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Coordinating Coordination Failures in Keynesian Models
Abstract
This paper focuses on the importance of strategic complementarities in agents' payoff functions as a basis for macroeconomic coordination failures. Strategic complementarities arise when the optimal strategy of an agent depends positively upon the strategies of the other agents. We first analyze an abstract game and find that multiple equilibria and a multiplier process may arise when strategic complementarities are present. Often these equilibria can be Pareto ranked. We then place additional economic content on the analysis of this game by considering strategic complementarities arising from production functions, matching technologies, and commodity demand functions in a multisector, imperfectly competitive economy.
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“Evidence for these effects during the pandemic in De Fraja et al. (2021) aligns well with our evidence of projected effects after the pandemic.”
Background
Metadata
- Authors
- Cooper, R., & John, A.
- Venue
- The Quarterly Journal of Economics
- Publisher
- Oxford University Press (OUP)
- Published
- 1988-08
- Volume
- 103
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 441
- ISSN
- 0033-5533 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2132499788
- Cited by
- 1,663
- References
- 9
- FWCI
- 64.19
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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