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Noncooperative Collusion under Imperfect Price Information
Open accessAbstract
Recent work in game theory has shown that, in principle, it may be possible for firms in an industry to form a self-policing cartel to maximize their joints profits. This paper studies the applicability of that work to empirical industrial organization. A model of a noncooperatively supported cartel is presented, and the aspects of industry structure which would make such a cartel viable are discussed.
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Citations
Cited by
Rules, discretion and reputation in a model of monetary policy
Barro, R. J., & Gordon, D. B. (1983) · Journal of Monetary Economics · doi:10.1016/0304-3932(83)90051-x · Cited by 3,610
Chapter 17 Empirical studies of industries with market power
Bresnahan, T. F. (1989) · Handbook of Industrial Organization · doi:10.1016/s1573-448x(89)02005-4 · Cited by 1,271
Financial Policy and Reputation for Product Quality
Maksimovic, V., & Titman, S. (1991) · Review of Financial Studies · doi:10.1093/rfs/4.1.175 · Cited by 533
THE DYNAMICS OF SELLER REPUTATION: EVIDENCE FROM EBAY*
CABRAL, L., & HORTAÇSU, A. (2010) · The Journal of Industrial Economics · doi:10.1111/j.1467-6451.2010.00405.x · Cited by 505
Athey, S., Bagwell, K., & Sanchirico, C. (2004) · Review of Economic Studies · doi:10.1111/0034-6527.00286 · Cited by 371
Metadata
- Authors
- Green, E. J., & Porter, R. H.
- Venue
- Econometrica
- Publisher
- JSTOR
- Published
- 1984-01
- Volume
- 52
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 87
- ISSN
- 0012-9682 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2168876164
- Cited by
- 1,998
- References
- 0
- FWCI
- 85.94
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
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- CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Noncooperative Collusion under Imperfect Price Information. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.2307/1911462
- The paper
- Green, E. J., & Porter, R. H. (1984). Noncooperative Collusion under Imperfect Price Information. Econometrica. https://doi.org/10.2307/1911462
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.
