Cited by 0Legal principles and applicationsFamily and Matrimonial LawProperty Rights and Legal Doctrine

Joint Tenancy: Right to Transfer by One Party: Right of Survivorship

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Pickering, John H.·1940·Michigan Law Review

Abstract

In two recent cases the Supreme Court of Michigan has had occasion to pass upon the doctrine of survivorship in joint tenancies. In one case the deed ran to father and son as joint tenants and contained a covenant that neither would sell without the written consent of the other. The father conveyed his interest without the son's consent and died. The court held that the deed created a joint tenancy, that since the restrictive covenant was void as a restraint on alienation and repugnant to the grant, the joint tenancy was severed by the father's conveyance, and therefore the right of survivorship was gone and the son and the grantee of the father held as tenants in common. Another decision handed down the same day construed a deed reading to A and B "as joint tenants and not tenants in common, and to the survivor thereof, parties of the second part" to create an indestructible right of survivorship.

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Crossref · 10.2307/1283025

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Claims the paper makes

0 of 15 cited sources checked · 0 supported · 0 flagged

  • Premisecitation
    § JOINT TENANCY -RIGHT TO TRANSFER BY ONE PARTY -RIGHT JOINT TENANCY -RIGHT TO TRANSFER BY ONE PARTY -RIGHT OF SURVIVORSHIP OF SURVIVORSHIP

    Equity disfavored joint tenancy and survivorship, so courts of equity construed language providing for division as creating tenancies in common despite words of survivorship.

    “However, it is said that equity abhorred joint tenancy and its doctrine of survivorship.Consequently courts of equity construed language providing for division as creating tenancies in common despite words of survivorship.11”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
  • Premisecitation
    § JOINT TENANCY -RIGHT TO TRANSFER BY ONE PARTY -RIGHT JOINT TENANCY -RIGHT TO TRANSFER BY ONE PARTY -RIGHT OF SURVIVORSHIP OF SURVIVORSHIP

    A joint tenancy requires four unities: time, title, interest, and possession.

    “Necessary to the estate are the four unities of time, title, interest and possession.5”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 2 sources checked
    • cites 2 BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 179

      Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

    • cites 2 ibid.,I 80.

      Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

  • Premisecitation
    § JOINT TENANCY -RIGHT TO TRANSFER BY ONE PARTY -RIGHT JOINT TENANCY -RIGHT TO TRANSFER BY ONE PARTY -RIGHT OF SURVIVORSHIP OF SURVIVORSHIP

    At common law, joint tenancies were favored because they avoided multiplying feudal duties on land.

    “The common law favored the creation of joint tenancies since such an estate avoided multiplying the feudal duties resting on the land.9”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites Fisher v. Wigg, I Salk.391, 91 Eng.Rep. 339 at 340 (1700)

      Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

  • Premisecitation

    Under the first theory, a deed to A and B and the survivor, his heirs and assigns, was held to convey a life estate and contingent remainder because the explicit limitation of the fee to the survivor alone implied a life estate in A and B.

    “Under the first theory a deed to A and B and to the survivor 0£ them, his heirs and assigns, was held to convey a life estate and contingent remainder on the ground that although there was no express limitation to A and B for life, the explicit limitation of the fee to the survivor alone necessarily implied it.26”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites Ewing's Heirs v. Savary, 3 Bibb.(Ky.) 235 (1813)

      Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

  • Premisecitation

    Many American cases have followed Butler and held that a grant to A and B and to the survivor, his heirs and assigns, creates a joint estate for life with a contingent remainder, thereby creating a binding survivorship right that severance of the joint life estate cannot destroy.

    “In the light of this prejudice against survivorship, it is surprising that many American cases have followed the lead of Butler 25 and have held that a grant to A and B and to the survivor, his heirs and assigns, creates a joint estate for life with contingent remainder.By such a holding a binding right of survivorship is created which cannot be destroyed by severance of the joint life estate.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites Butler

      Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

  • Classified as probably not a substantial claim. 3
  • May combine two claims. 13
  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).

    Premisecitation
    § JOINT TENANCY -RIGHT TO TRANSFER BY ONE PARTY -RIGHT JOINT TENANCY -RIGHT TO TRANSFER BY ONE PARTY -RIGHT OF SURVIVORSHIP OF SURVIVORSHIP

    Butler argued that a grant to A and B and the survivor of them and the heirs of the survivor creates a joint estate for life of the shorter liver with a contingent remainder in fee to the survivor.

    “However, Butler emphasizes the fact that Coke was speaking only of a joint tenancy for life and himself sets forth the proposition that the granting of an estate to A and B, and the survivor of them and the heirs of the survivor, creates a joint estate for the life of the shortest liver with a contingent remainder in fee to the survivor.15”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites 2 CoKE oN LITTLE-TON, 19th ed., § 301, note by Butler (1832)

      Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

  • May combine two claims.

    Premisecitation
    § JOINT TENANCY -RIGHT TO TRANSFER BY ONE PARTY -RIGHT JOINT TENANCY -RIGHT TO TRANSFER BY ONE PARTY -RIGHT OF SURVIVORSHIP OF SURVIVORSHIP

    Destroying any of the four unities severs a joint tenancy, and severance destroys its incidents, including survivorship.

    “A joint tenancy is severed by the destruction of any of the four unities; the severance of the estate destroys the incidents thereof, including the right of survivorship.8”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 2 sources checked
    • cites 2 BLACKSTONE, CoMMENTARIES 18 5

      Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

    • cites 2 TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY, 3d ed., § 425 (1939)

      Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

  • May combine two claims.

    Premisecitation

    Some states have abolished joint tenancy by statute or judicial decision; others have modified it, mainly by eliminating survivorship.

    “The estate has been abolished by statute or judicial decision in some states; in others it has been modified in certain respects, principally by elimination of the right of survivorship.24”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
  • May combine two claims.

    Premisecitation
    § JOINT TENANCY -RIGHT TO TRANSFER BY ONE PARTY -RIGHT JOINT TENANCY -RIGHT TO TRANSFER BY ONE PARTY -RIGHT OF SURVIVORSHIP OF SURVIVORSHIP

    When one joint tenant dies, their interest does not pass by descent or devise; the surviving joint tenants take under the deed that created the estate.

    “Upon the death of one joint tenant his interest does not pass by descent or devise; his surviving joint tenants take by force of the deed creating the estate.7”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites Authorities cited, note 6.

      Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

  • May combine two claims.

    Interpretationreasoning

    Joint tenancy has not been favored in the United States because the common-law reason for favoring it, avoiding multiplied feudal duties, does not exist there.

    “Joint tenancy has not been favored in the United States.The basis for the common-law preference, avoidance of multiplying feudal duties, does not exist here.23”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim
  • May combine two claims.

    Interpretationreasoning
    § JOINT TENANCY -RIGHT TO TRANSFER BY ONE PARTY -RIGHT JOINT TENANCY -RIGHT TO TRANSFER BY ONE PARTY -RIGHT OF SURVIVORSHIP OF SURVIVORSHIP

    The net result of English cases is that a limitation of the fee to A and B and to the survivor, his heirs and assigns, creates a joint life estate with a contingent remainder in fee, while adding words that the estate is held in joint tenancy may remove that limitation and create a joint tenancy in fee.

    “The net result of the English cases would seem to be that a limitation of the fee to A' and B and to the survivor, his heirs and assigns, creates a joint life estate with contingent remainder in fee, while possibly the addition of words that the estate is to be held in joint tenancy removes the effect of such limitation and creates a joint tenancy in fee.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim
  • May combine two claims.

    Premisereasoning

    American courts have used three theories to reach that result: absent words of inheritance, only a life estate is created in A and B; because survivorship is implicit in joint tenancy, adding survivorship words shows intent to create something more than a mere joint tenancy; and in jurisdictions where joint tenancy or survivorship is abolished, the construction carries out the conveyor's intent.

    “Three distinct theories seem to be followed in arriving at this result: ( r) in the absence of words of inheritance a life estate only is created in A and B; ( 2) since survivorship is implicit in a joint tenancy, the grantor or devisor by addition of words of survivorship must mean to create something other than a mere joint tenancy; (3) in jurisdictions where either joint tenancies or the right”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim
  • May combine two claims.

    Interpretationreasoning

    Where a modified joint tenancy exists without survivorship, an express survivorship provision must mean something other than the restricted joint tenancy, so courts adopt a joint life estate with contingent remainder in fee.

    “The same reasoning applies where a modified form of joint tenancy exists, shorn of the incident of survivorship.If a grantor expressly provides for such a right, he must mean something other than the restricted joint tenancy allowed in the jurisdiction.Consequently the construction of an estate for the joint lives with contingent remainder in fee is adopted.40”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim
  • May combine two claims.

    Premisereasoning

    In jurisdictions where joint tenancy is abolished by statute, the only effect that can be given to an express survivorship provision is to construe it as creating a contingent remainder; it cannot create a joint estate in fee with survivorship.

    “In a jurisdiction where joint tenancy is abolished by statute the only effect which can be given to the express provision for survivorship is to construe it as creating a contingent remainder; it cannot operate to create a joint estate in fee carrying with it the incident of survivorship.39”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 2 sources checked
    • cites Lewis v. Baldwin, II Ohio 352 (1842)

      Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

    • cites In re Estate of Hutchison, 120 Ohio St. 542, 166 N. E. 687 (1929)

      Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

  • May combine two claims.

    Premisecitation

    In Michigan, words of inheritance are no longer necessary to convey a fee; unless the grantor expresses an intent to convey a lesser estate, the fee is conveyed.

    “It is no longer necessary to add words of inheritance to convey a fee in Michigan; unless the grantor expresses an intent to convey a lesser estate in the transfer, the fee is conveyed.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites 3 Mich.Comp.Laws (1929), § 13323

      Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

  • Classified as probably not a substantial claim. May combine two claims.

    Interpretationreasoning

    It is regrettable that the court in Ames v. Cheyne created an indestructible right of survivorship when another possible construction would have allowed survivorship to be destroyed by severance of the joint tenancy.

    “Consequently it is regrettable that the court in Ames v. Cheyne created an indestructible right of survivorship when another possible construction was open to it whereby survivorship might be destroyed by severance of the joint tenancy.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites Ames v. Cheyne, 290 Mich.215, 287 N. W. 439 (1939)

      Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

  • Classified as probably not a substantial claim. May combine two claims.

    Interpretationreasoning

    The Ames v. Cheyne decision is unfortunate because it construed the deed as creating a remainder preceded by a joint life estate rather than a joint tenancy in fee; a joint tenancy in fee was a possible construction and would have allowed survivorship subject to defeat by severance.

    “The decision in Ames v. Cheyne 51 seems unfortunate in that it construes the deed to create a remainder preceded by a joint life estate rather than a joint tenancy in fee.The latter was a possible construction and, if adopted, the right of survivorship would be allowed, subject to being defeated by termination of the joint tenancy by destruction of any one of its four unities.52”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites Ames v. Cheyne, 290 Mich.215, 287 N. W. 439 (1939)

      Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

  • May combine two claims.

    Interpretationreasoning

    The only remaining basis for the Ames v. Cheyne holding would be the grantor's intent to create something other than a joint tenancy by expressly providing for survivorship; that insertion can be rationally explained as a precautionary measure to satisfy statutory requirements for creating a joint tenancy.

    “The only remaining basis for the holding would be the intent of the grantor to create something other than joint tenancy since he expressly provided for survivorship.The answer to this is that such an insertion can be rationally explained as a precautionary measure to meet the statutory requirements requisite to the creation of a joint tenancy.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim
    • Rests on an assumption: Deeds or wills are often prepared by inexperienced persons, possibly the parties themselves, who do not visualize the possibility of a joint life estate and contingent remainders.
  • May combine two claims.

    Premisecitation

    Joint tenancies are recognized in Michigan, but a conveyance to two or more persons is presumed to create a tenancy in common.

    “Joint ~~_uancies are recognized in Michigan 45 with the qualification that a conveyance to two or more persons is presumed to be a tenancy in common.46”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites 3 Mich.Comp.Laws (1929), § 12964

      Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

14 of 14
  • The paper relies on this without support.

    Deeds or wills are often prepared by inexperienced persons, possibly the parties themselves, who do not visualize the possibility of a joint life estate and contingent remainders.

    “In the first place, the deed or will is often prepared by inexperienced persons, possibly the parties themselves, who surely do not visualize the possibilities of a joint life estate and contingent remainders; courts should proceed cautiously in”
1 of 1

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Each contradiction between two passages listed here was confirmed by an independent check.

  • Conflicting page numbers for the same case

    Minor

    The two citations to Mittel v. Karl give different starting pages in the same reporter volume, while agreeing on the parallel citation and year.

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Authors
Pickering, J. H.
Corresponding author
Pickering, John H.
Venue
Michigan Law Review
Publisher
JSTOR
Published
1940-04
Volume
38
Issue
6
Pages
875
ISSN
0026-2234 (ISSN-L)
OpenAlex
W2802644927
Cited by
0
References
0
FWCI
0.00
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
Locations
  • Michigan Law Review (publishedVersion)
  • eYLS (Yale Law School) (submittedVersion)
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Law › Legal principles and applications
  • Social Sciences › Law › Family and Matrimonial Law
  • Social Sciences › Law › Property Rights and Legal Doctrine
Keywords
joint tenancy, right of survivorship, tenants in common, restrictive covenants, Michigan Supreme Court

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