Student or educator? Sign up with your school email and get 6 months of Pro free.
Cited by 333

The DOI matches its Crossref record; 10 of the 10 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.

A common language for computer security incidents

Open access
John D. Howard, Thomas A Longstaff · 1998

Abstract

Much of the computer security information regularly gathered and disseminated by individuals and organizations cannot currently be combined or compared because a common language has yet to emerge in the field of computer security. A common language consists of terms and taxonomies (principles of classification) which enable the gathering, exchange and comparison of information. This paper presents the results of a project to develop such a common language for computer security incidents. This project results from cooperation between the Security and Networking Research Group at the Sandia National Laboratories, Livermore, CA, and the CERT{reg_sign} Coordination Center at Carnegie Mellon University, Pittsburgh, PA. This Common Language Project was not an effort to develop a comprehensive dictionary of terms used in the field of computer security. Instead, the authors developed a minimum set of high-level terms, along with a structure indicating their relationship (a taxonomy), which can be used to classify and understand computer security incident information. They hope these high-level terms and their structure will gain wide acceptance, be useful, and most importantly, enable the exchange and comparison of computer security incident information. They anticipate, however, that individuals and organizations will continue to use their own terms, which may be more specific both in meaning and use. They designed the common language to enable these lower-level terms to be classified within the common language structure.

Overview

The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.

Run the check — free, no account needed. It reads the open-access text and checks the sources it cites.

A few free checks a day · papers already verified open instantly · results are public

Integrity signals

Registry

Crossref · 10.2172/751004

Cites

10 of 10 references verified0 citation errors · 0 not checkable

Statistics

Verification

Claims the paper makes

The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.

Run the check — free, no account needed. It reads the open-access text and checks the sources it cites.

A few free checks a day · papers already verified open instantly · results are public

Self-check

Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.

The self-check needs the paper’s full text.

Citations

Cites

Cited by

See all 333

Metadata

Authors
Howard, J. D., & Longstaff, T. A.
Published
1998-10-01
OpenAlex
W1499966149
Cited by
333
References
10
Type
report
Language
en
Open access
green

About these checks

Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.

Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.

Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.

What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›

Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review

Data sources

Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.

Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).

Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.