The DOI matches its Crossref record; 4 of the 4 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
An Optimal Taxation Approach to Fiscal Federalism
Abstract
In a Federal system of government, each unit of government decides independently how much of each type of public good to provide, and what types of taxes, and which tax rates, to use in funding the public goods. In this paper we explore what types of problems can arise from this decentralized form of decision-making. In particular, we describe systematically the types of externalities that one unit of government can create for nonresidents, through both its public goods decisions and its taxation decisions. The paper also explores briefly what the central government might do to lessen the costs of decentralized decision-making.
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“In the case of uncoordinated tax policy, each fiscal authority ignores any externalities that it imposes on other fiscal authorities (for example, Gordon 1983).”
From Taxation and Migration: Evidence and Policy Implications (2020) · cites this paper as Gordon 1983
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Citations
Cites
The Demand and Supply of Public Goods
Wilde, J. A., & Buchanan, J. M. (1969) · Southern Economic Journal · doi:10.2307/1056053 · Cited by 610
Zoning and Property Taxation in a System of Local Governments
Hamilton, B. W. (1975) · Urban Studies · doi:10.1080/00420987520080301 · Cited by 568
22. The Peculiar Economics of Bureaucracy
Niskanen, W. A. (2019) · The Economic Approach to Public Policy · doi:10.7591/9781501741012-024 · Cited by 378
Group Segregation and Optimal Jurisdictions
McGuire, M. C. (1974) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/260173 · Cited by 190
Cited by
Oates, W. E. (1999) · Journal of Economic Literature · doi:10.1257/jel.37.3.1120 · Cited by 3,376
The Fundamental Institutions of China's Reforms and Development
Xu, C. (2011) · Journal of Economic Literature · doi:10.1257/jel.49.4.1076 · Cited by 2,623
Toward A Second-Generation Theory of Fiscal Federalism
Oates, W. E. (2005) · International Tax and Public Finance · doi:10.1007/s10797-005-1619-9 · Cited by 1,226
Budget spillovers and fiscal policy interdependence
Case, A. C., Rosen, H. S., & Hines, J. R. (1993) · Journal of Public Economics · doi:10.1016/0047-2727(93)90036-s · Cited by 1,220
Economic competition among jurisdictions: efficiency enhancing or distortion inducing?
Oates, W. E., & Schwab, R. M. (1988) · Journal of Public Economics · doi:10.1016/0047-2727(88)90036-9 · Cited by 1,017
Metadata
- Authors
- Gordon, R. H.
- Venue
- The Quarterly Journal of Economics
- Publisher
- Oxford University Press (OUP)
- Published
- 1983-11
- Volume
- 98
- Issue
- 4
- Pages
- 567
- ISSN
- 0033-5533 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2021329595
- Cited by
- 425
- References
- 4
- FWCI
- 39.28
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
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