The DOI matches its Crossref record; 9 of the 9 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Excessive Deficits: Sense and Nonsense in the Treaty of Maastricht
Abstract
Maastricht's fiscal rules Willem Buiter, Giancarlo Corsetti and Nouriel Roubini The Maastricht Treaty on Economic and Monetary Union in the EC has specified limits on both government debt and fiscal deficits. Satisfying these criteria is necessary for getting into EMU; once inside, violating these limits will also incur penalties. The fiscal requirements, especially the debt criterion, are much tougher than is required to ensure public-sector solvency. Trying to attain these targets will force the EC initially into substantial deflation and recession. Failure to correct for real growth, inflation and the business cycle makes the nominal deficit a poor basis for any policy or target. Ambiguity about how fiscal targets will in fact be interpreted might provide a way out but cannot today be relied upon to do so. Supranational fiscal rules are sometimes claimed to be justified by externalities in national fiscal policies. We find this justification wanting, both in theory and empirically. A better case might be built on the imposition of external commitments to offset domestic political distortions that systematically induce excessive deficits. Even so, we conclude that the fiscal convergence criteria on balance are harmful, and should be disregarded or applied very loosely to avoid the risk of serious fiscal overkill.
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Citations
Cites
Bank Runs, Deposit Insurance, and Liquidity
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Political and Monetary Institutions and Public Financial Policies in the Industrial Countries
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Political and economic determinants of budget deficits in the industrial democracies
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Self-citationOn the Limitations of Government Borrowing: A Framework for Empirical Testing
Hamilton, J. D., & Flavin, M. A. (1985) · National Bureau of Economic Research · doi:10.3386/w1632 · Cited by 948
Common trends, the government's budget constraint, and revenue smoothing
Trehan, B., & Walsh, C. E. (1988) · Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control · doi:10.1016/0165-1889(88)90048-6 · Cited by 500
MACROECONOMIC POLICY AND ELECTIONS IN OECD DEMOCRACIES*
Alesina, A., Cohen, G. D., & Roubini, N. (1992) · Economics & Politics · doi:10.1111/j.1468-0343.1992.tb00052.x · Cited by 291
Self-citationPublic Debt Guarantees and Private Capital Flight
Eaton, J. (1987) · The World Bank Economic Review · doi:10.1093/wber/1.3.377 · Cited by 181
Debt, deficits, and inflation: An application to the public finances of India
Buiter, W. H., & Patel, U. R. (1992) · Journal of Public Economics · doi:10.1016/0047-2727(92)90047-j · Cited by 153
Self-citationBuiter, W. H. (1983) · Staff Papers · doi:10.2307/3867002 · Cited by 120
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Cited by
The European Sovereign Debt Crisis
Lane, P. R. (2012) · Journal of Economic Perspectives · doi:10.1257/jep.26.3.49 · Cited by 985
Government Partisanship, Labor Organization, and Macroeconomic Performance
Alvarez, R. M., Garrett, G., & Lange, P. (1991) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.2307/1963174 · Cited by 465
Eichengreen, B., Wyplosz, C., Branson, W. H., & Dornbusch, R. (1993) · Brookings Papers on Economic Activity · doi:10.2307/2534603 · Cited by 436
Control of the Public Debt: A Requirement for Price Stability?
Woodford, M. (1996) · National Bureau of Economic Research · doi:10.3386/w5684 · Cited by 423
Metadata
- Authors
- Buiter, W., Corsetti, G., Roubini, N., Repullo, R., & Frankel, J.
- Venue
- Economic Policy
- Publisher
- Oxford University Press (OUP)
- Published
- 1993-04
- Volume
- 8
- Issue
- 16
- Pages
- 57
- ISSN
- 0266-4658 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2040905844
- Cited by
- 583
- References
- 9
- FWCI
- 62.45
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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