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Noncooperative Collusion under Imperfect Price Information
Open accessAbstract
Recent work in game theory has shown that, in principle, it may be possible for firms in an industry to form a self-policing cartel to maximize their joints profits. This paper studies the applicability of that work to empirical industrial organization. A model of a noncooperatively supported cartel is presented, and the aspects of industry structure which would make such a cartel viable are discussed.
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Metadata
- Authors
- Green, E. J., & Porter, R. H.
- Venue
- Econometrica
- Publisher
- JSTOR
- Published
- 1984-01
- Volume
- 52
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 87
- ISSN
- 0012-9682 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2168876164
- Cited by
- 1,998
- References
- 9
- FWCI
- 85.94
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
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