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Monitoring Cooperative Agreements in a Repeated Principal-Agent Relationship
Open accessAbstract
The situation in which a principal-agent relationship is repeated finitely many times (T) is formulated as a sequential game.For any Pareto-optimal cooperative arrangement in the one-period game that dominates a one-period Nash equilibrium, and any positive number epsilon, there exists for every sufficiently large T a (noncooperative) epsilon equilibrium of the T-period game that yields each player an average expected utility that is at least his expected utility in the one-period cooperative arrangement, less epsilon. 'This is a revision and extension of "Monitoring Cooperative Agreements between Principals and Agents," Tech. Report No. 3, Center on Decision and Conflict in Complex Organizations, Harvard University,
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Citations
Cited by
Managerial Incentive Problems: A Dynamic Perspective
Holmstrom, B. (1999) · Review of Economic Studies · doi:10.1111/1467-937x.00083 · Cited by 3,172
Jarillo, J. C. (1988) · Strategic Management Journal · doi:10.1002/smj.4250090104 · Cited by 2,555
An Analysis of the Principal-Agent Problem
Grossman, S. J., & Hart, O. D. (1983) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/1912246 · Cited by 2,095
An Analysis of the Principal-Agent Problem
Grossman, S. J., & Hart, O. D. (1992) · Huebner International Series on Risk, Insurance and Economic Security · doi:10.1007/978-94-015-7957-5_16 · Cited by 1,913
(1988) · Cited by 1,379
Metadata
- Authors
- Radner, R.
- Venue
- Econometrica
- Publisher
- JSTOR
- Published
- 1981-09
- Volume
- 49
- Issue
- 5
- Pages
- 1127
- ISSN
- 0012-9682 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2165408566
- Cited by
- 405
- References
- 0
- FWCI
- 18.03
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
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- Radner, R. (1981). Monitoring Cooperative Agreements in a Repeated Principal-Agent Relationship. Econometrica. https://doi.org/10.2307/1912747
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