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The Income Tax and Charitable Contributions
Abstract
Charitable contributions are an important source of basic finance for a wide variety of private nonprofit organizations that perform quasi-public functions. The tax treatment of charitable contributions substantially influences the volume and distribution of these gifts. The current study presents new estimates of the price and income elasticities of charitable giving. The parameter estimates are then used with the United States Treasury Tax File to simulate the effects of several possible alternatives to the current tax treatment of charitable giving. INDIVIDUAL CHARITABLE CONTRIBUTIONS are an important source of basic finance for a wide variety of private nonprofit organizations. Higher education, research, health care, the visual and performing arts, welfare services, and community and religious activities rely heavily on the voluntary institution. In 1970, American families contributed more than $17 billion for their support. The volume and distribution of charitable gifts is influenced by the personal income tax treatment of charitable contributions. There are today a number of widely discussed proposals for changing these rules. The appropriate tax treatment of such gifts involves a complex series of economic issues. Critical to a resolution of these issues is an understanding of the likely quantitative effects of alternative tax rules: the effects on the total volume of charitable gifts and its distribution among the different types of donees; the effects on the distribution of tax burdens
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“Empirical studies have shown that charitable contributions are highly sensitive to tax rates 1see, e.g., Feldstein and Amy Taylor 1976; Clotfelter 19852 , suggesting that a significant part of the taxable income response observed in the data could be driven by this margin.”
From Is the Taxable Income Elasticity Sufficient to Calculate Deadweight Loss? The Implications of Evasion and Avoidance (2009) · cites this paper as Feldstein and Amy Taylor 1976
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Citations
Cited by
Impure Altruism and Donations to Public Goods: A Theory of Warm-Glow Giving
Andreoni, J. (1990) · The Economic Journal · doi:10.2307/2234133 · Cited by 5,825
“Sources: i, Clotfelter and Steuerle (1981), table 4; 2, Feldstein (1975); 3, Feldstein and Taylor (1976), table I Source 2 is in 1967 dollars, all others are in current dollars.”
BackgroundBekkers, R., & Wiepking, P. (2011) · Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly · doi:10.1177/0899764010380927 · Cited by 1,503
An Introduction to the TAXSIM Model
Feenberg, D., & Coutts, E. (1993) · Journal of Policy Analysis and Management · doi:10.2307/3325474 · Cited by 971
Weisbrod, B. A., & Dominguez, N. D. (1986) · Journal of Public Economics · doi:10.1016/0047-2727(86)90078-2 · Cited by 471
Bekkers, R., & Wiepking, P. (2011) · Voluntary Sector Review · doi:10.1332/204080511x6087712 · Cited by 457
Housing decisions and the U.S. income tax
Rosen, H. S. (1979) · Journal of Public Economics · doi:10.1016/0047-2727(79)90042-2 · Cited by 402
The Market for Charitable Giving
List, J. A. (2011) · Journal of Economic Perspectives · doi:10.1257/jep.25.2.157 · Cited by 365
Chetty, R. (2009) · American Economic Journal: Economic Policy · doi:10.1257/pol.1.2.31 · Cited by 340
Civic Norms, Social Sanctions, and Voter Turnout
KNACK, S. (1992) · Rationality and Society · doi:10.1177/1043463192004002002 · Cited by 328
On the Economics of Philanthropy
Sugden, R. (1982) · The Economic Journal · doi:10.2307/2232444 · Cited by 313
Charitable giving and “excessive” fundraising
Rose-Ackerman, S. (1982) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/1880754 · Cited by 280
Metadata
- Authors
- Feldstein, M., & Taylor, A.
- Venue
- Econometrica
- Publisher
- JSTOR
- Published
- 1976-11
- Volume
- 44
- Issue
- 6
- Pages
- 1201
- ISSN
- 0012-9682 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2002754280
- Cited by
- 184
- References
- 0
- FWCI
- 15.93
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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