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PreprintCited by 7

The DOI matches its Crossref record; 1 of the 1 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.

Efficiency Consequences of Rate Regulation in Insurance Markets

Tennyson, Sharon L.·2007
DOI 10.2139/ssrn.985578
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Abstract

Despite the presence of many and diverse sellers of insurance in most markets, insurance prices in some markets remain subject to regulation by state governments. Insurance rate regulation has a long and storied history in this country and the reasons for its continued existence are subject to debate and interpretation. This paper critically examines the arguments for rate regulation and discusses the consequences of this regulation for the insurance marketplace. It first provides a brief overview of the history, scope and objectives of insurance rate regulation, examines the most prevalent justifications for rate regulation and argues that they are incorrect or incomplete. It then turns to the consequences of rate regulation for insurance market outcomes making use of both economic theory and empirical evidence from academic studies of regulated insurance markets. The paper concludes that insurance rate regulation entails high costs for society and for insurance consumers, and that alternative policies for meeting regulatory objectives should be considered.

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Crossref · 10.2139/ssrn.985578

Cites

1 of 1 references verified0 citation errors · 0 not checkable

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Citations

Cites

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Research works printed but not linked: 46

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Cited by

  • The Discriminating (Pricing) Actuary

    Frees, E. W. (., & Huang, F. (2023) · North American Actuarial Journal · doi:10.1080/10920277.2021.1951296 · Cited by 56

    “Tennyson (2007) described two types of rate regulation regimes: rate suppression: reducing average rates for all consumers, and rate compression: reducing rates for some consumers (usually high-risk) relative to others (usually low-risk).”
    BackgroundInfluential

See all 7

Metadata

Authors
Tennyson, S. L.
ORCID
Tennyson, Sharon L.
Publisher
Elsevier BV
Published
2007
DOI
10.2139/ssrn.985578
Cited by
7
References
1
Type
Preprint

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CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Efficiency Consequences of Rate Regulation in Insurance Markets. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.2139/ssrn.985578
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Tennyson, S. L. (2007). Efficiency Consequences of Rate Regulation in Insurance Markets. https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.985578

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