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Bureaucracy and Constitutionalism

Long, Norton E.·1952·American Political Science Review

Abstract

There is an old aphorism that fire is a good servant but a bad master. Something like this aphorism is frequently applied to the appropriate role of the bureaucracy in government. Because bureaucracy is often viewed as tainted with an ineradicable lust for power, it is alleged that, like fire, it needs constant control to prevent its erupting from beneficient servitude into dangerous and tyrannical mastery. The folklore of constitutional theory relegates the bureaucracy to somewhat the same low but necessary estate as Plato does the appetitive element of the soul. In the conventional dichotomy between policy and administration, administration is the Aristotelian slave, properly an instrument of action for the will of another, capable of receiving the commands of reason but incapable of reasoning. The amoral concept of administrative neutrality is the natural complement of the concept of bureaucracy as instrument; for according to this view the seat of reason and conscience resides in the legislature, whatever grudging concession may be made to the claims of the political executive, and a major, if not the major, task of constitutionalism is the maintenance of the supremacy of the legislature over the bureaucracy. The latter's sole constitutional role is one of neutral docility to the wishes of the day's legislative majority.

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Research works printed but not linked: 18

  1. Graham, 1946, Elements of Public Administration
  2. Ogg, 1948, Introduction to American Government, 304
  3. Mosca, 1939, The Ruling Class, 258
  4. MacMahon, 1939, Federal Administrators; A Biographical Approach to the Problem of Departmental Management
  5. Burns, 1949, Congress on Trial
  6. 1949, Policy and Administration
  7. 1945, Big Democracy, 164
  8. 1950, Bureaucracy in a Democracy
  9. Galloway, 1946, Congress at the Cross Roads, 150
  10. Gaus, 1940, Public Administration and the United States Department of Agriculture
  11. 1935, Civil Service Abroad
  12. 1950, Constitutional Government and Democracy
  13. Truman, 1951, The Governmental Process
  14. 10.2307/1948387 · doi:10.2307/1948387
  15. Herring, 1936, Public Administration and the Public Interest, 10.2307/1333055 · DOI · Paper page
  16. 10.2307/1951299 · doi:10.2307/1951299
  17. Locke, 1947, The Second Treatise of Civil Government and A Letter concerning Toleration, 87
  18. Young, 1943, This Is Congress

Cited by

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Metadata

Authors
Long, N. E.
Venue
American Political Science Review
Published
1952-09
Volume
46
Issue
3
Pages
808-818
ISSN
  • 0003-0554 (ISSN-L)
  • 1537-5943
OpenAlex
W2012399762
Cited by
229
References
0
FWCI
0.00
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
closed

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Long, N. E. (1952). Bureaucracy and Constitutionalism. American Political Science Review. https://doi.org/10.2307/1952286

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