The DOI matches its Crossref record; 7 of the 7 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Justifying the First-Order Approach to Principal-Agent Problems
Abstract
It is of interest to know when the incentive compatibility conditio n in principal-agent problems can be replaced by the condition that the agent's expected utility be stationary in effort. The Mirrlees-Rogerson conditions do not work if the principal can observe more than one observable statistic. Also, the Mirrlees-Rogerson assumption that the distribution function of output is convex in the agent's action is unsatisfactory even in the context of the basi c model; it is too restrictive. The paper presents a suite of conditio ns that are applicable to the multistatistic case and replaces the objectionable convex distribution function assumption. Copyright 1988 by The Econometric Society.
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Citations
Cites
Moral Hazard and Observability
Holmstrom, B. (1979) · The Bell Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/3003320 · Cited by 8,311
Good News and Bad News: Representation Theorems and Applications
Milgrom, P. R. (1981) · The Bell Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/3003562 · Cited by 3,123
An Analysis of the Principal-Agent Problem
Grossman, S. J., & Hart, O. D. (1992) · Huebner International Series on Risk, Insurance and Economic Security · doi:10.1007/978-94-015-7957-5_16 · Cited by 1,913
The First-Order Approach to Principal-Agent Problems
Rogerson, W. P. (1985) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/1913212 · Cited by 868
Optimal Monitoring Policies in Agencies
Dye, R. A. (1986) · The RAND Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/2555715 · Cited by 128
Jewitt, I. (1987) · The Review of Economic Studies · doi:10.2307/2297447 · Cited by 97
Self-citationVariance Analysis Procedures as Motivational Devices
Baiman, S., & Demski, J. S. (1980) · Management Science · doi:10.1287/mnsc.26.8.840 · Cited by 39
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Contracting theory and accounting
Lambert, R. A. (2001) · Journal of Accounting and Economics · doi:10.1016/s0165-4101(01)00037-4 · Cited by 1,050
Limited liability and incentive contracting with ex-ante action choices
Innes, R. D. (1990) · Journal of Economic Theory · doi:10.1016/0022-0531(90)90066-s · Cited by 923
CEO reputation and stock-based compensation
Milbourn, T. T. (2003) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/s0304-405x(03)00066-7 · Cited by 639
The Economics of Career Concerns, Part I: Comparing Information Structures
Dewatripont, M., Jewitt, I., & Tirole, J. (1999) · Review of Economic Studies · doi:10.1111/1467-937x.00084 · Cited by 580
Self-citationMonotone Comparative Statics under Uncertainty
Athey, S. (2002) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.1162/003355302753399481 · Cited by 382
Metadata
- Authors
- Jewitt, I.
- Venue
- Econometrica
- Publisher
- JSTOR
- Published
- 1988-09
- Volume
- 56
- Issue
- 5
- Pages
- 1177
- ISSN
- 0012-9682 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2074555403
- Cited by
- 511
- References
- 7
- FWCI
- 8.14
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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