Repetition and Rated Truth Value of Statements
The DOI matches its Crossref record; 1 of the 1 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
Two experiments investigated the effect; i.e., the finding that, when statements of uncertain truth value are repeated, the repetition tends to shift their truth-value ratings toward the true end of the scale. In Experiment 1, one group of subjects rated statements on a 7-point truth-value scale while another group rated the same statements on a 7-point scale of preexperimental familiarity. Presentation of statements in the experimental context before the rating task increased both their perceived truth value and their perceived preexperimental familiarity, but there was evidence against the hypothesis that judgments of truth value were mediated directly by judgments of preexperimental familiarity. In Experiment 2, the truth effect was found regardless of whether the repeated statements were shown in the context of other repeated statements or in the context of new statements, thus ruling out the possibility that the effect depends on a mixed-list contrast or sensitization effect. The present results greatly extend the generality of the truth effect found in earlier experiments, and they make more plausible the suggestion that increments in belief as the result of repetition may be an important factor in the accumulation of general knowledge.
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Citations
Cites
Frequency and the conference of referential validity
Hasher, L., Goldstein, D., & Toppino, T. (1977) · Journal of Verbal Learning and Verbal Behavior · doi:10.1016/s0022-5371(77)80012-1 · Cited by 920
Cited by
Prior exposure increases perceived accuracy of fake news
Pennycook, G., Cannon, T. D., & Rand, D. G. (2018) · Journal of Experimental Psychology General · doi:10.1037/xge0000465 · Cited by 1,268
“, “The capybara is the largest of the marsupials”) increases the likelihood that participants will judge it to be accurate (Arkes, Boehm, & Xu, 1991; Bacon, 1979; Begg, Anas, & Farinacci, 1992; Dechêne, Stahl, Hansen, & Wänke, 2010; Fazio, Brashier, Payne, & Marsh, 2015; Hasher, Goldstein, & Toppino, 1977; Polage, 201…”
InfluentialUnbelieving the unbelievable: Some problems in the rejection of false information.
Gilbert, D. T., Krull, D. S., & Malone, P. S. (1990) · Journal of Personality and Social Psychology · doi:10.1037//0022-3514.59.4.601 · Cited by 679
The truth about the truth: a meta-analytic review of the truth effect
Dechêne, A., Stahl, C., Hansen, J., & Wänke, M. (2010) · Personality and Social Psychology Review · doi:10.1177/1088868309352251 · Cited by 592
Knowledge does not protect against illusory truth.
Fazio, L. K., Brashier, N. M., Payne, B. K., & Marsh, E. J. (2015) · Journal of Experimental Psychology: General · doi:10.1037/xge0000098 · Cited by 598
“The effect emerges after delays of minutes (e.g., Begg & Armour, 1991; Schwartz, 1982), weeks (Bacon, 1979; Gigerenzer, 1984), and months (Brown & Nix, 1996).”
BackgroundThe Role of Television in the Construction of Consumer Reality
O'Guinn, T. C., & Shrum, L. J. (1997) · Journal of Consumer Research · doi:10.1086/209483 · Cited by 403
Low-Involvement Learning: Memory without Evaluation
Hawkins, S. A., & Hoch, S. J. (1992) · Journal of Consumer Research · doi:10.1086/209297 · Cited by 378
Preference Falsification, Policy Continuity and Collective Conservatism
Kuran, T. (1987) · The Economic Journal · doi:10.2307/2232928 · Cited by 358
Reversing the truth effect: Learning the interpretation of processing fluency in judgments of truth.
Unkelbach, C. (2007) · Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition · doi:10.1037/0278-7393.33.1.219 · Cited by 350
The generality of the relation between familiarity and judged validity
Arkes, H. R., Hackett, C., & Boehm, L. (1989) · Journal of Behavioral Decision Making · doi:10.1002/bdm.3960020203 · Cited by 229
Helpful or Harmful? How Frequent Repetition Affects Perceived Statement Credibility
Koch, T., & Zerback, T. (2013) · Journal of Communication · doi:10.1111/jcom.12063 · Cited by 164
Peter, C., & Koch, T. (2016) · Science Communication · doi:10.1177/1075547015613523 · Cited by 124
“Those without any expert knowledge could check whether they had heard this statement before (Arkes, Boehm, & Xu, 1991; Arkes, Hackett, & Boehm, 1989; Schwartz, 1982): Does this claim sound familiar?”
BackgroundFluency, familiarity, aging, and the illusion of truth
Parks, C. M., & Toth, J. P. (2006) · Aging Neuropsychology and Cognition · doi:10.1080/138255890968691 · Cited by 109
“The effect has been shown to occur over a period of minutes (Begg et al., 1992; Schwartz, 1982; Law et al., 1998; Law, 1998) as well as weeks (Hasher et al.”
BackgroundThe illusory truth effect leads to the spread of misinformation
Vellani, V., Zheng, S., Ercelik, D., & Sharot, T. (2023) · Cognition · doi:10.1016/j.cognition.2023.105421 · Cited by 83
“…& Kerr, 1985; Begg & Armour, 1991; Brown & Nix, 1996; Doland, 1999; Gigerenzer, 1984; Hawkins, Hoch, & Meyers-Levy, 2001; Law & Haw-kins, 1997; Schwartz, 1982; Fazio, Brashier, Payne, & Marsh, 2015; Swire, Ecker, & Lewandowsky, 2017; for a review Dech ˆ ene, Stahl, Hansen, & W ¨ anke, 2010)…”
Topolinski, S., & Reber, R. (2010) · Cognition · doi:10.1016/j.cognition.2009.09.009 · Cited by 61
“In general, it is known that more fluently processed statements are more likely judged to be true (e.g., Begg, Anas, & Farinacci, 1992; Hansen, Dechêne, & Wänke, 2008; Hasher, Goldstein, & Toppino, 1977; Schwartz, 1982; Unkelbach, 2007).”
Background
Metadata
- Authors
- Schwartz, M.
- Venue
- The American Journal of Psychology
- Publisher
- University of Illinois Press
- Published
- 1982
- Volume
- 95
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 393
- ISSN
- 0002-9556 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W1963587213
- Cited by
- 103
- References
- 1
- FWCI
- 0.00
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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