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Blockchain technology and decentralized governance : the pitfalls of a trustless dream
Open accessAbstract
Blockchain technology was first elaborated as a part of the Bitcoin network, a decentralized payment system and virtual currency that can be traded on a peer-to-peer network, without relying on banks or other financial institutions. Deployed in 2009 by a pseudonymous entity called Satoshi Nakamoto, the idea underlying Bitcoin was that it is possible to delegate to a technological artefact the trust that we have thus far granted to existing social or political institutions. As such, the technology has been often referred to as “trustless technology” or as a “trust machine”, because it eliminates the need to rely on trusted intermediaries, as long as one can trust the underlying technology. When it comes to governance, the most significant innovation of blockchain technology is that it provides us with the ability to experiment with new organizational structures and distributed governance models, which are more transparent and less hierarchical than those we have become accustomed to. Indeed, the technology potentially allows for the creation of so-called decentralized blockchain-based organizations, enabling people to coordinate themselves in a peer-to-peer manner, according to a set of protocols and rules incorporated into self-executing smart contract code. Because it enables people to coordinate themselves in a peer-to-peer manner, early blockchain advocates claimed that blockchain technology would ultimately promote individual freedom and autonomy. Yet, in practice, there are many limitations to that dream. As the Internet has shown, a decentralized infrastructure does not necessarily lead to a decentralization of powers within that infrastructure. To the contrary, over the years, the Internet network has grown more and more centralized, with a concentration of power in the hands of a few large online operators. Despite its promises of decentralization, the blockchain space is no exception to that. Over the years, the governance of the most popular blockchain networks has become highly centralized, and only a few large corporations (such as the main blockchain exchanges and wallet providers) are responsible for making blockchain technology accessible to the wider public. If we can learn anything from the history of Internet governance, it is crucial that we start thinking today about how we can shape the governance of blockchain-based networks in ways that ultimately preserve the distribution of powers of these infrastructures.
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“Blockchain-based systems are governed by an alternative set of rules and procedures-sometimes referred to as Lex Cryptographica [89]-which are defined by the underlying blockchain protocol, and are enforced by a distributed network of miners and validators maintaining the system.”
From Blockchain as a confidence machine: The problem of trust & challenges of governance (2020) · cites this paper as [89]
In the citing paper
“However, this characterisation is problematic because it does not account for the multiple layers of trust inherent in blockchain governance [106], and the complex power dynamics that subsist underneath the technological infrastructure of many blockchain-based systems [108].”
From Blockchain as a confidence machine: The problem of trust & challenges of governance (2020) · cites this paper as [106]
In the citing paper
“As a result, the governance of most blockchain-based systems is highly centralized: on-chain governance is inherently plutocratic, dominated by a few large operators or individuals who control most of the mining resources and/or token holdings, whereas off-chain governance most often operates as a technocracy, with a few influential players dominating both the front-stage and the backstage [106].”
From Blockchain as a confidence machine: The problem of trust & challenges of governance (2020) · cites this paper as [106]
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Metadata
- Authors
- De Filippi, P.
- Venue
- SSRN Electronic Journal
- Publisher
- Elsevier BV
- Published
- 2019
- ISSN
- 1556-5068 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W3003064366
- Cited by
- 35
- References
- 0
- Citations by year
- 2026: 3 · 2025: 7 · 2024: 4 · 2023: 5 · 2022: 11 · 2021: 2 · 2020: 3
- Type
- posted content
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
- doi.org
- Locations
- SSRN Electronic Journal (publishedVersion)
- HAL (submittedVersion, other-oa)
- Topics
- Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Information Systems › Blockchain Technology Applications and Security
- Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Information Systems › Blockchain Technology in Education and Learning
- Social Sciences › Political Science and International Relations › E-Government and Public Services
- Keywords
- blockchain governance, decentralized governance, Bitcoin, smart contracts, decentralized autonomous organizations, decentralization, centralization of power, internet governance, peer-to-peer coordination
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Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.