The DOI matches its Crossref record; 21 of the 21 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Rational Expectations, Information Acquisition, and Competitive Bidding
Abstract
Most rational expectations market equilibrium models are not models of price formation, and naive mechanisms leading to such equilibria can be severely manipulable. In this paper, a bidding model is developed which has the market-like features that bidders act as price takers and that prices convey information. Higher equilibrium prices convey more favorable information about the quality of the objects being sold than do lower prices. Bidders can benefit from trading only if they have a transactions motive or if they have access to inside information. Apart from exceptional cases, prices are not fully revealing. A two stage model is developed in which bidders may acquire information at a cost before bidding and for which the equilibrium price is fully revealing, resolving a well-known paradox.
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Citations
Cites
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A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding
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Self-citationOn the impossibility of informationally efficient markets
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Self-citationGames with Incomplete Information Played by “Bayesian” Players, I–III: Part I. The Basic Model
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Self-citationRules for Ordering Uncertain Prospects
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Self-citationA Model of Rational Competitive Bidding
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Self-citation
Cited by
A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding
Milgrom, P. R., & Weber, R. J. (1982) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/1911865 · Cited by 3,753
Self-citationMultiagent systems: algorithmic, game-theoretic, and logical foundations
(2009) · Choice Reviews Online · doi:10.5860/choice.46-5662 · Cited by 1,756
Information, trade and common knowledge
Milgrom, P., & Stokey, N. (1982) · Journal of Economic Theory · doi:10.1016/0022-0531(82)90046-1 · Cited by 1,729
Self-citationPutting Auction Theory to Work
Milgrom, P. (2004) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511813825 · Cited by 1,642
Self-citationAuction Theory: A Guide to the Literature
Klemperer, P. (1999) · Journal of Economic Surveys · doi:10.1111/1467-6419.00083 · Cited by 1,394
Metadata
- Authors
- Milgrom, P. R.
- Venue
- Econometrica
- Publisher
- JSTOR
- Published
- 1981-07
- Volume
- 49
- Issue
- 4
- Pages
- 921
- ISSN
- 0012-9682 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2125899808
- Cited by
- 500
- References
- 21
- FWCI
- 5.55
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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