The DOI matches its Crossref record.
A Political Theory of American Corporate Finance
Open accessAbstract
Why is the public corporation-with its fragmented shareholders buying and selling on the stock exchange-the dominant form of enterprise in the United States? Since Berle and Means, the conventional corporate law story begins with technology dictating large enterprises with capital needs so great that even a few wealthy individuals cannot provide enough. These enterprises consequently must draw capital from many dispersed shareholders. Shareholders diversify their own holdings, further fragmenting ownership. This combination of a huge enterprise, concentrated management, and dispersed, diversified stockholders shifts corporate control from shareholders to managers. Managers can pursue their own agenda, at times to the detriment of the enterprise.In the classic story, the large public firm survived because it best balanced the problems of managerial control, risk sharing, and capital needs. In a Darwinian evolution, the large public firm mitigated the managerial agency problems with a board of directors of outsiders, with a managerial headquarters of strategic planners overseeing the operating divisions, and with managerial incentive compensation. Hostile takeovers, proxy contests, and the threat of each further disciplined managers. Fragmented ownership survived because public firms adapted. They solved enough of the governance problems created by the large unwieldy structures needed to meet the huge capital needs of modern technology. In the conventional story, the large public firm evolved as the efficient response to the economics of organization.
Overview
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
The self-check needs the paper’s full text.
Citations
Cited by
The Modern Industrial Revolution, Exit, and the Failure of Internal Control Systems
JENSEN, M. C. (1993) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/j.1540-6261.1993.tb04022.x · Cited by 8,528
Campbell, J. L. (2007) · Academy of Management Review · doi:10.5465/amr.2007.25275684 · Cited by 4,906
The Modern Industrial Revolution, Exit, and the Failure of Internal Control Systems
JENSEN, M. C. (1993) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.2307/2329018 · Cited by 1,666
Modern Industrial Revolution, Exit, and the Failure of Internal Control Systems
Jensen, M. C. (1999) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.93988 · Cited by 1,659
Chen, C. J. P., & Jaggi, B. (2000) · Journal of Accounting and Public Policy · doi:10.1016/s0278-4254(00)00015-6 · Cited by 979
Corporate Governance and Control
Becht, M., Bolton, P., & Röell, A. (2003) · Handbook of the Economics of Finance · doi:10.1016/s1574-0102(03)01005-7 · Cited by 795
Managerial ownership and the performance of firms: Evidence from the UK
Short, H., & Keasey, K. (1999) · Journal of Corporate Finance · doi:10.1016/s0929-1199(98)00016-9 · Cited by 743
Social Movements and Organization Theory
(2005) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511791000 · Cited by 735
Family control, board independence and earnings management: Evidence based on Hong Kong firms
Jaggi, B., Leung, S., & Gul, F. (2009) · Journal of Accounting and Public Policy · doi:10.1016/j.jaccpubpol.2009.06.002 · Cited by 597
THE INFLUENCE OF ACTIVISM BY INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS ON R&D.
David, P., Hitt, M. A., & Gimeno, J. (2001) · Academy of Management Journal · doi:10.2307/3069342 · Cited by 518
McAdam, D., & Scott, W. R. (2005) · Social Movements and Organization Theory · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511791000.003 · Cited by 516
Martínez-Ferrero, J., & García-Sánchez, I.-M. (2017) · International Business Review · doi:10.1016/j.ibusrev.2016.05.009 · Cited by 461
Golden-Biddle, K., & Rao, H. (1997) · Organization Science · doi:10.1287/orsc.8.6.593 · Cited by 450
Is integrated reporting determined by a country's legal system? An exploratory study
Frías-Aceituno, J. V., Rodríguez-Ariza, L., & García-Sánchez, I. M. (2013) · Journal of Cleaner Production · doi:10.1016/j.jclepro.2012.12.006 · Cited by 388
A welfare comparison of intermediaries and financial markets in Germany and the US
Allen, F., & Gale, D. (1995) · European Economic Review · doi:10.1016/0014-2921(94)00095-h · Cited by 351
WHERE DO WE STAND? COMMON MECHANISMS IN ORGANIZATIONS AND SOCIAL MOVEMENTS RESEARCH
Campbell, J. L. (2005) · Social Movements and Organization Theory · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511791000.004 · Cited by 330
Hail Britannia?: Institutional Investor Behavior under Limited Regulation
Black, B. S., & Coffee, J. C. (1994) · Michigan Law Review · doi:10.2307/1289659 · Cited by 308
Corporate Social Responsibility and Earnings Management: Evidence from Asian Economies
Scholtens, B., & Kang, F. (2013) · Corporate Social Responsibility and Environmental Management · doi:10.1002/csr.1286 · Cited by 301
Impact of the Institutional Macro Context on the Voluntary Disclosure of CSR Information
Garcia-Sanchez, I.-M., Cuadrado-Ballesteros, B., & Frias-Aceituno, J.-V. (2016) · Long Range Planning · doi:10.1016/j.lrp.2015.02.004 · Cited by 284
Political and legal restraints on ownership and control of public companies
Roe, M. J. (1990) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/0304-405x(90)90019-v · Cited by 269
Self-citationPERSISTENCE AND CHANGE AMONG NATIONALLY FEDERATED SOCIAL MOVEMENTS
McCarthy, J. D. (2005) · Social Movements and Organization Theory · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511791000.011 · Cited by 37
Metadata
- Authors
- Roe, M. J.
- Venue
- Columbia Law Review
- Publisher
- JSTOR
- Published
- 1991-01
- Volume
- 91
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 10
- ISSN
- 0010-1958 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W1568422590
- Cited by
- 233
- References
- 0
- FWCI
- 29.08
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.