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PreprintCited by 0American Constitutional Law and PoliticsJudicial and Constitutional StudiesLegal and Constitutional Studies

Trump v. United States and the Half-Originalist Presidency

Open access
Chabot, Christine Kexel·2025·University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform
DOI 10.2139/ssrn.5095985
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Abstract

The Court's recent decision in Trump v. United States has been criticized for its ahistorical approach to presidential immunity. This essay offers the first account of the historical mismatch between the Trump Court's decision to immunize presidential removal power and Founding-era conceptions of the Presidency. Unlike the presumptive immunity that the Court recognized for most other official presidential acts, the immunity afforded for presidential removal power is absolute. The Court ruled that the President's "unrestricted power of removal" can never be regulated by Congress or considered as evidence of wrongdoing, even when the President threatens removal in order to effectuate blatantly unlawful ends. The Court's approach creates a far more powerful Presidency than was ever recognized by the Founding generation. The text of Article II authorized the President "to execute" the law, not to violate it, and it required Presidents to "take care" that the law be faithfully executed. The Court's decision to immunize removal also conflicts with Founding era understandings and laws in which Congress restricted the President's removal power.

Verified 2026-10-23 · 1 reference not checked yet

AI snapshot

Written from the paper’s full text.

TL;DR

This Essay argues that *Trump v. United States* recognized an absolute presidential immunity for removal power that conflicts with Founding-era understandings of the presidency. It contends that Article II’s text, early debates, and early statutes show Congress could regulate removal and that Presidents could not use removal to promote unlawful ends.

Key findings

  • The Court treated presidential removal as a “core” executive power that is “conclusive and preclusive,” meaning it can never be regulated by Congress or considered as evidence of wrongdoing, even when removal is threatened to effectuate unlawful ends.
  • The Essay argues this conflicts with Article II’s Vesting Clause, Take Care Clause, Appointments Clause, Impeachment Clause, and Due Process Clause, as well as with Founding-era understandings that the President must execute, not violate, the law.
  • Early practice is said to contradict an indefeasible removal power: the First Congress created the Sinking Fund Commission with non-removable officers, including the Vice President and Chief Justice, and allocated it over $400 billion in current terms; it also assigned removal power to courts and private parties in various statutes.
  • The Court’s approach is said to depart from precedent such as *Morrison v. Olson* and *Humphrey’s Executor*, and to have been decided without substantial historical briefing on removal.

Methods

  • Legal/historical essay using originalist analysis of constitutional text, framing and ratification history, First Congress debates, and early federal statutes.
  • Analyzes *Trump v. United States* alongside Founding-era sources and precedent including *Myers*, *Humphrey’s Executor*, *Morrison*, and *Seila Law*.
  • Main analysis compares the Court’s removal-immunity holding to Founding-era conceptions of the presidency and early laws regulating or structuring removal.

Limitations

  • Not stated in the paper: the Essay does not include a formal limitations section.
  • The text makes evident that it is a doctrinal and historical essay rather than an empirical study, and its claims depend on contested originalist interpretations of Founding-era sources.
  • The paper’s scope is focused on the removal-power aspect of *Trump v. United States*, not the full immunity doctrine.

Model-written summary. Check it against the paper before relying on it.

Integrity signals

Registry

Crossref · 10.2139/ssrn.5095985

Cites

1 of 15 references verified0 citation errors · 13 not checkable

Statistics

Nothing to recompute.

Claims the paper makes

0 of 116 cited sources checked · 0 supported · 0 flagged

  • Findingreasoning

    The majority treated removal as a power that can never be regulated by Congress or the courts.

    “and treated removal as a power that can never be regulated by Congress or the courts.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim
  • Findingcitation

    The majority ignored a balancing test that the Court had earlier applied to removal.

    “It ignored a balancing test that the Court had earlier applied to removal”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 691 (1988)

      Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

  • Findingcitation

    Early Congresses repeatedly assigned executive functions to officers whom the President could not remove.

    “When passing laws in the shadow of the newly minted Constitution, early Congresses repeatedly assigned executive functions to officers whom the President could not remove.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites [81]

      Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

  • Findingcitation

    The Trump Court suggested that improper removals could not be considered as grounds for finding presidential wrongdoing.

    “a position inconsistent with the Trump Court's suggestion that improper removals could not be considered as grounds for finding presidential wrongdoing.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites [73]

      Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

  • Findingcitation

    The First Congress initially debated whether the President had an Article II removal power in 1789.

    “The First Congress initially debated whether the President even had an Article II removal power in 1789, when it was attempting to pass legislation establishing the three initial departments of the United States government (Foreign Affairs, War, and Treasury).”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites [69]

      Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

  • Classified as probably not a substantial claim. 26
  • May combine two claims. 19
  • The quote only partly states this claim. 1

  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).

    Findingcitation

    Any President who hoped to replace a law-abiding officer with the President's partner in crime would still need to obtain senatorial confirmation of the replacement.

    “President's partner in crime would still need to obtain senatorial confirmation of the replacement.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites [74]

      Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).

    Findingcitation

    Similar concerns about presidential corruption and abuse of the removal power were noted by other members, including Rep. Boudinot.

    “Similar concerns were noted by other members, 78 including Rep. Boudinot, who generally favored a presidential removal power.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 3 sources checked
    • cites [78]

      Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

    • cites [79]

      Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

    • cites [80]

      Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).

    Findingcitation

    Corrupt Presidents might remove law-abiding officers with the hope of appointing dishonest successors.

    “Corrupt Presidents might remove law-abiding officers with the hope of appointing dishonest successors.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites [71]

      Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

  • May combine two claims.

    Findingcitation

    The Trump Court's ruling immunized presidential removals designed to effectuate unlawful private ends and held that such removals could not even be considered as evidence of wrongdoing.

    “The Trump Court's ruling went even further astray when it immunized presidential removals that were designed to effectuate unlawful private ends and held that such removals could not even be considered as evidence of wrongdoing.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites [73]

      Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S1 (asserted), S3 (load-bearing).

    Findingcitation

    A tyrannical President might use the removal power to unlawfully gain control of both the sword and the purse.

    “A final, significant concern was that a tyrannical President might use the removal power to unlawfully gain control of both the sword and the purse.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 3 sources checked
    • cites [75]

      Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

    • cites [76]

      Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

    • cites [77]

      Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

  • May combine two claims.

    Findingcitation

    Some unitary scholars claim that Article II must grant the President an unrestricted removal power, but their claims turn primarily on a subset of historical examples in which Congress declined to regulate removal.

    “Some unitary scholars do not accept the full import of this historical evidence and claim that Article II must grant the President an unrestricted removal power, but their claims turn primarily on a subset of historical examples in which Congress declined to regulate removal.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites [92]

      Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

  • May combine two claims.

    Findingcitation

    Despite lengthy amici briefs on originalist arguments for and against an indefeasible presidential removal power in SEC v. Jarkesy, the Court eschewed the benefits of this additional historical briefing and declined to decide the removal issue in that case.

    “Despite lengthy amici briefs on originalist arguments for and against an indefeasible presidential removal power in SEC v. Jarkesy, 127 the Court eschewed the benefits of this additional historical briefing and declined to decide the removal issue in that case.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 2 sources checked
    • cites [127]

      Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

    • cites [128]

      Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S4 (based).

    Premisenone given

    Unitary arguments have not addressed the Trump Court's further idea that courts cannot even consider evidence of improperly motivated removals in order to demonstrate wrongdoing.

    “Nor have they addressed the Trump Court's further idea that courts cannot even consider evidence of improperly motivated removals in order to demonstrate wrongdoing.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim

  • Classified as probably not a substantial claim.

    Interpretationreasoning

    The Court's decision raises questions about whether the President may remove or threaten to remove officers in order to promote unlawful ends, such as punishment for refusing to help the President break the law.

    “It also raises questions about whether the President may remove or threaten to remove officers in order to promote unlawful ends, such as punishment for refusing to help the President break the law.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim

  • May combine two claims.

    Interpretationnone given

    The unfettered removal power recognized by the Court conflicts with longstanding precedent and the Founding Generation's understanding of the presidency.

    “The unfettered removal power recognized by the Court conflicts with not only longstanding precedent but also the Founding Generation's understanding of the presidency.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
    • Rests on an assumption: The Founding generation's understanding of the presidency is the correct or authoritative benchmark for assessing the constitutionality of the Trump Court's removal immunity ruling.

  • May combine two claims.

    Interpretationreasoning

    The Court suggested a sea change in governing law on removal without substantial briefing on the historical evidence that would typically inform a judicial decision to set aside longstanding precedent in this area.

    “As a result, the Court suggested not only a sea change in governing law on removal, but it did so without substantial briefing on the historical evidence that would typically inform a judicial decision to set aside longstanding precedent in this area.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim

  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing). May combine two claims.

    Premisecitation

    Unitary scholars have argued that original understandings of Article II extend the President's removal power to all subordinate officers and empower the President to remove these officials based on disagreement over lawful policy choices.

    “Unitary scholars have argued that original understandings of Article II extend the President's removal power to all subordinate officers and empower the President to remove these officials based on disagreement over”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites Steven G. Calabresi & Saikrishna B. Prakash, The President's Power to Execute the Laws, 104 YALE L.J. 541, 597 (1994)

      Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

  • May combine two claims.

    Premisenone given

    Removal is an implicit Article II power, whereas the pardon and veto powers are granted by the express text of the Constitution.

    “Removal is an implicit Article II power, whereas the pardon and veto powers are granted by the express text of the Constitution.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 2 sources checked
    • cites U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1

      Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

    • cites id. art. I, § 7, cl. 2

      Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

  • May combine two claims.

    Interpretationnone given

    The Court's historical assertions rest on half-truths and a distorted view of how the Founding generation conceptualized the presidency.

    “This Essay explains that the Court's historical assertions rest on halftruths and a distorted view of how the Founding generation conceptualized the presidency.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
    • Rests on an assumption: The Founding generation's understanding of the presidency is the correct or authoritative benchmark for assessing the constitutionality of the Trump Court's removal immunity ruling.

  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S4 (based). May combine two claims.

    Interpretationreasoning

    By suggesting that it has excepted the whole of the President's removal power from the reach of criminal laws, the Court has raised questions about whether Article II empowers the President to remove officers using unlawful means, such as murder.

    “By suggesting that it has excepted the whole of the President's removal power from the reach of criminal laws, the Court has raised questions about whether Article II empowers the President to remove officers using unlawful means, such”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim

  • Classified as probably not a substantial claim. May combine two claims.

    Premisecitation
    § Trump v. United States and the Half-Originalist Presidency and the Half-Originalist Presidency

    Mortenson's historical research shows that the signal demand characteristic of executive power was that it was substantively an empty vessel, and the Vesting Clause only authorized the President to carry out legal instructions created pursuant to some other authority.

    “the”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites Julian Davis Mortenson, The Executive Power Clause, 168 U. PA. L. REV. 1269, 1278 (2020)

      Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

  • May combine two claims. The quote only partly states this claim.

    Interpretationreasoning

    Arguments that overruling Humphrey's Executor is a foregone conclusion fail to account for important aspects of decisional independence in certain agencies or the consequences of extending unitary executive theory to the type of criminal wrongdoing alleged in Trump v. United States.

    “these arguments fail to account for important aspects of decisional independence in certain agencies”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites Seila Law, 140 S. Ct. at 2218 (2020)

      Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

  • Classified as probably not a substantial claim.

    Premisecitation

    According to Kent, Leib, and Shugerman, the constitutional language shows how important it was to constitutional designers that the President stay within his authorizations and not act ultra vires.

    “According to their research, this constitutional language shows”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites Kent et al., supra note 24, at 2178

      Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

  • May combine two claims.

    Premisecitation

    Article I's Impeachment Judgment Clause further contemplates that impeachment will effectuate removal from office and leave the ousted officer open to criminal prosecution.

    “Article I's Impeachment Judgment Clause further contemplates that impeachment will effectuate removal from office and leave the ousted officer open to criminal prosecution.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 7

      Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

  • Classified as probably not a substantial claim.

    Premisecitation

    The Take Care Clause in Article II, section 3 requires the President to take care that the Laws be faithfully executed.

    “The Take Care Clause in Article II, section 3 further requires the President to”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3

      Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

  • May combine two claims.

    Interpretationcitation

    While delegates to the 1787 Philadelphia Convention urged a strong national President with energy and vigor, they did not lose sight of the basic limits on presidential power reflected in state constitutions.

    “While delegates to the 1787 Philadelphia Convention urged a strong national President with energy and vigor, they did not lose sight of the basic limits on presidential power reflected in state constitutions.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim

  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable).

    Interpretationreasoning

    Exercises of the presidential removal power to promote unlawful, private ends are especially difficult to square with Article II's language vesting the executive power in a President of the United States.

    “Exercises of the presidential removal power to promote unlawful, private ends are especially difficult to square with Article II's language vesting”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1

      Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

  • Classified as probably not a substantial claim.

    Premisecitation

    A presidential removal power appears nowhere in the express language of the Constitution.

    “A presidential removal power appears nowhere in the express language of the Constitution.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 109 (1926)

      Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).

    Premisecitation

    As explained by Professor Josh Chafetz, the army clause was designed to guard against a tyrannical president who might otherwise assemble a standing army that could be used to oppress the people.

    “As explained by Professor Josh Chafetz, this clause was designed to guard against a”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites JOSH CHAFETZ, CONGRESS'S CONSTITUTION: LEGISLATIVE AUTHORITY AND SEPARATION OF POWERS 57 (2017)

      Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

  • Classified as probably not a substantial claim.

    Premisecitation

    The only exceptions allowed by the Constitution are recess appointments or cases where Congress by law vests the appointment of inferior officers in the President alone, in the Courts of Law, or in the Heads of Departments.

    “The only exceptions allowed by the Constitution are recess appointments or in cases where Congress”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2-3

      Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).

    Premisecitation

    James Wilson urged a single magistrate in order to give most energy dispatch and responsibility to the office.

    “James Wilson urged”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites 1 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 65 (Max Farrand ed., 1911)

      Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

  • Classified as probably not a substantial claim.

    Interpretationreasoning

    Unlawful action is ultra vires and outside the scope of the public law execution power conferred by the Vesting Clause.

    “Unlawful action is ultra vires and outside the scope of the public law execution power conferred by the Vesting Clause.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim

  • Classified as probably not a substantial claim. May combine two claims.

    Premisecitation

    Section 4 is the only part of the Constitution that grants an express removal power, and it grants this power to Congress, not the President.

    “Section 4 is the only part of the Constitution that grants an express removal power, and it grants this power to Congress, not the President.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites U.S. CONST. art. II, § 4

      Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

  • Classified as probably not a substantial claim.

    Premisecitation

    Kent, Leib, and Shugerman note that the Take Care and oath requirements may restrict the President's power to dismiss officials for primarily self-protective purposes against the public interest.

    “They also note that these requirements”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites Id. at 2189-90

      Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable).

    Interpretationreasoning

    The point of any implicit appointments power would be to facilitate the President's execution, not evasion, of the law.

    “But again, the point of any implicit appointments power would be to facilitate the President's execution, not evasion, of the law.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim

  • May combine two claims.

    Premisecitation

    Removing officers by putting them to death or by cutting short their service in term-of-years offices has historically required due process beyond executive fiat.

    “Removing officers by putting them to death”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites Jane Manners & Lev Menand, The Three Permissions: Presidential Removal and the Statutory Limits of Agency Independence, 121 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 20 n.117 (2021)

      Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

  • May combine two claims.

    Premisecitation

    The states subjected executive governors to mere law execution, limited terms in office, and accountability under criminal laws.

    “The states subjected executive governors to mere law execution, limited terms in office, and accountability under criminal laws.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites Prakash, supra note 38, at 68-69

      Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).

    Premisecitation

    After Edmund Randolph objected that a single executive would create the foetus of monarchy, Wilson reiterated that the executive was not governed by the British Model.

    “After Edmund Randolph objected that a single executive would create”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 2 sources checked
    • cites Id. at 65

      Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

    • cites Id. at 66

      Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

  • May combine two claims.

    Premisecitation

    Wilson acknowledged that the President's powers would not be unlimited and noted that the only powers he conceived as strictly Executive were those of executing the laws and appointing Officers.

    “At the same time, Wilson acknowledged that the President's powers would not be unlimited and noted that the”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites Id. at 66

      Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).

    Interpretationreasoning

    Anti-removal powers take on additional dimensions when one considers the President's use of removal to facilitate unlawful conduct.

    “These anti-removal powers take on additional dimensions when one considers the President's use of removal to facilitate unlawful conduct.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim

  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable).

    Interpretationreasoning

    The Court seems bent on avoiding, rather than confronting, this inconvenient historical evidence.

    “The Court seems bent on avoiding, rather than confronting, this inconvenient historical evidence.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim

  • May combine two claims.

    Interpretationreasoning

    Such vacancies would remain subject to the Appointments Clause default and require successors to obtain senatorial confirmation.

    “Such vacancies would remain subject to the Appointments Clause default and require successors to obtain senatorial confirmation.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 2 sources checked
    • cites [107]

      Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

    • cites [108]

      Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable).

    Interpretationcitation

    The Court has forgotten what happened at the Founding.

    “The Court has forgotten what happened at the Founding.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites [120]

      Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable), S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based).

    Interpretationnone given

    Removal might be an effective way for a President to halt unlawful conduct, such as by firing an embezzling officer, without the need to await impeachment proceedings.

    “Removal might be an effective way for a President to halt unlawful conduct (say by firing an embezzling officer), without the need to await impeachment proceedings.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim

  • May combine two claims.

    Interpretationreasoning

    The removal power recognized by the Trump Court seems to exceed the President's fundamental power to execute the law as well as the President's fundamental duty of faithful execution.

    “The removal power recognized by the Trump Court seems to exceed the President's fundamental power to execute the law as well as the President's fundamental duty of faithful execution.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim

  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable), S4 (based).

    Interpretationreasoning

    The Court's decision demonstrated no awareness of one of the Founding generation's most important lessons: that the President was never meant to be a king.

    “The Court's decision demonstrated no awareness of one of the Founding generation's most important lessons: that the President was never meant to be a king.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
41 of 41

  • The paper relies on this without support.

    The Founding generation's understanding of the presidency is the correct or authoritative benchmark for assessing the constitutionality of the Trump Court's removal immunity ruling.

    “This Essay offers the first account of the historical mismatch between the Trump Court's ruling on removal and Founding era conceptions of the presidency.”
1 of 1

Self-check

Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.

Each contradiction between two passages listed here was confirmed by an independent check.

  • Conflicting dates for the same Spirits Act

    Minor

    The paper cites the March 3, chapter 15 Spirits Act as enacted in 1971 here, but elsewhere cites the same act as enacted in 1791.

1 of 1

Cites

  • Presidential Immunity and Democratic Disorder

    Sunstein, C. R., & Submitter, H. P. L. R. (2024) · doi:10.2139/ssrn.4896559

  • Untitled work

    Id (n.d.)

    Unresolved

  • Untitled work

    (n.d.) · But see id. at 2360 (Sotomayor J., dissenting) ("the majority . . . endorses an expansive vision of Presidential immunity that was never recognized by the Founders

    Unresolved

  • Untitled work

    Baude, W. (2024) · TIMES

    Unresolved

  • Untitled work

    Ct, S. (1926) · at 2328 (internal citations omitted) (quoting Myers v

    Unresolved

  • Untitled work

    Id (2341)

    Unresolved

  • Untitled work

    (n.d.) · For other work discussing the Court's ruling on removal, see Sunstein, supra note 2, at 7 ("under existing statutory law, the President has unrestricted power to remove the Attorney General

    Unresolved

  • (noting that the Court's removal decision in Trump is inconsistent with its mention of exceptions allowing regulation of removal in Seila Law

    Roisman, S. (2023) · You're Fired": Criminal Use of the Presidential Removal Power

    Unresolved

  • Untitled work

    (2020) · See Seila Law LLC v. Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau

    Unresolved

  • Untitled work

    (2010) · Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Acct. Oversight Bd., 561 U.S

    Unresolved

  • Untitled work

    Generally, J. M. S. (2024) · MEMORY AND AUTHORITY: THE USES OF HISTORY IN CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION

    Unresolved

  • Untitled work

    Law, S. (n.d.) · at 2226 (Kagan, J., dissenting in part and concurring in part) (the majority's recognition of removal power

    Unresolved

  • Untitled work

    (n.d.) · See Mortenson, supra note 38; see also Mortensen

    Unresolved

  • Untitled work

    Shugerman, S. (n.d.) · at 860 (Madison opted for "strategic ambiguity in the Foreign Affairs bill because he and the presidentialists were outnumbered by their opponents in the House and Senate" and

    Unresolved

  • Untitled work

    Bowie, N. (2020) · ) (before Myers, "the Court had never struck down a statute on the ground that it unconstitutionally regulated the President or executive branch

    Unresolved

Flagged first, then by citations

14 of the 15 references couldn’t be matched to a known paper.

Authors
Chabot, C. K.
Affiliations
Marquette University (US)
Corresponding author
Chabot, Christine Kexel
Venue
University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform
Publisher
Elsevier BV
Published
2025
Issue
58.3
Pages
653-653
ISSN
0363-602X (ISSN-L)
DOI
10.2139/ssrn.5095985
OpenAlex
W4414310420
Semantic Scholar
6d79fe6b1e2d87ba3331e3450ba86ac8ced116c4
Cited by
0
References
15
FWCI
0.00
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
Locations
  • University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform (publishedVersion)
  • SSRN Electronic Journal (acceptedVersion)
  • bepress Legal Repository (submittedVersion)
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Political Science and International Relations › American Constitutional Law and Politics
  • Social Sciences › Law › Judicial and Constitutional Studies
  • Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Legal and Constitutional Studies
Keywords
Trump v. United States, presidential removal power, presidential immunity, originalism, Article II, separation of powers, executive power, Supreme Court

About these checks

Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.

Claims read by deepseek-v4.1-flash under definition version 3 (extract-v3) on 2026-10-23.

Classified by jev-1.13-20260917 (gold-guideline-v0.2) on 2026-10-23.

Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.

Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.

What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›

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