The Rise of Robots and the Law of Humans
Open accessThe DOI matches its Crossref record; 2 of the 2 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
In this article, I attempt to answer fundamental questions raised by the rise of robots and the emergence of ‘robot law’. The main theses developed in this article are the following: (i) robot regulation must be robot- and context-specific. This requires a profound understanding of the micro- and macro-effects of ‘robot behaviour’ in specific areas. (ii) (Refined) existing legal categories are capable of being sensibly applied to and regulating robots. (iii) Robot law is shaped by the ‘deep normative structure’ of a society. (iv) If that structure is utilitarian, smart robots should, in the not too distant future, be treated like humans. That means that they should be accorded legal personality, have the power to acquire and hold property and to conclude contracts. (v) The case against treating robots like humans rests on epistemological and ontological arguments. These relate to whether machines can think (they cannot) and what it means to be human. I develop these theses primarily in the context of self-driving cars – robots on the road with a huge potential to revolutionize our daily lives and commerce.
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“The Brazilian regulatory framework emphasizes the protection of personal data; however, this approach does not provide comprehensive regulation for the operation of AI systems. 3”
From Responsibility in the Field of Artificial Intelligence Systems Usage: Features of Private and Public Law Regulation (2025) · cites this paper as [3]
Citations
Cites
Searle, J. R. (1980) · Behavioral and Brain Sciences · doi:10.1017/s0140525x00005756 · Cited by 6,954
(2015) · Transformations of Populism in Europe and the Americas : History and Recent Tendencies · doi:10.5040/9781474225243.ch-006 · Cited by 908
Research works printed but not linked: 8
- Eidenm�ller (note 40 supra)
- Robots' Legal Eidenm�ller, 2017, Oxford Business Law Blog
- Juristenzeitung (JZ) 2016, pp. 660, 663 et seq. ("[Roboter] sind insoweit rechtsf�hig, wie es zweckm��ig ist, also immer dann, wenn entweder ihre Einordnung als selbst�ndiger Akteur zu ihrem Schutz notwendig ist oder f�r den Rechtsverkehr einen Mehrwert bringt."). However, utilitarianism is of course a much disgraced legal philosophy. See, for example, Eidenm�ller, Effizienz als Rechtsprinzip: M�glichkeiten und Grenzen der �konomischen Analyse des Rechts
- See Darling (note 29 supra), 226
- 1992, This point was succinctly made by Dreyfus, What Computers Still Can't Do: A Critique of Artificial Reason
- 1982, Kripke suggested a 'sceptical solution'. This takes the form of a social criterion of rule following: an individual follows a rule insofar as its behavior conforms to that of other members of their community, As should be clear from the text, this assessment is based on a conception of rule-following that is richer than the reductionist approach advocated by Kripke, Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language
- 2015, On the threats for the 'human condition' by 'Big Data', see generally White, We, Robots: Staying Human in the Age of Big Data
- 2011, On regulatory competition in different fields of the law, see, for example, Eidenm�ller, The Transnational Law Market, Regulatory Competition, and Transnational Corporations, Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies, 18
Cited by
Hickman, E., & Petrin, M. (2020) · European Business Organization Law Review · doi:10.1007/s40804-021-00224-0 · Cited by 217
Artificial Intelligence and Law Enforcement
Rademacher, T. (2019) · Springer eBooks · doi:10.1007/978-3-030-32361-5_10 · Cited by 113
Symbiosis with artificial intelligence via the prism of law, robots, and society
Karnouskos, S. (2021) · Artificial Intelligence and Law · doi:10.1007/s10506-021-09289-1 · Cited by 107
Artificial Intelligence as a Challenge for Law and Regulation
Hoffmann‐Riem, W. (2019) · Springer eBooks · doi:10.1007/978-3-030-32361-5_1 · Cited by 117
Liability for robots I: legal challenges
Guerra, A., Parisi, F., & Pi, D. (2021) · Journal of Institutional Economics · doi:10.1017/s1744137421000825 · Cited by 41
Metadata
- Authors
- Eidenmueller, H. G. M.
- Affiliations
- University of Oxford (GB)
- Corresponding author
- Eidenmueller, Horst G. M.
- Venue
- SSRN Electronic Journal
- Publisher
- Elsevier BV
- Published
- 2017
- ISSN
- 1556-5068 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2598490853
- Cited by
- 52
- References
- 2
- Citations by year
- 2025: 1 · 2024: 8 · 2023: 10 · 2022: 4 · 2021: 15 · 2020: 3 · 2019: 8 · 2018: 2 · 2017: 1
- Type
- posted content
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
- doi.org
- Locations
- SSRN Electronic Journal (acceptedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Law › Digitalization, Law, and Regulation
- Social Sciences › Law › Literary and Philosophical Studies
- Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Artificial Intelligence › Ethics and Social Impacts of AI
- Keywords
- robotics law, robotics regulation, legal personality of robots, intelligent robots, autonomous vehicles, legal categories, utilitarianism, human nature, artificial consciousness, property rights, contract formation
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