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Metaverse governance: An empirical analysis of voting within Decentralized Autonomous Organizations

Goldberg, Mitchell, Schär, Fabian·2023·Journal of Business Research
DOI 10.1016/j.jbusres.2023.113764
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Abstract

In this paper we explore the importance of platform governance. We discuss various problems of centralized architecture in the context of the metaverse or sharing economy applications which may lead to monopoly market structures. We argue that open standards and blockchain-based governance can potentially mitigate some of these issues. We then collect governance data from the first blockchain-based virtual world and conduct an empirical analysis to study voter behavior within Decentralized Autonomous Organizations (DAOs). We provide empirical evidence that open standards and blockchain-based governance are a necessary but not a sufficient condition for a decentralized and neutral platform. Centralization and concentrated voting power may lead to dependencies, rent extraction behavior and create hold-up problems. Consequently, producers, prosumers and service providers must evaluate the governance structure of the platform before establishing a presence.

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  • This could reflect barriers, such as the complexity of implementing decentralized governance systems or a preference for hybrid approaches that balance traditional and decentralized elements.

    “This could reflect barriers, such as the complexity of implementing decentralized governance systems or a preference for hybrid approaches that balance traditional and decentralized elements (Goldberg and Schär, 2023).”

    From Exploring the decentralized science ecosystem: insights on organizational structures, technologies, and funding (2025) · cites this paper as Goldberg and Schär, 2023

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Metadata

Authors
Goldberg, M., & Schär, F.
ORCID
Goldberg, Mitchell
Venue
Journal of Business Research
Publisher
Elsevier BV
Published
2023-05
Volume
160
Pages
113764
ISSN
0148-2963
DOI
10.1016/j.jbusres.2023.113764
Cited by
155
References
2
Language
en
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