Two-Sided Adverse Selection and Bilateral Reviews in Sharing Economy
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Abstract
We examine two-sided adverse selection in a sharing economy context where a platform matches service providers with consumers and both providers and consumers derive heterogeneous payoffs depending on whom they are matched with. Unlike the more prevalent unilateral review scheme in which only consumers rate providers, many sharing economy platforms use a bilateral review scheme in which both consumers and providers rate each other to reduce the information asymmetry on both sides of the market and to facilitate superior matches. However, we show that the bilateral review scheme does not necessarily lead to a higher social welfare than either the unilateral review scheme or the no review scheme. If the proportion of the low-cost consumers is less than a threshold, consumers are better off, the platform is worse off, and the providers are worse off under the bilateral review scheme than the unilateral review scheme. The key driver for these results is that the price competition between providers for the low-cost consumers can be fundamentally different under the different review schemes; the price competition affects the consumer preference for a provider and hence the match between consumers and providers, which ultimately determines the payoffs to participants and the social welfare. Our results highlight the importance of addressing the consumer-side adverse selection first to eliminate a market failure even in the sharing economy context. Our findings also contribute to the adverse selection literature by identifying the critical role played by demand and supply conditions on the impact of adverse selection.
Overview
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TL;DR
The paper develops a game-theoretic model of a peer-to-peer sharing platform with two-sided adverse selection and compares no reviews, unilateral reviews, and bilateral reviews. It finds that bilateral reviews intensify provider price competition, lower platform profit, can raise provider profit when low-cost consumers are sufficiently numerous, and do not always improve social welfare relative to unilateral reviews or no reviews.
Key findings
- Bilateral reviews intensify price competition because providers lower prices to attract low-cost consumers; consequently, the platform’s revenue is lower under bilateral reviews than under unilateral reviews (Proposition 3). In low demand the platform profit is the same under both schemes, but in high demand unilateral reviews always yield higher platform profit.
- Providers’ total profit is higher under bilateral reviews than under unilateral reviews when the proportion of low-cost consumers is sufficiently high: \(\pi^{BR*} > \pi^{UR*}\) if and only if \(\gamma^* < \gamma \le 1\), where \(\gamma^*\) is a threshold formula given in the paper. Otherwise, providers are worse off under bilateral reviews.
- Social welfare is greater under unilateral reviews than under no reviews (Proposition 1). However, bilateral reviews yield lower social welfare than unilateral reviews when the proportion of high-quality providers is sufficiently high, \(q_H/(q_H+q_L) < \rho\), and the proportion of low-cost consumers is sufficiently low, \(\gamma < \frac{M(1-\rho)(q_H-q_L)}{q_H(N_H-M\rho)-q_L M(1-\rho)}\) (Proposition 2). Figure 3 also indicates bilateral reviews can hurt social welfare even relative to no reviews when both \(\rho\) and \(\gamma\) are small.
- Consumer surplus is greater under bilateral reviews than under unilateral reviews (Proposition 5), because providers lower prices to compete for low-cost consumers.
Methods
- Analytical game-theoretic model of an online peer-to-peer platform that matches \(M\) competing providers with \(N\) consumers. Providers choose prices and pay the platform a commission \(\alpha\); provider quality is \(q_j \in \{q_H,q_L\}\), consumer cost type is \(\theta_i \in \{\theta_H,\theta_L\}\), and provider \(j\)’s cost to serve consumer \(i\) is \(c_{i,j} = \theta_i q_j\).
- The model compares three information regimes: no review, unilateral review (provider types revealed), and bilateral review (both provider and consumer types revealed). It derives equilibrium prices, provider profits, platform profit, consumer surplus, and social welfare under high-demand and low-demand scenarios.
- Social welfare is calculated as expected service quality minus expected cost to serve; prices cancel out in the welfare calculation. Proofs and equilibrium derivations are provided in the appendix.
Limitations
- The paper states several limitations and future extensions: the platform’s matching algorithm is assumed to maximize social welfare rather than its own profit; ratings are assumed to reveal provider quality and consumer type perfectly; providers are assumed to charge one price, whereas in practice they may charge multiple prices such as cleaning fees or refundable deposits; competing platforms with different review schemes and endogenous provider quality choices are left for future work.
- The model assumes the proportions of low-cost consumers and high-quality providers are common knowledge for analytical tractability, and it considers only two demand scenarios (high and low), excluding other possible demand configurations for brevity.
- The text makes evident that the analysis abstracts away from search frictions, review manipulation, and the platform’s information-disclosure policy, focusing instead on the impact of the bilateral review scheme itself.
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Verification
Claims the paper makes
0 Valid · 2 Not valid · 9 Not checked · 64 Own results and interpretations
A result the paper states — it cites no source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“Interestingly, service providers may be better off with more intense price competition and lower prices when the proportion of low-cost consumers is sufficiently high.”
- Also stated in: § Introduction · hedged
“Interestingly, service providers may be better off with more intense price competition and lower prices when the proportion of low-cost consumers are sufficiently high.”
hedgedstates a possible cause- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
- Rests on 3 assumptions not shown here.
- Also stated in: § Introduction · hedged
A result the paper states — it cites no source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“More importantly, we find that social welfare is not always higher under the bilateral review scheme compared to either the unilateral review scheme or no reviews.”
- Also stated in: § Introduction · plain
“More importantly, we find that social welfare is not always higher under the bilateral review scheme, compared to the unilateral scheme or no reviews.”
plain- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
- Rests on an assumption not shown here.
- Also stated in: § Introduction · plain
A result the paper states — it cites no source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“In the high-demand scenario, neither provider type has an incentive to compete on prices since their capacity will be fully satisfied. Therefore, they set a price equal to the expected quality.”
plain- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
- Rests on 2 assumptions not shown here.
A result the paper states — it cites no source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“Therefore, the low-quality provider would mimic the high-quality provider and set the same price as the high-quality provider, i.e., E [ c H ] 1 -α .”
- Also stated in: § No Review · plain
“In the low-demand scenario, providers compete on prices to attract consumers.”
plain- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
- Rests on 3 assumptions not shown here.
- Also stated in: § No Review · plain
A result the paper states — it cites no source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“We show that, in equilibrium, the bilateral review scheme intensifies price competition among service providers to attract low-cost consumers and consequently reduces the platform's profit.”
- Also stated in: § Introduction · plain
“We show that the bilateral review scheme intensifies the price competition among service providers as they lower their prices in equilibrium to attract the low-cost consumers.”
plainstates a cause- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
- Rests on 2 assumptions not shown here.
- Also stated in: § Introduction · plain
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Citations
Cites
The publisher hasn’t deposited this paper’s reference list.
Research works printed but not linked: 2
- Akerlof, G. A. 1978. 'The Market for 'Lemons': Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism,' in Uncertainty in Economics, Elsevier, pp. 235-251.
- Jin, C., Hosanagar, K., and Veeraraghavan, S. 2017. 'Impact of Bilateral Rating System on Online to Offline Platforms,' in 28th Workshop on Information Systems and Economics (WISE 2017), Seoul, South Korea,
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Should a Sharing Platform Adopt the Bilateral Review System?
Chen, X., Li, G., Li, S., & Zheng, Q. (2020) · MIS Quarterly · doi:10.25300/misq/2023/17596 · Cited by 12
Service Quality and Wage Differentiation in Two-Sided Ridesharing PlatformsPreprint
Zhang, H., Zhang, C., & Raghunathan, S. (2020) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.3737241 · Cited by 4
Self-citationShould a Sharing Platform Adopt the Bilateral Review System?Preprint
Chen, X., Li, G., Li, S., et al. (2020) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.3724924 · Cited by 2
(2025) · doi:10.1177/10591478251361592 · Cited by 1
“In addition, Tunc et al. (2019) studied the information asymmetry and quality of users on ridesharing platform.”
Metadata
- Authors
- Tunc, M. M., Cavusoglu, H., & Raghunathan, S.
- Affiliations
- Tilburg University (NL)
- The University of Texas at Dallas (US)
- Corresponding author
- Tunc, Murat M
- Venue
- SSRN
- Publisher
- Elsevier BV
- Published
- 2019
- ISSN
- 1556-5068 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2989697314
- Cited by
- 5
- References
- 0
- Citations by year
- 2025: 1 · 2024: 1 · 2020: 3
- Type
- posted content
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
- doi.org
- Locations
- SSRN Electronic Journal (acceptedVersion)
- RePEc: Research Papers in Economics (submittedVersion)
- Data Archiving and Networked Services (DANS) (submittedVersion)
- Journal of the Association for Information Systems (submittedVersion)
- International Conference on Information Systems
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Business, Management and Accounting › Marketing › Sharing Economy and Platforms
- Social Sciences › Business, Management and Accounting › Strategy and Management › Digital Platforms and Economics
- Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Game Theory and Voting Systems
- Keywords
- sharing economy platforms, information asymmetry, social welfare (welfare economics), price competition, market failure
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