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Moral Hazard and Observability
Open accessAbstract
The role of imperfect information in a principal-agent relationship subject to moral hazard is considered.A necessary and sufficient condition for imperfect information to improve on contracts based on the payoff alone is derived, and a characterization of the optimal use of such information is given.
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Citations
Cited by
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Shleifer, A., & Vishny, R. W. (1997) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/j.1540-6261.1997.tb04820.x · Cited by 16,243
Agency Theory: An Assessment and Review
Eisenhardt, K. M. (1989) · The Academy of Management Review · doi:10.5465/amr.1989.4279003 · Cited by 13,338
Financial intermediation and delegated monitoring
Diamond, D. W. (1984) · The Review of Economic Studies · doi:10.2307/2297430 · Cited by 8,476
Agency Costs, Net Worth, And Business Fluctuations
Bernanke, B., Gertler, M., Bernanke, B., & Gertler, M. (1988) · Unknown · doi:10.22004/ag.econ.292693 · Cited by 4,386
The Provision of Incentives in Firms
Prendergast, C. (1999) · Journal of Economic Literature · doi:10.1257/jel.37.1.7 · Cited by 3,338
Metadata
- Authors
- Holmstrom, B.
- Venue
- The Bell Journal of Economics
- Publisher
- JSTOR
- Published
- 1979
- Volume
- 10
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 74
- ISSN
- 0361-915X (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W1485535210
- Cited by
- 8,311
- References
- 0
- FWCI
- 27.23
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
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Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
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- CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Moral Hazard and Observability. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.2307/3003320
- The paper
- Holmstrom, B. (1979). Moral Hazard and Observability. The Bell Journal of Economics. https://doi.org/10.2307/3003320
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.
