The DOI matches its Crossref record; 17 of the 17 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
A Theory of Competition Among Pressure Groups for Political Influence
Abstract
This paper presents a theory of competition among pressure groups for political influence. Political equilibrium depends on the efficiency of each group in producing pressure, the effect of additional pressure on their influence, the number of persons in different groups, and the deadweight cost of taxes and subsidies. An increase in deadweight costs discourages pressure by subsidized groups and encourages pressure by taxpayers. This analysis unifies the view that governments correct market failures with the view that they favor the politically powerful: both are produced by the competition for political favors.
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Citations
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Self-citationToward a More General Theory of Regulation
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Self-citation
Cited by
La Porta, R. (1999) · Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization · doi:10.1093/jleo/15.1.222 · Cited by 5,699
Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy
Acemoglu, D., & Robinson, J. A. (2005) · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511510809 · Cited by 4,810
The great reversals: the politics of financial development in the twentieth century
Rajan, R. G., & Zingales, L. (2003) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/s0304-405x(03)00125-9 · Cited by 3,327
Political Connections and Corporate Bailouts
FACCIO, M., MASULIS, R. W., & McCONNELL, J. J. (2006) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/j.1540-6261.2006.01000.x · Cited by 2,561
Botero, J. C., Djankov, S., Porta, R. L., Lopez-de-Silanes, F., & Shleifer, A. (2004) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.1162/0033553042476215 · Cited by 2,124
Metadata
- Authors
- Becker, G. S.
- Venue
- The Quarterly Journal of Economics
- Publisher
- Oxford University Press (OUP)
- Published
- 1983-08
- Volume
- 98
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 371
- ISSN
- 0033-5533 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W1982375873
- Cited by
- 4,117
- References
- 17
- FWCI
- 113.17
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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