The DOI matches its Crossref record.
Overinsurance and Public Provision of Insurance: The Roles of Moral Hazard and Adverse Selection
Abstract
I. The competitive allocation of insurance under moral hazard, 45. — II. “Competitive” equilibrium, 50. — III. Moral hazard and public provision, 52. — IV. Adverse selection and the competitive market, 54. — V. Alternative devices for dealing with adverse selection and moral hazard from overinsurance, 60.
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Citations
Cited by
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Mills, P. K., & Morris, J. H. (1986) · The Academy of Management Review · doi:10.2307/258392 · Cited by 735
Does affirmative action lead to mismatch? A new test and evidence
Arcidiacono, P., Aucejo, E. M., Fang, H., & Spenner, K. I. (2011) · Quantitative Economics · doi:10.3982/qe83 · Cited by 80
Economic Effects of Risk Classification Bans
Dionne, G., & Rothschild, C. (2014) · The Geneva Risk and Insurance Review · doi:10.1057/grir.2014.15 · Cited by 52
Metadata
- Authors
- Pauly, M. V.
- Venue
- The Quarterly Journal of Economics
- Publisher
- Oxford University Press (OUP)
- Published
- 1974-02
- Volume
- 88
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 44
- ISSN
- 0033-5533 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2027088814
- Cited by
- 707
- References
- 0
- FWCI
- 26.36
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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- CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Overinsurance and Public Provision of Insurance: The Roles of Moral Hazard and Adverse Selection. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.2307/1881793
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- Pauly, M. V. (1974). Overinsurance and Public Provision of Insurance: The Roles of Moral Hazard and Adverse Selection. The Quarterly Journal of Economics. https://doi.org/10.2307/1881793
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.
