The DOI matches its Crossref record; 8 of the 8 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
How to License Intangible Property
Abstract
We examine the optimal licensing strategy of a research lab selling to firms who are product market competitors. We consider an independent lab as well as a research joint venture. We show that (1) demands are interdependent and hence the standard price mechanism is not the profit-maximizing licensing strategy; (2) the seller's incentives to develop the innovation may be excessive; (3) the seller's incentives to disseminate the innovation typically are too low; (4) larger ventures are less likely to develop the innovation, and more likely to restrict its dissemination in those cases where development occurs; and (5) a downstream firm that is not a member of the research venture is worse off as a result of the innovation.
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Cites
Standardization, Compatibility, and Innovation
Farrell, J., & Saloner, G. (1985) · The RAND Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/2555589 · Cited by 2,597
An Analysis of Cooperative Research and Development
Katz, M. L. (1986) · The RAND Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/2555479 · Cited by 781
Self-citationUncertainty, Industrial Structure, and the Speed of R and D
Dasgupta, P. S., & Stiglitz, J. E. (1980) · RePEc: Research Papers in Economics · doi:10.7916/d8pc3c15 · Cited by 770
Market Structure and Innovation: A Reformulation
Lee, T., & Wilde, L. L. (1980) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/1884551 · Cited by 718
Fees Versus Royalties and the Private Value of a Patent
Kamien, M. I., & Tauman, Y. (1986) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/1885693 · Cited by 632
THE IMPERFECT MARKET FOR TECHNOLOGY LICENSES*
Caves, R. E., Crookell, H., & Killing, J. P. (1983) · Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics · doi:10.1111/j.1468-0084.1983.mp45003002.x · Cited by 299
Research Joint Ventures: An Antitrust Analysis
Grossman, G. M., & Shapiro, C. D. (1986) · The Journal of Law Economics and Organization · doi:10.1093/oxfordjournals.jleo.a036914 · Cited by 150
Self-citationNetwork Externalities, Competition, and Compatibility
Shapiro, K. (1985) · Medical Entomology and Zoology · Cited by 74
Cited by
Sequential innovation, patents, and imitation
Bessen, J., & Maskin, E. (2009) · The RAND Journal of Economics · doi:10.1111/j.1756-2171.2009.00081.x · Cited by 722
Managing Intellectual Capital: Organizational, Strategic, and Policy Dimensions
Teece, D. J. (2002) · doi:10.1093/0198295421.001.0001 · Cited by 541
Technology Transfer under Asymmetric Information
Gallini, N. T., & Wright, B. D. (1990) · The RAND Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/2555500 · Cited by 487
Licensing the market for technology
Arora, A., & Fosfuri, A. (2003) · Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization · doi:10.1016/s0167-2681(03)00002-7 · Cited by 443
The Theory of Business Strategy
Shapiro, C. (1989) · The RAND Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/2555656 · Cited by 427
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Metadata
- Authors
- Katz, M. L., & Shapiro, C.
- Venue
- The Quarterly Journal of Economics
- Publisher
- Oxford University Press (OUP)
- Published
- 1986-08
- Volume
- 101
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 567
- ISSN
- 0033-5533 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2125524474
- Cited by
- 506
- References
- 8
- FWCI
- 9.92
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
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