The DOI matches its Crossref record; 12 of the 12 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Price Discrimination in Broadway Theater
Abstract
A common thread in the theory literature on price discrimination has been the ambiguous welfare effects for consumers and the rise in profit for firms, relative to uniform pricing. In this study I resolve the ambiguity for consumers and quantify the benefit for a firm. I describe a model of price discrimination that includes both second-degree and third-degree price discrimination. Using data from a Broadway play, I estimate the structural model and conduct various experiments to investigate the implications of alternative pricing policies. The observed price discrimination may improve the firm's profit by approximately 5%, relative to uniform pricing, while the difference for aggregate consumer welfare is negligible. Also, I show that the gain from changing prices in the face of fluctuating demand is small under the observed price discrimination.
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Citations
Cites
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Cited by
Advertising, learning, and consumer choice in experience good markets: An empirical examination
Ackerberg, D. A. (2003) · International Economic Review · doi:10.1111/1468-2354.t01-2-00098 · Cited by 476
Accounting for Incomplete Pass-Through
NAKAMURA, E., & ZEROM, D. (2009) · Review of Economic Studies · doi:10.1111/j.1467-937x.2009.589.x · Cited by 428
Chapter 34 Price Discrimination and Competition
Stole, L. A. (2007) · Handbook of Industrial Organization · doi:10.1016/s1573-448x(06)03034-2 · Cited by 309
The Economics of Multidimensional Screening
Rochet, J.-C., & Stole, L. A. (2010) · Advances in Economics and Econometrics · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511610240.006 · Cited by 289
Metadata
- Authors
- Leslie, P.
- Venue
- The RAND Journal of Economics
- Publisher
- Wiley
- Published
- 2004
- Volume
- 35
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 520
- ISSN
- 0741-6261 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2000246975
- Cited by
- 276
- References
- 12
- FWCI
- 25.05
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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