The DOI matches its Crossref record; 12 of the 12 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
A Theory of Dynamic Oligopoly, I: Overview and Quantity Competition with Large Fixed Costs
Open accessAbstract
The authors introduce a class of alternating-move, infinite-horizon models of duopoly. The timing captures the presence of short-run commitment s. They apply this framework to a natural monopoly in which costs are so large that at most one firm can make a profit. The firms install short-run capacity. In the unique symmetric Markov perfect equilibriu m, only one firm is active and practices the quantity analogue of lim it pricing. For commitments of brief duration, the market is almost c ontestable. The authors conclude with a discussion of more general mo dels where the alternating timing is derived rather than imposed. Copyright 1988 by The Econometric Society.
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Citations
Cites
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Noncooperative Collusion under Imperfect Price Information
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Entry, Capacity, Investment and Oligopolistic Pricing
Spence, A. M. (1977) · The Bell Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/3003302 · Cited by 1,147
A Model of Duopoly Suggesting a Theory of Entry Barriers
Dixit, A. (1979) · The Bell Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/3003317 · Cited by 948
A MODEL OF DUOPOLY SUGGESTING A THEORY OF ENTRY BARRIERS
Dixit, A. K., & Dixit, A. (1978) · AgEcon Search (University of Minnesota, USA) · doi:10.22004/ag.econ.269023 · Cited by 825
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Duopoly Models with Consistent Conjectures
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Exit Barriers are Entry Barriers: The Durability of Capital as a Barrier to Entry
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Self-citationExercises in Conjectural Equilibria
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Cited by
A Theory of Dynamic Oligopoly, II: Price Competition, Kinked Demand Curves, and Edgeworth Cycles
Maskin, E., & Tirole, J. (1988) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/1911701 · Cited by 729
Self-citationThe Costs of Environmental Regulation in a Concentrated Industry
(2012) · Econometrica · doi:10.3982/ecta6750 · Cited by 668
Simple estimators for the parameters of discrete dynamic games (with entry/exit examples)
Pakes, A., Ostrovsky, M., & Berry, S. (2007) · The RAND Journal of Economics · doi:10.1111/j.1756-2171.2007.tb00073.x · Cited by 482
Vertical Integration and Exclusivity in Platform and Two-Sided Markets
Lee, R. S. (2013) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.103.7.2960 · Cited by 446
Accounting for Incomplete Pass-Through
NAKAMURA, E., & ZEROM, D. (2009) · Review of Economic Studies · doi:10.1111/j.1467-937x.2009.589.x · Cited by 428
Metadata
- Authors
- Maskin, E., & Tirole, J.
- Venue
- Econometrica
- Publisher
- JSTOR
- Published
- 1988-05
- Volume
- 56
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 549
- ISSN
- 0012-9682 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2135949932
- Cited by
- 519
- References
- 12
- FWCI
- 24.07
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
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