The DOI matches its Crossref record; 48 of the 48 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Government Partisanship, Labor Organization, and Macroeconomic Performance
Abstract
Governments of the Left and Right have distinct partisan economic policies and objectives that they would prefer to pursue. Their propensity to do so, however, is constrained by their desire for reelection. We argue that the ability of governments to further their partisan interests and preside over reelectable macroeconomic outcomes simultaneously is dependent on the organization of the domestic economy, particularly the labor movement. We hypothesize that there are two different paths to desirable macroeconomic performance. In countries with densely and centrally organized labor movements, leftist governments can promote economic growth and reduce inflation and unemployment. Conversely, in countries with weak labor movements, rightist governments can pursue their partisan-preferred macroeconomic strategies and achieve similarly beneficial macroeconomic outcomes. Performance will be poorer in other cases. These hypotheses are supported by analysis of pooled annual time series data for 16 advanced industrial democracies between 1967 and 1984.
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Political Parties and Macroeconomic Policy
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Bargaining Structure, Corporatism and Macroeconomic Performance
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Cited by
What To Do (and Not to Do) with Time-Series Cross-Section Data
Beck, N., & Katz, J. N. (1995) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.2307/2082979 · Cited by 6,840
Social Foundations of Postindustrial Economies
Esping-Andersen, G. (1999) · doi:10.1093/0198742002.001.0001 · Cited by 6,253
An Introduction to Varieties of Capitalism
(2001) · Varieties of Capitalism · doi:10.1093/0199247757.003.0001 · Cited by 3,083
Social Protection and the Formation of Skills: A Reinterpretation of the Welfare State
Estevez‐Abe, M., Iversen, T., & Soskice, D. (2001) · Varieties of Capitalism · doi:10.1093/0199247757.003.0004 · Cited by 1,568
Hall, P. A., & Gingerich, D. W. (2009) · British Journal of Political Science · doi:10.1017/s0007123409000672 · Cited by 1,113
Metadata
- Authors
- Alvarez, R. M., Garrett, G., & Lange, P.
- Venue
- American Political Science Review
- Publisher
- Cambridge University Press (CUP)
- Published
- 1991-06
- Volume
- 85
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 539-556
- ISSN
- 0003-0554 (ISSN-L)
- 1537-5943
- OpenAlex
- W2087166361
- Cited by
- 465
- References
- 48
- FWCI
- 28.13
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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