CoChat
Sign Up
Cited by 37Monetary Policy and Economic ImpactFiscal Policies and Political EconomyGlobal Financial Crisis and Policies

The Politics of Central Bank Independence

Open access
<!>de Haan, Jakob, Eijffinger, Sylvester C. W.·2016·SSRN Electronic Journal
DOI 10.2139/ssrn.2887931
Open this paper in CoChat — free accountOpen PDF

The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.

Run the check — free, no account needed. It reads the open-access text and checks the sources it cites.

A few free checks a day · papers already verified open instantly · results are public

Integrity signals

Registry

Crossref · 10.2139/ssrn.2887931

Cites

4 of 4 references verified0 citation errors · 0 not checkable

Statistics

Claims the paper makes

The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.

Run the check — free, no account needed. It reads the open-access text and checks the sources it cites.

A few free checks a day · papers already verified open instantly · results are public

Claims other papers make about this one

Each is checked against this paper’s own text: does it say what the citing paper says it does?

  • In practice, a substantive portion of the liquidity injected by unconventional monetary policy has been used to buy existing assets instead of stimulating investment and consumption, leading to booms on real estate and stock markets and to unintended distributive consequences.

    “In practice, a substantive portion has been used to buy existing assets instead, thus leading to booms on real estate and stock markets and to unintended distributive consequences (e.g., De Haan and Eijffinger 2016; White 2012).”

    From Independent Agencies, Distribution, and Legitimacy: The Case of Central Banks (2020) · cites this paper as De Haan and Eijffinger 2016

    Split into 2 atoms — 0 confirmed, 2 partially supported, 0 disputed, 0 misattributed, 0 unverifiable. Expand the claim to see per-atom verdicts.

    Experimental — accuracy not yet measured

  • Unconventional monetary policy since the 2007 financial crisis inevitably involves choices with significant distributive consequences.

    “In sum, it seems fair to say that unconventional monetary policy of the kind we have seen since the financial crisis inevitably involves choices that have significant distributive consequences.”

    From Independent Agencies, Distribution, and Legitimacy: The Case of Central Banks (2020) · cites this paper as De Haan and Eijffinger 2016

  • Contemporary monetary policy has significant distributive consequences.

    “Given that monetary policy today has significant distributive consequences”

    From Independent Agencies, Distribution, and Legitimacy: The Case of Central Banks (2020) · cites this paper as De Haan and Eijffinger 2016

Self-check

Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.

The self-check needs the paper’s full text.

Cites

Flagged first, then by citations

Research works printed but not linked: 64

  1. Adolph, C. 2013. Bankers, Bureaucrats and Central Bank Politics: The Myth of Neutrality. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
  2. Aiyagari, S. R., and M. Gertler. 1985. "The Backing of Government Bonds and Mone tarism." Journal of Monetary Economics 16: 19-44.
  3. Alesina, A., and R. Gatti 1995. "Independent Central Banks: Low Inflation at No Cost?" American Economic Review 85(2): 196-200.
  4. Alesina, A., and G. Tabellini. 2008. "Bureaucrats or Politicians? Part II: Multiple Policy Tasks." Journal of Public Economics 92: 426-447.
  5. Artha, I. K. S., and J. de Haan. 2015. "Financial Crises and the Dismissal of Central Bank Governors: New Evidence." International Journal of Finance and Economics 20: 80-95.
  6. Barro, R. J., and D. B. Gordon. 1983. "Rules, Discretion and Reputation in a Model of Monetary Policy." Journal of Monetary Economics 12: 101-121.
  7. Belke, A., and N. Potrafke. 2012. "Does Government Ideology Matter in Monetary Policy? A Panel Data Analysis for OECD Countries." Journal of International Money and Finance 31: 1126-1139.
  8. Berger, H., J. de Haan, and S. C. W. Eijffinger 2001. "Central Bank Independence: An Up date of Theory and Evidence." Journal of Economic Surveys 15: 3-40.
  9. Bernanke, B. S. 2010. "Central Bank Independence, Transparency, and Accountability." Speech at the Institute for Monetary and Economic Studies International Conference, Bank of Japan, Tokyo, May 25.
  10. Bernhard, W. 1998. "A Political Explanation of Variations in Central Bank Independence." American Political Science Review 92: 311-327.
  11. PRINTED FROM OXFORD HANDBOOKS ONLINE (www.oxfordhandbooks.com). © Oxford University Press, 2018.
  12. All Rights Reserved. Under the terms of the licence agreement, an individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a title in Oxford Handbooks Online for personal use (for details see Privacy Policy and Legal Notice). Subscriber: University of Groningen; date: 12 February 2020
  13. Bhattarai, S., J. W. Lee, and W. Y. Park. 2012. "Monetary-Fiscal Policy Interactions and In determinacy in Postwar US Data." American Economic Review: Papers & Proceedings 102(3): 173-178.
  14. Bhattarai, S., J. W. Lee, and W. Y. Park. 2014. "Inflation Dynamics: The Role of Public Debt and Policy Regimes." Journal of Monetary Economics 67: 93-108.
  15. Bhattarai, S., J. W. Lee, and W. Y. Park. 2016. "Policy Regimes, Policy Shifts, and U.S. Busi ness Cycles." Review of Economics and Statistics 98: 968-983.
  16. Blinder, A. S. 2012. "Central Bank Independence and Credibility During and After a Cri sis." Jackson Hole Symposium, Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City, September 1.
  17. Bodea, C., and R. Hicks. 2015. "Price Stability and Central Bank Independence: Disci pline, Credibility and Democratic Institutions." International Organization 69(1): 35-61.
  18. Bodea, C., and M. Higashijima. 2017. "Central Bank Independence and Fiscal Policy: In centives to Spend and Constraints on the Executive." British Journal of Political Science 47: 47-70.
  19. Campillo, M., and J. A. Miron. 1997. "Why Does Inflation Differ Across Countries?" In Re ducing Inflation: Motivation and Strategy, edited by C.D. Romer and D. H. Romer, 335- 357. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. (p. 517)
  20. Cerutti, E., S. Claessens, and L. Laeven. 2017. "The Use and Effectiveness of Macroprudential Policies: New Evidence." Journal of Financial Stability 28: 203-224.
  21. Cochrane, J. H. 2011. "Determinacy and Identification with Taylor Rules." Journal of Polit ical Economy 119(3): 565-615.
  22. Crowe, C. 2008. "Goal Independent Central Banks: Why Politicians Decide to Delegate." European Journal of Political Economy 24: 748-762.
  23. Crowe, C., and E. Meade. 2007. "Central Bank Governance: What Is It and Does It Mat ter?" Journal of Economic Perspectives 21: 69-90.
  24. Crowe, C., and E. Meade. 2008. "Central Bank Independence and Transparency: Evolu tion and Effectiveness." European Journal of Political Economy 24: 763-777.
  25. Cukierman, A. 2008. "Central Bank Independence and Monetary Policymaking Institu tions: Past, Present and Future." European Journal of Political Economy 24(4): 722-736.
  26. PRINTED FROM OXFORD HANDBOOKS ONLINE (www.oxfordhandbooks.com). © Oxford University Press, 2018. All Rights Reserved. Under the terms of the licence agreement, an individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a title in Oxford Handbooks Online for personal use (for details see Privacy Policy and Legal Notice). Subscriber: University of Groningen; date: 12 February 2020
  27. Cukierman A. 2013. "Monetary Policy and Institutions Before, During, and After the Glob al Financial Crisis." Journal of Financial Stability 9: 373-384.
  28. Cukierman, A., S. B. Webb, and B. Neyapti. 1992. "Measuring the Independence of Cen tral Banks and Its Effects on Policy Outcomes." World Bank Economic Review 6: 353-398.
  29. Davig, T., and E. M. Leeper. 2011. "Monetary-Fiscal Policy Interactions and Fiscal Stimu lus." European Economic Review 55: 211-227.
  30. Del Negro, M., and Ch. A. Sims. 2015. "When Does a Central Bank's Balance Sheet Re quire Fiscal Support?" Journal of Monetary Economics 73: 1-19.
  31. Dreher, A., J. Sturm, and J. de Haan. 2010. "When Is a Central Bank Governor Replaced? Evidence Based on a New Data Set." Journal of Macroeconomics 32(3): 766-781.
  32. Ehrmann, M., and M. Fratzscher. 2011. "Politics and Monetary Policy." Review of Econom ics and Statistics 93(3): 941-960.
  33. Eijffinger, S. C. W., and M. Hoeberichts. 1998. "The Trade Off between Central Bank Inde pendence and Conservativeness." Oxford Economic Papers 50: 397-411.
  34. Eijffinger, S. C. W., and M. Hoeberichts. 2008. "The Trade Off between Central Bank Inde pendence and Conservativeness in a New Keynesian Framework." European Journal of Political Economics 24: 742-747.
  35. Ennser-Jedenastik, L. 2014. "Party Politics and the Survival of Central Bank Governors." European Journal of Political Research 53: 500-519.
  36. Fernández-Albertos, J. 2015. "The Politics of Central Bank Independence." Annual Review of Political Science 18: 217-237.
  37. PRINTED FROM OXFORD HANDBOOKS ONLINE (www.oxfordhandbooks.com). © Oxford University Press, 2018. All Rights Reserved. Under the terms of the licence agreement, an individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a title in Oxford Handbooks Online for personal use (for details see Privacy Policy and Legal Notice). Subscriber: University of Groningen; date: 12 February 2020
  38. Franzese, R. 1999. "Partially Independent Central Banks, Politically Responsive Govern ments, and Inflation." American Journal of Political Science 43(3): 681-706. (p. 518)
  39. Giordano, R., and P. Tommasino. 2011. "What Determines Debt Intolerance? The Role of Political and Monetary Institutions." European Journal of Political Economy 27: 471-484.
  40. Goodman, J. 1991. "The Politics of Central Bank Independence." Comparative Politics 23(3): 329-349.
  41. Hefeker, C., and B. Zimmer. 2011. "The Optimal Choice of Central Bank Independence and Conservatism under Uncertainty." Journal of Macroeconomics 33: 595-606.
  42. Keefer, P., and D. Stasavage. 2002. "Checks and Balances, Private Information, and the Credibility of Monetary Commitments." International Organization 56(4): 751-774.
  43. Klomp, J., and J. de Haan. 2010c. "Do Central Bank Law Reforms Affect the Term in Office of Central Bank Governors?" Economics Letters 106(3): 219-222.
  44. Kumhof, M., R. Nunes, and I. Yakadina. 2010. "Simple Monetary Rules under Fiscal Domi nance." Journal of Money, Credit and Banking 42(1): 63-92.
  45. Kydland, F. E., and E. C. Prescott. 1977. "Rules Rather than Discretion: The Inconsistency of Optimal Plans." Journal of Political Economy 85: 473-492.
  46. Leeper, E. M. 1991. "Equilibrium under Active and Passive Monetary and Fiscal Policies." Journal of Monetary Economics 27: 129-147.
  47. PRINTED FROM OXFORD HANDBOOKS ONLINE (www.oxfordhandbooks.com). © Oxford University Press, 2018. All Rights Reserved. Under the terms of the licence agreement, an individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a title in Oxford Handbooks Online for personal use (for details see Privacy Policy and Legal Notice). Subscriber: University of Groningen; date: 12 February 2020
  48. Leeper, E. M., and T. B. Walker. 2013. "Perceptions and Misperceptions of Fiscal Infla tion." In Fiscal Policy after the Financial Crisis, edited by A. Alesina and F. Giavazzi, 255-299. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
  49. Levieuge, G., and Y. Lucotte. 2014. "A Simple Empirical Measure of Central Banks' Con servatism." Southern Economic Journal 81(2): 409-434.
  50. Lohmann S. 1997. "Partisan Control of the Money Supply and Decentralized Appointment Powers." European Journal of Political Economy 13: 225-246.
  51. Lohmann S. 2006. "The Non-Politics of Monetary Policy." In The Oxford Handbook of Po litical Economy, edited by B. Weingast and D. Wittman, 523-544. Oxford: Oxford Universi ty Press.
  52. Masciandaro, D., and D. Romelli. 2015. "Ups and Dows. Central Bank Independence from the Great Inflation to the Great Recession: Theory, Institutions and Empirics." Financial History Review 22(3): 259-289.
  53. Maxfield, S. (1997). Gatekeepers of Growth: The International Political Economy of Cen tral Banking in Developing Countries. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
  54. Moser, P. 1999. "Checks and Balances, and the Supply of Central Bank Indepen dence." European Economic Review 43(8): 1569-1593.
  55. Neuenkirch, M., and F. Neumeier. 2015. "Party Affiliation rather than Former Occupation: The Background of Central Bank Governors and Its Effect on Monetary Policy." Applied Economics Letters 22(17): 1424-1429.
  56. Pistoresi, B., F. Salsano, and D. Ferrari. 2011. "Political Institutions and Central Bank In dependence Revisited." Applied Economics Letters 18: 679-682.
  57. Polillo, S., and M. Guillén. 2005. "Globalization Pressures and the State: The Worldwide Spread of Central Bank Independence." American Journal of Sociology 110(6): 1764- 1802.
  58. Posen, A. S. 1993. "Why Central Bank Independence Does Not Cause Low Inflation: There Is No Institutional Fix for Politics." In Finance and the International Economy, edited by R. O'Brien, 41-65. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
  59. Reis, R. 2015. "Comment on: 'When Does a Central Bank's Balance Sheet Require Fiscal Support?' by M. Del Negro and Ch. A. Sims." Journal of Monetary Economics 73: 20-25.
  60. PRINTED FROM OXFORD HANDBOOKS ONLINE (www.oxfordhandbooks.com). © Oxford University Press, 2018. All Rights Reserved. Under the terms of the licence agreement, an individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a title in Oxford Handbooks Online for personal use (for details see Privacy Policy and Legal Notice). Subscriber: University of Groningen; date: 12 February 2020
  61. Rogoff, K. 1985. "The Optimal Degree of Commitment to an Intermediate Monetary Tar get." Quarterly Journal of Economics 100: 1169-1189.
  62. Sargent T., and N. Wallace. 1981. "Some Unpleasant Monetarist Arithmetic." Federal Re serve Bank of Minneapolis Quarterly Review 5(3): 1-17.
  63. Stella, P. 2005. "Central Bank Financial Strength, Transparency and Policy Credibility." IMF Staff Papers 52(2): 335-365.
  64. Vuletin, G., and L. Zhu. 2011. "Replacing a 'Disobedient' Central Bank Governor with a 'Docile' One: A Novel Measure of Central Bank Independence and Its Effect on Inflation." Journal of Money, Credit and Banking 43(6): 1185-1215.

Cited by

Sorted by citations

Authors
<!>de Haan, J., & Eijffinger, S. C. W.
Affiliations
Ifo Institute for Economic Research (DE)
Venue
SSRN Electronic Journal
Publisher
Elsevier BV
Published
2016
ISSN
1556-5068 (ISSN-L)
DOI
10.2139/ssrn.2887931
OpenAlex
W3005870229
Cited by
37
References
4
Citations by year
2025: 2 · 2024: 15 · 2023: 1 · 2022: 4 · 2021: 2 · 2020: 7 · 2019: 2 · 2018: 2 · 2017: 2
Type
posted content
Language
en
Open access
Licence
other-oa
Locations
SSRN Electronic Journal (publishedVersion, other-oa)
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › General Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Monetary Policy and Economic Impact
  • Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Fiscal Policies and Political Economy
  • Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Finance › Global Financial Crisis and Policies
Keywords
central bank independence, monetary policy, political economy of monetary policy, inflation bias, coalition government, political polarization, financial crisis, unconventional monetary policy, macroprudential policy, financial stability, fiscal dominance, central bank governors

About these checks

Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.

Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.

Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.

What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›

Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review