-log/ [https://perma.cc/Q9BP-V8K2]. 122. Vlad Zamfir (@VladZamfir), TWITTER (Mar. 4, 2017, 4:40 AM), https://twitter.com/vladzamfir/status/838006311598030848?lang=en [https://perma.cc/Z94J-VNDB]. Zamfir felt the need to explain himself the next day in a longer post. See Vlad Zamfir, About My Tweet from Yesterday.., MEDIUM (Mar. 5, 2017), https://medium.com/@Vlad_Zamfir/about-my-tweet-from-yesterday-dcc61915b572 [https://perma.cc/P6BL-ECND]. 123. Agreement does not necessarily presume trust. An insight of game theory is that even non-communicating parties may converge on common points by independently choosing the most likely or familiar option. See
- [24]24. Vitalik Buterin, SchellingCoin: A Minimal-Trust Universal Data Feed, ETHEREUM BLOG (Mar. 28, 2014), https://blog.ethereum.org/2014/03/28/schellingcoin-a-minimal-trust-universal-data-feed/ [https://perma.cc/ZHA6-WSH9]. 145. See Robin Sidel, Eleanor Warnock & Takashi Mochizuki, Almost Half a Billion Worth of Bitcoins Vanish, WALL ST. J. (Feb. 28, 2014) https://www.wsj.com/articles/mt-gox-to-hold -news-conference-1393579356 [https://perma.cc/C8E5-AG7A];
- [29]29. FED. COMM. L.J. 203, 207 (2013). 200. See id. at 231. 201. See Camila Russo, Ethereum Co-Founder Says Crypto Coin Market Is a Time-Bomb, BLOOMBERG (July 18, 2017), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-07 -18/ethereum-co-founder-says-crypto-coin-market-is-ticking-time-bomb [https://perma.cc/H3ZB-6CPC] (quoting Ripple CEO Brad Garlinghouse, stating that, "If it talks like a duck and walks like a duck, the SEC will say it's a duck."). 202. See Sarah Todd, Fincen Fines Ripple Labs Over AML, Says Firm 'Enhancing' Protocol, AM.
- [35]35. WAKE FOREST L. REV. 345, 359 (2014). 244. See, e.g., Derek Khanna, The Law that Gave Us the Modern Internet-and the Campaign to
- [40]40. LEGALESE, http://legalese.com [https://perma.cc/2TUM-7SXM] (last visited Sept. 2, 2018). 258. See INT'L SWAPS & DERIVATIVES ASS'N., The Future of Derivatives Processing and Market Infrastructure [hereinafter ISDA WHITE PAPER] (Sept. 2016), at 15, https://www2.isda.org/attachment/ODcwMA==/Infrastructure%20white%20paper.pdf [https://perma.cc/KE4P-BZDS]. 259. See Werbach & Cornell, supra note 25, at 318. 260. See generally Ian Grigg, The Ricardian Contract, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE FIRST IEEE WORKSHOP ON ELECTRONIC CONTRACTING 25 (2004). 261. See id. at 25. 262. The Ricardo platform that Grigg was building never took off. 263. See Clack et al., supra note 251, at 12;
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Metadata
- Authors
- Werbach, K.
- Affiliations
- University of Pennsylvania (US)
- Corresponding author
- Werbach, Kevin
- ORCID
- Werbach, Kevin
- Venue
- Berkeley Technology Law Journal
- Publisher
- Berkeley Technology Law Journal
- Published
- 2018
- Volume
- 33
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 487
- ISSN
- 1556-5068 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W3125186743
- Cited by
- 235
- References
- 0
- Citations by year
- 2026: 6 · 2025: 30 · 2024: 30 · 2023: 30 · 2022: 33 · 2021: 25 · 2020: 37 · 2019: 27 · 2018: 13
- Type
- posted content
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
- doi.org
- Locations
- SSRN Electronic Journal (acceptedVersion)
- bepress Legal Repository (submittedVersion, public-domain)
- Berkeley technology law journal
- UC Berkeley
- Topics
- Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Information Systems › Blockchain Technology Applications and Security
- Social Sciences › Law › Digital Transformation in Law
- Social Sciences › Law › Digitalization, Law, and Regulation
- Keywords
- blockchain, trust, blockchain regulation, blockchain governance, Bitcoin, legal enforcement, innovation and regulation, public policy, law and technology
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Data sources
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
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