The DOI matches its Crossref record; 44 of the 44 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Common Property Externalities: Isolation, Assurance, and Resource Depletion in a Traditional Grazing Context
Abstract
Institutional alternatives to common property externalities are wider than argued by private exclusive property rights advocates. The “tragedy of the commons” is not a prisoners' dilemma, characterized by the strict dominance of individual strategies. The nonseparable common property externality is an “assurance problem.” The assurance problem provides striking perspectives in analytical and policy terms. It redefines the problem of the commons as one of decision making under uncertainty. Institutional rules innovated by the group to reduce uncertainty and coordinate expectations can solve the problem of overexploitation. Rules come in many forms, and private property is only one.
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Cites
Axelrod, R., & Hamilton, W. D. (1981) · Science · doi:10.1126/science.7466396 · Cited by 20,065
Coase, R. H. (1960) · The Journal of Law and Economics · doi:10.1086/466560 · Cited by 18,255
Theory of games and economic behavior
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The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups.
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Toward a Theory of Property Rights
Demsetz, H. (1974) · Classic Papers in Natural Resource Economics · doi:10.1057/9780230523210_9 · Cited by 3,816
(2015) · Adversarial Risk Analysis · doi:10.1201/b18653-3 · Cited by 3,632
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Cited by
Property-Rights Regimes and Natural Resources: A Conceptual Analysis
Schlager, E., & Ostrom, E. (1992) · Land Economics · doi:10.2307/3146375 · Cited by 2,663
A socio‐economic theory of regulatory compliance
Sutinen, J. G., & Kuperan, K. (1999) · International Journal of Social Economics · doi:10.1108/03068299910229569 · Cited by 522
Toward a theory of induced institutional innovation
Ruttan, V. W., & Hayami, Y. (1984) · The Journal of Development Studies · doi:10.1080/00220388408421914 · Cited by 449
Common property and collective action in economic development
Runge, C. F. (1986) · World Development · doi:10.1016/0305-750x(86)90128-2 · Cited by 422
Self-citationBlue Water Crime: Deterrence, Legitimacy, and Compliance in Fisheries
Kuperan, K., & Sutinen, J. G. (1998) · Law & Society Review · doi:10.2307/827765 · Cited by 367
Metadata
- Authors
- Runge, C. F.
- Venue
- American Journal of Agricultural Economics
- Publisher
- Wiley
- Published
- 1981-11
- Volume
- 63
- Issue
- 4
- Pages
- 595-606
- ISSN
- 0002-9092 (ISSN-L)
- 1467-8276
- OpenAlex
- W2146887046
- Cited by
- 324
- References
- 44
- FWCI
- 26.94
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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