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Cited by 186

The DOI matches its Crossref record; 1 of the 1 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.

Resources for Sale: Corruption, Democracy and the Natural Resource Curse

Open access
Bulte, Erwin, Damania, Richard·2008·The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy

Abstract

A puzzling piece of empirical evidence suggests that resource-abundant countries tend to grow slower than their resource-poor counterparts. We attempt to explain this phenomenon by developing a lobbying game in which rent seeking firms interact with corrupt governments. The presence or absence of political competition, as well as the potential costs of political transitions, turn out to be key elements in generating the 'resource curse.' These variables define the degree of freedom that incumbent governments have in pursuing development policies that maximize surplus in the lobbying game, but put the economy off its optimal path.

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Metadata

Authors
Bulte, E., & Damania, R.
Venue
The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy
Published
2008-02-13
Volume
8
Issue
1
ISSN
1935-1682 (ISSN-L)
OpenAlex
W2156844464
Cited by
186
References
1
FWCI
24.07
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
green

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CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Resources for Sale: Corruption, Democracy and the Natural Resource Curse. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.2202/1935-1682.1890
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Bulte, E., & Damania, R. (2008). Resources for Sale: Corruption, Democracy and the Natural Resource Curse. The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy. https://doi.org/10.2202/1935-1682.1890

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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).

Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.