The DOI matches its Crossref record; 39 of the 39 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Civic Norms, Social Sanctions, and Voter Turnout
Abstract
Voter participation is viewed as a collective action problem overcome chiefly by means of “solidary” and “purposive” selective incentives in the contemporary United States rather than by material incentives. It is argued that these incentives are primarily in the form of civic or societal norms rather than special interest norms associated with partisan or group loyalties as in Uhlaner's (1986) model. The emphasis on civic norms is supported by positive correlations between turnout and other socially cooperative behaviors such as responding to the census, participating in parent-teacher associations, and giving to charities. Data on interpersonal pressures to vote are found to support the hypothesis that “enforcement” of voting norms via social sanctions significantly enhances turnout. The American turnout decline is interpreted in terms of a weakening of social ties adversely affecting the socialization and enforcement of norms responsible for generating civic participation.
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Cites
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Cited by
Does Social Capital Have an Economic Payoff? A Cross-Country Investigation
Knack, S., & Keefer, P. (1997) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.1162/003355300555475 · Cited by 7,484
Self-citationОстром, Э. (2010) · Public Administration Issues · doi:10.17323/1999-5431-2010-0-1-5-52 · Cited by 2,850
Third-party punishment and social norms
Fehr, E., & Fischbacher, U. (2004) · Evolution and Human Behavior · doi:10.1016/s1090-5138(04)00005-4 · Cited by 2,417
Crawford, S. E. S., & Ostrom, E. (1995) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.2307/2082975 · Cited by 1,362
Social Pressure and Voter Turnout: Evidence from a Large-Scale Field Experiment
GERBER, A. S., GREEN, D. P., & LARIMER, C. W. (2008) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.1017/s000305540808009x · Cited by 1,345
Metadata
- Authors
- KNACK, S.
- Venue
- Rationality and Society
- Publisher
- SAGE Publications
- Published
- 1992-04
- Volume
- 4
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 133-156
- ISSN
- 1043-4631 (ISSN-L)
- 1461-7358
- OpenAlex
- W2004009208
- Cited by
- 328
- References
- 39
- FWCI
- 16.58
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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