The DOI matches its Crossref record; 9 of the 9 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Coordinating Coordination Failures in Keynesian Models
Abstract
This paper focuses on the importance of strategic complementarities in agents' payoff functions as a basis for macroeconomic coordination failures. Strategic complementarities arise when the optimal strategy of an agent depends positively upon the strategies of the other agents. We first analyze an abstract game and find that multiple equilibria and a multiplier process may arise when strategic complementarities are present. Often these equilibria can be Pareto ranked. We then place additional economic content on the analysis of this game by considering strategic complementarities arising from production functions, matching technologies, and commodity demand functions in a multisector, imperfectly competitive economy.
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Cites
Holmstrom, B. (1982) · The Bell Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/3003457 · Cited by 4,903
Multimarket Oligopoly: Strategic Substitutes and Complements
Bulow, J. I., Geanakoplos, J. D., & Klemperer, P. D. (1985) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/261312 · Cited by 2,523
Aggregate Demand Management in Search Equilibrium
Diamond, P. A. (1982) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/261099 · Cited by 1,932
Quantity precommitment and Bertrand competition yield Cournot outcomes
Kreps, D. M., & Scheinkman, J. A. (1989) · Cournot Oligopoly · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511528231.014 · Cited by 1,611
Small Menu Costs and Large Business Cycles: A Macroeconomic Model of Monopoly
Mankiw, N. G. (1985) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/1885395 · Cited by 1,218
Two Concepts of External Economies
Scitovsky, T. (1954) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/257498 · Cited by 1,215
A Near-Rational Model of the Business Cycle, with Wage and Price Inertia
Akerlof, G. A., & Yellen, J. L. (1985) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.1093/qje/100.supplement.823 · Cited by 890
A Model of Imperfect Competition with Keynesian Features
Hart, O. (1982) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/1882629 · Cited by 428
Micro Shocks and Aggregate Risk
Jovanovic, B. (1987) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/1885069 · Cited by 175
Cited by
General purpose technologies ‘Engines of growth’?
Bresnahan, T. F., & Trajtenberg, M. (1995) · Journal of Econometrics · doi:10.1016/0304-4076(94)01598-t · Cited by 2,879
Looking into the Black Box: A Survey of the Matching Function
Petrongolo, B., & Pissarides, C. A. (2001) · Journal of Economic Literature · doi:10.1257/jel.39.2.390 · Cited by 2,384
The financial accelerator, and the flight to quality
Bernanke, B., Gertler, M., & Gilchrist, S. (1996) · The Review of Economics and Statistics · doi:10.2307/2109844 · Cited by 2,351
Sticky Information versus Sticky Prices: A Proposal to Replace the New Keynesian Phillips Curve
Mankiw, N. G., & Reis, R. (2002) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.1162/003355302320935034 · Cited by 2,292
Rationalizability, Learning, and Equilibrium in Games with Strategic Complementarities
Milgrom, P., & Roberts, J. (1990) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/2938316 · Cited by 1,804
Metadata
- Authors
- Cooper, R., & John, A.
- Venue
- The Quarterly Journal of Economics
- Publisher
- Oxford University Press (OUP)
- Published
- 1988-08
- Volume
- 103
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 441
- ISSN
- 0033-5533 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2132499788
- Cited by
- 1,663
- References
- 9
- FWCI
- 64.19
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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